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The question of why individuals value identities like race and gender is contested.
Scholars in the Reflected Appraisals tradition argue that members of minority groups experience
identity devaluation and minority stress (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Meyer 1995; Tatum 1997;
Hoff-Sommers 2000; McIntyre 2002) and value their identities less than do members of
equivalent majority groups (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995). However, several empirical tests fail to
support this argument (Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003). In this dissertation,
I employ ordinal and List Experiment surveys to determine whether members of four minority
groups value their identities less than members of the equivalent majority groups (racial, sexual,
heterosexual, religious). I hypothesize that minority status will not correlate to a significant
degree with lowered identity valuation, as oppositional identitificaton allows minorities to value
themselves despite discrimination (Stern 1995; Simein 2005). This thesis was largely confirmed.
With several exceptions during my List Experiment, minority race does not correlate with
lowered valuation of racial identity, and female sex does not correlate with lowered valuation of
gender identity. Religious minorities do not value their religious identities less than Protestants,
to a statistically significant degree. However, I did find consistent negative correlations between
LGBT status and lowered valuation of sexual orientation. List Experiment results also indicate
that whites may be less honest about their levels of in-group identification than are minorities.
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CHAPTER 1
THE IDENTITY DEBATE IN THE DISCIPLINE

The question of how the status of the in-groups to which an individual belongs (i.e.
dominant as versus minority race, sex, class) affects the values she places on those in-group
identities (Black American) is an important one. The question is inherently interesting, and levels
of identification with and valuation of group identities affect political behavior (Horowitz 1985,
2000; Dawson 2001; Chong & Rogers 2005; Block 2011). There are two main scholarly
perspectives on this issue; authors writing in the Reflected Appraisals tradition argue that
identity valuation is status dependent. Members of majority groups value their core
characteristics more than members of minority groups (Hacker 1992), because majority statuses
like whiteness are a form of valuable property (Harris 1993).1 Authors writing within paradigms
of oppositional identity, such as the Linked Fate tradition, disagree. These scholars argue that
members of minority groups often display very high levels of in-group identification – such as
adherence to the heuristic “that what is good for the race is good for the individual (Block 2011:
29),” - and certainly do not seem to devalue their minority identities (Stern 1995; Simein 2005).
Positions reflective of both the Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA) and of Linked Fate
Theory (LFT) and other oppositional identity-based theories have been advanced across
academic disciplines, in domestic (Harris 1993) and international (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-

1

Throughout this paper, the term “minority group” is used to refer to non-dominant social populations. This is
common usage in and outside the discipline; it is in this sense that women – who make up 52% of the American
population – are invariably referred to as a minority (Wolf 1991). For logical reasons, most non-dominant social
populations are also minorities in mathematical fact. With the exception of Catholic Christians, each of the nonfemale minority groups analyzed here makes up less than 15% of the U.S. citizenry (www.census.gov). The term
“minority” is used in preference to alternatives like “low status group.” Minority groups like Asian Americans and
American Jews (Wilson 1996; Chen 1999) are socially non-dominant, and take a good deal of abuse, but are actually
high status-holders in class terms.
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Morse 2003) contexts. The goal of this dissertation is to test the two opposing theories using
modern methodological techniques, and determine which more closely approaches the truth.
The TRA position is the simpler of the two arguments. TRA theorists argue that
dominant groups within a society often hold the traits of non-dominant groups in low regard,
causing members of these subordinate identity populations to develop devalued identities
(Jacques and Chason 1977; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002). The ideas of white privilege (Lucal
1996) and whiteness as property (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993) provide well-known examples of
this argument. Hacker very specifically contends that, because of individual bigotry and the
social advantages of dominant group membership, whites in the USA value their racial identity
more than minorities like Blacks - to such an extent that they would demand tens of millions of
dollars to become Black if this were possible (1992: 36). More broadly, Tatum argues that
identity devaluation occurs among most Blacks and members of other racial minority groups
because dominant-group views tend to be validated by society, while members of subordinate or
minority in-groups are labeled “defective or sub-standard (1997: 23).” These arguments extend
well beyond race: Meyer claims that lesbians and gays can internalize homophobia and
experience intense “minority stress (1995: 40), while Hoff-Sommers notes that many feminists
describe young women as “silenced” by “hate crime(s) used my men to maintain and enforce the
inferior status of women (2000: 70).” TRA advocates point out that many members of minority
groups have engaged in behaviors like “passing,” and describe this behavior as logical result of
oppression (Harris 1993: 1710).

2

The primary American branch of the Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA), Value of
Whiteness Theory (VWT), unifies these observations into three central theses.2 First, American
TRA scholars contend that whites – and presumably other members of dominant racial
populations – place high and measurable values on their dominant identity (Hacker 1992;
McIntyre 2002); they would be unwilling to consider even hypothetical changes to it (Hacker
1992: 36-40). Second, they argue that many members of minority racial populations do not
highly value their racial identities, and might prefer to be white (Chen 1999: 596; Rockquemore
2002: 494). Finally, some extend these claims beyond the arena of race, arguing that members of
non-racial minority groups (women, gays) experience identity devaluation relative to members of
equivalent non-racial majority groups (Faludi 1992; Rivers 2001; Ryan and Reynolds 2003). In
stochastic terms, membership in a minority in-group can be expected to correlate significantly
with lowered levels of in-group identity valuation. These theses all appear with great frequency
in the literature, they are sometimes presented together in the same work, and opponents contest
all of them.
The chief opposition to TRA comes from theories of oppositional identity, the most
prominent of which in the modern American context is Linked Fate Theory (Simien 2005).3 The
primary thesis of Linked Fate Theory is that minority group members often respond to majority
hostility not by developing self-hatred (Tajfel and Turner 1979) but rather by coming to view
group unity as necessary for survival (Simein 2005: 530), and engaging in social and political
competition as a cohesive group (Sanchez 2006; Block 2011; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012).
2

The term “Value of Whiteness” comes from Hacker (1992) and Harris (1993); it appears elsewhere in the literature
with some frequency. The American branch of TRA has also been referred to as the theory of “Whiteness as
Property” (Harris 1993) and as “self-hatred theory” (Phinney 1990).
3
The term “Linked Fate” is extremely common in both ethnic politics and Black studies literatures (Dawson 1994;
Dawson 2001; Gay 2004; Winter 2007; Block 2011), and will be the primary term employed throughout this paper
to describe a coherent and oppositional sense of minority identity. This term will be used concurrently with the less
frequently employed term “Oppositional Identity.”
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During inter-group conflict, fragmentation puts groups, particularly small ones, at a serious
disadvantage (Horowitz 2000). Thus, oppression and other forms of intense group competition
frequently lead to increased levels of group unity (Simein 2005), positive group consciousness
(Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012: 529), and even nationalism (Block 2011) among minority
groups and presumably among other populations. Worldwide, this effect has been observed
among groups as diverse as the Fong of Gabon and the Yoruba of Nigeria (Horowitz 2000: 71).
Closer to home, multiple scholars have argued that it is also very observable among American
Blacks and Latinos. More than 77% of Black Americans believe that what happens to other
members of their race is important to them personally (Simein 2005: 539), a figure higher than
those recorded for whites. This sense of togetherness in the face of adversity is a cause of bloc
political participation among Blacks (2005: 530), and a probable source of high Black selfesteem (Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard 2001). Similarly, perceived discrimination against Hispanics
has been found to increase the likelihood that Mexican Americans will identify as Latino rather
than white (Cornell and Hartmann 2006: 202). Moving beyond race, the collective esteem of
religious minority groups which engage in inter-group competition has been linked to the
achievements of entities like Israel and the Vatican (Winter 1996; Hartman and Hartman 2000),
which provide examples of group successes outside of and sometimes opposed to the U.S.A
Simein, along with earlier authors like Dawson, argues that discrimination makes racial
collective action and the construction of collective ethnic esteem logical forms of resistance for
African-Americans (Dawson 1994, Simein 2005), and multiple scholars contend that such
unified resistance is common among minority groups (Horowitz 2000; Spinner-Halev and
Theiss-Morse 2003; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008; Block 2011).

4

This question of whether minority status actually correlates with decreased valuation of
core characteristic identities matters to the discipline of political science. To be more precise, my
dissertation research has four primary political implications (a more detailed discussion of these
implications in the context of the literature, and of the specific limitations of my research, takes
place from pp.29-40 of the Literature Review chapter). First, it is indisputable that many authors
have argued that minority identity devaluation is occurring within the American context of white,
male, and other majority group privileges (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; McIntyre 1997; HoffSommers 2000; Hunter 2002; McIntyre 2002), and that political remedies such as affective
education (Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002) or affirmative action targeted at “expected privilege
(Harris 1993: 1758-59) are needed to deal with this problem. An empirical test of whether
minority identity devaluation is in fact occurring, which is the focus of this dissertation, can
make a useful contribution to the dialogue concerning which policy options might best counter
identity devaluation.
Second, this project examines the relationship between identity valuation and Linked
Fate. In a wide-ranging literature, political scientists have analyzed Linked Fate as a predictor of
Black political homogeneity (Dawson 2001; Block 2011), minority political participation (Chong
& Rogers 2005; Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012), political activism and vote choice among
non-Black minority groups (Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008), the relative absence of class divisions in
the contemporary African American community (Winter 2007), and even attitudes toward one
minority group among members of another (McClain et al 2006). However, no published studies
of which I am aware examine Linked Fate as a predictor of identity valuation. At the least, I
intend this project to introduce a theory often employed in the discipline to a new if niche area of
research. Further, Linked Fate has been found to be a significant predictor of specific political
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behaviors – including petitioning, donating money, and direct action – for members of the racial
minority groups among whom the concept is usually studied (Chong & Rogers 2005; Sanchez
2006; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012). If I find Linked Fate to have sufficient influence among
non-racial minority groups to significantly impact an important dependent variable, especially if
this finding is combined with the measurement of levels of levels of Linked Fate on par with
those for racial minority groups, it is reasonable to assume that similar political behavior will
occur within these “new” populations – and political scientists should test whether that is the
case. To give one potential example, the socio-political behavior of atheists remains extremely
understudied (Zuckerman 2011; Guenther & Mulligan 2013), despite massive recent growth in
the size of the active atheist population (Guenther & Mulligan 2013: 458-60).
Finally, this dissertation makes tertiary contributions to political science by examining (1)
the relationship between conservatism and prejudice and (2) the potential transition of
contemporary America to a post-racial society. Many political scientists have noted the
discrepancy between stated support for formal equality on the part of most Americans (Schuman
et al 1997; Sparks & Watts 2009; Donovan 2010), and the fact that most Americans and almost
all conservatives oppose redistributive programs designed to promote actual equality (Kukinski
et al 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Hutchings 2009; Sparks & Watts 2009). The symbolic
racism school attributes this dichotomy to a form of bigotry combining dislike of minorities with
reification of the American Dream (Wood 1994; Pike 2004; Tarman & Sears 2005; Speakman &
Moskowitz 2009). However, other authors argue that conservatives can be expected to oppose
government giveaway programs regardless of whether or not they are racist (Sears, van Laar,
Carillo, & Kosterman 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997). The same would seem to be true
simply of individuals suspicious of the current civil rights agenda. A typical question designed to
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measure symbolic racism is whether “most Black Americans who receive welfare payments”
could make it without welfare if they tried (Tarman & Sears 2005: 734), and it is debatable
whether agreeing with such items constitutes racism (Speakman & Moskowitz 2009: 3-4).4
My research design, while not perfect for this purpose (see pp.29-40) allows me to
conduct several interesting tests of potential relationships between conservatism and prejudice.
Data collected from roughly 1,400 respondents during my dissertation research process includes
the two standard measures of political conservatism – personal ideology and partisan political
identification (Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman 1997; Pike 2004; Tarman & Sears 2005;
Sparks & Watts 2009). Inclusion of these variables in the linear regression, logistic regression,
and List Experiment models I run allows me to test not merely the relationship between
conservatism and identity valuation – which would not itself demonstrate prejudice if positive
(see Sowell 2005) – but also the relationship between conservatism and dislike of out-group
members (in response to an open-ended survey item) and conservatism and valuation of core
characteristics under List conditions designed to elicit total honesty (Kuklinski & Cobb 1997;
Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese 2008). The structure of my dissertation also lets me extend
this analysis beyond race, and examine the impact of increasing conservatism on attitudes toward
three non-racial minority identities: female sex, LGBT orientation, and religious minority status.
Similarly, my dissertation project makes a small contribution to the conversation within
political science about whether the United States is becoming a “post-racial” society. In recent
years, scholars have tackled the question of whether the nation is moving past her traditional
focus on race (Hutchings 2009; Plant & Devine 2009; Donovan 2010; Redlawsk 2011; Scahffer

4

To be clear, Speakman & Moskowitz do argue that some variety of symbolic racism exists (2009). However, they
distinguish their items from others used to measure the concept, and explicitly state that a conservative responding
to some items used to measure symbolic racism would be classed as racist even if they had no racial animus (2009:
4)
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2011). Hutchings points out that individuals ranging from “CNN’s senior policy analyst” to
noted “conservative intellectuals Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom” have described the election
of a Black President by a fair margin as de facto evidence that the era of racist white voters is
over (2009: 918). Although all Americans are becoming more liberal about race relations (Plant
& Devine 2009: 919), the alleged post-racial revolution is often associated with younger age
cohorts. Redlawsk notes that Obama’s victory would have been “improbable at best” even a few
generations ago (2011: 935), while Ansolabhere & Stewart (2009) attribute the Obama win to a
coalition of minority and young white voters. However, other scholars question the post-racial
paradigm: Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau argue that an electoral landslide was taken from
President Obama because of race prejudice (2010), while Tuch & Hughes explicitly challenge
the age cohort-based view of post-racial transition by arguing that policy positions and levels of
“racial resentment” have not changed significantly among whites since the 1980s (2011: 243).
Again, my research structure allows me to tackle the question of whether post-racial
transition is occurring in America. If there is an ongoing “shift toward a post-racial era” where
race matters less in decisions (Donovan 2010: 863), and this movement is led by younger
Americans, it is reasonable to assume that membership in a younger age cohort correlates with
both reduced levels of attachment to racial identity and reduced levels of out-group prejudice.
Age is included as a variable in all of my dissertation’s empirical models, and double digit
numbers of respondents fall into every age cohort from “under 20” to “40-50.” This allows me to
examine the effect of age as a predictor of racial identity valuation, out-group prejudice, and
attachment to core characteristics under covert List conditions. Finding a significant positive
correlation between increasing age and racial identity valuation would provide at least limited
support for the thesis that race is becoming increasingly irrelevant within younger age cohorts.

8

By itself, this result might also mean that young Americans are more susceptible than their elders
to the social desirability bias that often influences research results (Kuklinski & Cobb 1997;
Krysan & Mick 2003; Streb et al 2008; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009), or that 50-year olds
value most long-held personal traits more than 20-year olds. However, finding a correlation
between youth and decreased valuation of racial identity under List conditions would strongly
indicate that low estimates of racial identity valuation given by youth-cohort members reflect
actual opinions (Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Streb et al 2008; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al 2012).
Further, a correlation between increasing age and increasing levels of actual bigotry would
indicate that elevated levels of racial identity valuation among older Americans are not entirely a
benign artifact, and support the post-racial thesis. Again, I extend analysis of the relationship
between youth and “post-racial” attitudes to encompass perceptions of the non-racial categories
of sex, orientation, and religion.
This dissertation project has significant limitations that must be explicitly stated. Most
notably, I am testing entirely “first stage” questions. That is to say, I am testing the effect of
minority status and Linked Fate on identity valuation – among a broader range of groups than
scholars writing in the Linked Fate and American racial identity traditions generally focus on
(Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002; Chong & Rogers 2005; Sanchez 2006; McClain et al
2006; Block 2011). I am explicitly not then testing the impact of increasing levels of Linked Fate
or of identity valuation on the political behavior of my respondents; my dissertation surveys have
never even included questions designed to measure political behavior variables. However, there
is a place for first-stage questions – well asked – within the discipline, in that they help define
the parameters within which scholarly debates take place. It is indisputable that multiple scholars
argue that minority identity devaluation is taking place, within the context of majority group
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privilege, and that societal or even policy remedies for it are needed (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993;
Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 1997; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McIntyre 2002). Given that
fairly few of these seem to have occurred, a large-scale study of whether minority identity
devaluation is occurring provides a useful addition to the canon concerning what to do about it.
Similarly, Linked Fate has been found to be a significant predictor of political behaviors
including petitioning and direct action (Chong & Rogers 2005: 264), donating money to and
meeting allied politicians (Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012: 632), and even support for organized
nationalism (Block 2011) among American racial minority groups. Testing whether high levels
of Linked Fate exist, and influence important dependent variables, among non-racial populations
like atheists and LGBT citizens can suggest new research pathways for scholars studying the
political behavior of those groups. The goal of this project is to test the politically relevant
questions outlined above, with the goal of suggesting new avenues of research to future scholars.
But, future researchers must await the future. For now, more research is needed into the
question of whether or not minority status predicts decreased valuation of in-group identities.
The body of work currently in existence is inconclusive; many argue passionately for status
dependent theories of valuation (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995), but international observation
(Horowitz 2000) and the few empirical studies conducted (Charles 2003) do not generally
support this thesis. Linked Fate theorists may provide an explanation for why not. While not
generally focused on the question of identity valuation, they argue that oppression and other
forms of intense group competition often lead not to self-hatred but rather to group unity
(Dawson 1994; Simein 2005), positive group consciousness (Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012),
and even nationalism (Block 2011). However, few if any scholars to date have used empirical
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quantitative metrics to test the predictors specifically of identity valuation among and between
minority and majority populations
My dissertation is designed to contribute to the discipline of political science by adding to
the literature a Large-N quantitative study of the actual degree to which minority in-group status
and other variables predict the valuation of in-group identities. During this project, I used survey
research to tackle the question of whether membership in one of four distinct American minority
groups (racial minority populations, women, LGBT citizens, religious minorities) correlated
significantly with decreased valuation of in-group identity relative to membership in the
equivalent majority group (American whites, men, heterosexuals, and Protestant Christians in the
sense of respondents (1) being hypothetically less willing to identity and (2) demanding higher
levels of compensation in exchange for agreeing to identity changes. My primary survey, Survey
A, was a standard ordinal survey built around thought experiment questions and demographic
items while my second was a List Experiment survey divided into two survey instruments
(Surveys B and C) and focused only on Question (1) immediately above. Both surveys are
described in detail in the Methods chapter (pp.60-78) and are attached to this dissertation as
Appendices. The data obtained using my primary survey instrument was analyzed using crosstabulation, linear regression, and logistic regression in STATA 9.0, while List Experiment data
was analyzed via cross-tabulation and t-testing techniques within the same program.
My empirical results were mixed, but do not overall indicate that American minority
status generally correlates negatively and to a statistically significant degree with decreased
valuation of in-group identities. To quickly summarize: results for the impact of minority race on
identity valuation were mixed. In response to both the original Survey A and a randomized readministration of the same instrument, Blacks and other minorities valued their racial identities
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more than whites and did so to a statistically significant degree. In predicted probabilities models
based on Survey A data, racial minorities were 17.74% less likely than whites to change their
race and this finding was significant at the .008 level of confidence. However, in response to the
List Experiment, whites were less likely than members of any other racial group to consider
racial changes and this difference was also significant. In contrast to this variation, women and
men displayed nearly identical levels of sex identity valuation across all three instruments. Not
only did female sex not correlate with sex identity devaluation, literally the same percentage of
women and men (85.6%) refused to make sex identity changes in response to Survey A.
Similarly, although a slight negative correlation was observed between religious minority status
and religious identity valuation across most of my models, this relationship did not reach
significance in any regression or List model. Several religious minorities, notably atheists and
members of “non-traditional” faiths (i.e. not Christianity, Judaism, or Islam), displayed levels of
identity valuation on par with those for Protestant Christians. The one exception to this rule came
in the case of gay and lesbian respondents. In every model in which it ran, LGBT status
correlated negatively with the valuation of sexual orientation as an identity, and this relationship
was significant in three of five models. This finding seems attributable both to extreme and
continuing social abuse of gay Americans (Meyer 2005; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; HRC Fact
Sheet 2011) and to an understandable flexibility concerning sexual identity among bisexuals.
Overall, however, out of 16 primary linear, logistic, and List models I ran during this
dissertation, minority group status had a significant positive effect on identity valuation in two, a
significant negative effect on valuation in four (three focused on gay respondents), and no
statistically relevant effect on valuation at all in ten. This discovery – that minority status did not
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negatively affect identity valuation in 12 of 16 empirical models is a mixed finding, but tends to
support LTF rather than TRA.
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CHAPTER 2
DUELING FOOTNOTES, OR, THE IDENTITY DEBATE IN THE LITERATURE

Before I began this project, it was obviously necessary to read and attempt to understand
the extensive previous literature dealing with the valuation of in-group identities. There is a large
body of literature relevant to the central questions of this dissertation, produced by authors who
can be roughly separated into the two camps discussed briefly in the introduction. Scholars
writing in the tradition of the Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA) contend that dominant
group status has measurable value (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Hunter 2002), and
that dominant-group members value their own core characteristics while devaluing minority
identities (Harris 1993; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002). They also make the related argument that
members of minority groups internalize social bigotry and experience minority stress and/or
devaluation of their own core characteristic identities (Meyer 1995; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997;
Hoff-Sommers 2000; Rockquemore 2002: 488). In contrast, scholars in the Linked Fate camp
argue that minorities often respond to oppression or intense ethnic group competition with group
cohesion and positive group consciousness rather than self-hatred (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001;
Simein 2005; Chong & Rogers 2005; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010)value
minority identities as much as dominant-group members value majority identities (Spinner-Halev
& Theiss-Morse 2003: 517), while several empirical examples support the thesis that minority
status does not necessarily correlate with identity devaluation (Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev &
Theiss-Morse 2003). Review of these literatures is a necessary component of this work.
As previously mentioned, the idea that members of non-dominant groups place low
values on their group identities is an offshoot of the idea that identity is largely other-determined
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(Jacques & Chason 1977; Tatum 1997; Hoff-Sommers 2000). Scholars advancing this thesis
argue that members of non-dominant social groups will have a difficult task “resisting negative
societal messages” and developing healthy senses of self-and identity while receiving input about
“assumed…inferiority” in a prejudiced society (Tatum 1997: 94). Minority groups often
experience frequent devaluation of their minority identities by dominant group members (Harris
1993; Chen 1999, and thus low levels of collective esteem will characterize minority group
members. Minorities will disdain minority identities because other groups force them to. On the
other hand, members of dominant groups will highly value their identities as they contrast these
with the ‘lesser’ identities around them (Hacker 1992; Hacker 1995; McIntyre 2002;
Rockquemore 2002). The central idea of the TRA is that a person’s level of self- and identity
valuation is the product of how that person believes others see her (Hughes & Demo 1989: 134).
The Reflected Appraisals literature in the United States and Europe falls within a larger
rational choice paradigm of identity scholarship. Scholars writing in the tradition of rational
instrumentalism have long argued that the values individuals place on identities like race depend
on the practical utility of those identities (Cornell & Hartmann 2006). In a dramatic example,
many Tutsis tried to pass themselves off as Hutus during the opening weeks of the 1994
Rwandan genocide (2006: 59). Later, when Tutsis resumed power in 1995, thousands of Hutu
militiamen abruptly discovered the value of a Tutsi identity and “became” Tutsi (59). Similarly,
New World Chinese identity has traditionally been stronger in those nations where being
Chinese is a source of financial advantage (Jamaica) than in those where it is not, such as
Guyana (Patterson 1975; Cornell & Hartmann 2006: 59), while American Chinese groups such
as the “Mississippi Chinese” in fact “forcefully resisted” designation as minorities rather than
whites (McClain et al 2006: 573). In many cases worldwide, ethnic and racial identification has
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been alleged to follow the “law of interests,” in that members of groups facing social or fiscal
discrimination are less likely to display high levels of identity valuation – with the former
fighters in Cornell & Hartmann’s African example openly attempting to change these - than
groups not facing such barriers (Patterson 1975; Harris 1993; Cornell & Hartmann 2006;
McClain et al 2006).
The hypothesis that reflected appraisals will cause minority group members to place low
values on their core characteristics has most often been tested in the American context with
racial minorities. One of the most widely cited American “demonstrations” that majority group
members value a core characteristic more than minority group members was conducted by
Andrew Hacker in 1991 (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995). Hacker asked a group of his
Queens University students to estimate how much a representative white American would have
to be paid to become Black (Hacker 1992: 32). White students were told to state how much
money they would require, Black and Latino students to guess how much a “typical white”
would demand (Discussion 3/25/07). These questions yielded an estimate of $50 million as the
sum young whites would demand to permanently abandon white skin (Hacker 1992: 32).5
Hacker contends that the price placed by whites on their racial identity is uniquely high,
reflecting both bigotry itself and the perceived value of Caucasian race in a racist society (1992:
32). His results have been respectfully cited in political science, sociology, and Afro-American
studies (Harris 1993; Lucal 1996; Tatum 1997; Christian 2002).6

5

During an online discussion, Hacker was unclear as to whether he combined white and minority students’
estimates of the value of whiteness to arrive at his $50 million figure – saying only that he presented his parable to
both groups and obtained estimates from both. To say the least, it would tarnish Hacker’s experiment if his famous
estimate of white identification was obtained from a largely non-white sample. I assume that Hacker did not conmingle estimates.
6
It is worth noting that the citations given here are merely a sampling. Hacker’s experiment, while not initially
published in a ‘heavyweight’ academic monograph, was cited by three-fourths of the articles read for this
prospectus. Every author writing as a political sociologist or critical theorist cited Hacker.
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Hacker is not alone in arguing that Caucasian/majority racial status actually has
something akin to property value; this concept has in fact been extensively discussed in political
science and the law (Harris 1993; Hunter 2002; McIntyre 2002; Rockquemore 2002). Hunter
argues that, for women, light skin is a form of property with quantifiable value – which has
effects on income, education, and spousal status (2002: 175). For every gradation of lightness
among Black Americans, educational attainment increases by one-third of a year and income by
$673 annually (183).7 Similarly, Rockquemore contends that social and financial status in
America is linked to skin color (2002: 488). She notes that light-skinned Black and bi-racial
women, much less white women, are “systematically privileged” in financial terms, while
Black/African features like kinky hair correlate with low income (489). Cheryl Harris is an even
better-known advocate of the theory that whiteness is highly valued beneficial property. Harris
contends that white identity historically evolved into and is today considered a valuable good
(1993: 1709). Being white gives one access to a set of privileges that guarantee basic needs
(1713). In the recent past, this privilege set has included presumption of free status (1718), the
right to exclude ethnic rivals from competitions (1736), and the right to vote (1744). Even today,
it contains benefits ranging from freedom from most oppression to the ability to easily purchase
Band-Aids in the proper color (Lucal 1996: 246). Perhaps because of these perquisites, McIntyre
claims that Caucasian students and junior scholars use such phrases as “most powerful,”
“comfortable,” “privilege,” “all that glitters,” and “golden girl” when asked to define the concept
of whiteness (2002: 36).
The corollary of the argument that majority identities like whiteness are valuable property
few dominant group members would willingly abandon is the argument that minority identities
are devalued and minorities want to abandon them. Multiple authors have argued that immigrant7

Hunter recognizes five gradations (2002).
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origin minorities such as Asian and Hispanic immigrants see whiteness as a positive and valuable
identity, and may seek to be defined as white rather than as members of minority groups (Hacker
1995; Tatum 1997; Chen 1999; McClain et al 2006). Chen argues that Chinese-American men
experience feelings of inadequacy in a society where masculinity is defined in white terms
(1999: 589), and that some Chinese males openly express a desire for dominant-group status
(596). Similarly, Tatum notes attempted assimilation among Asian Americans, quoting a
Japanese respondent as saying: “up until my late twenties, I mainly avoided dealing with my
sansei (Japanese) identity, and tended to think of myself as a middle-class white person (1997:
165).” This phenomenon has perhaps most often been noted among African Americans, Black
Americans have hstorically been characterized as desiring white identity and attempting to obtain
it by “passing” (Harris 1993: 1710). Even today, Rockquemore argues that bi-racial women
reject characterization as Black in favor of identification as multi-racial or with white relatives
(Rockquemore 2002: 494-5). Some of the women she interviews openly express desire for white
traits like “long blond hair” (494). Others display anti-black sentiments, describing Blacks as
ignorant, under-employed, and poor, and stating a preference for whites (495). These arguments
extend well beyond the sphere of race, Meyer contends that gay men often develop negative
attitudes toward their homosexual in-group (1995:40) can wish to become straight (38-9), while
Hoff-Sommers notes the feminist argument that young women are almost entirely “silenced” and
devalued by male supremacist culture (2000: 102).
While the large majority of recent American work in the TRA tradition is somewhat
theoretical in nature (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Hoff-Sommers
2000; McIntyre 2002), the qualitative arguments of scholars like Harris are supported by some
large-scale empirical evidence that minority status can lead to decreased valuation of minority
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identities (Cornell & Hartmann 2006; McClain et al 2006). McClain et al, conducting an
extensive historical analysis, argue that non-white immigrant groups like Cuban immigrants and
the Mississippi Chinese have in the past “pursued a strategy of racial distancing,” aimed at
resisting social and legal designation with minority groups like Blacks in favor of pursuing
privileges associated with white or near-white status (2006: 573). Several of these groups, such
as Hispanic Cubans, actually identified or came to identify as white (573), while all saw the
benefits of “forcefully resist(ing)” designation as Black or exotic (574). Behavior like this
certainly can involve repression or denial of devalued minority identities; Tatum describes young
Hispanics encountering or assimilating into the dominant culture as feeling “ashamed” to be
bilingual (1997: 140).
On another tack, scholars have made the empirical argument that membership in a nondominant racial group can have a negative effect on self-efficacy (Hughes & Demo 1989;
Horowitz 2000). While Blacks score as or more highly than whites on measures of self-esteem
(essentially the belief that one is a moral and worthwhile person), they score far lower than do
whites on measures of personal efficacy (the belief that one can and will do well at most life
tasks) (137). This did not change during the Civil Rights movement, or during the 20-odd years
that followed (137). The authors attribute this effect to the Black community’s shared experience
of racial inequality (132). Horowitz (2000) provides global support for Hughes and Demo. He
argues that members of minority ethnic groups worldwide display doubts about their selfefficacy (200: 170), displaying a “compliant” personal view of life characterized by a nonassertive demeanor, feelings of weakness, and an assumption that others are more powerful and
efficient than oneself (171). While members of most minority groups seem to ‘like’ their ingroup (168), there is cross-national evidence that many do not view their in-group identity as
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having value in the sense of being powerful or utile (171). Self-efficacy is obviously not identical
to identity valuation, but personal and collective valuations do correlate, and Hughes and
Demo’s conclusions do provide some support for the hypothesis that minorities devalue minority
identities.
The argument that members of minority groups value their core characteristics less than
members of majority groups has been made outside the context of race. There exists a significant
literature exploring the effect of minority status on both identity valuation and related traits like
self-esteem among women. Across scholarly genres, several authors argue that discrimination
causes women to value female identity less than men value male identity (Vaughter 1976; Wolf
1991; Hoff-Somers 2000). It is certainly indisputable that women face discrimination in political
and social arenas, perhaps more than Asian or African American men (Browne 1999; Harris
1999; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese 2008; Schafer & Shaw 2009). Gender bias has been
common in the labor market throughout American history, and still exists (Faludi 1992; Browne
1999; Baunach 2002). Working women often find themselves segregated into low prestige
‘women’s jobs,’ and largely as a result, the average employed woman makes roughly 70% as
much money as the average employed man (Nelson & Bridges 1999: 2-3). Most of this gap
cannot be attributed to rational discrimination, and is the result of institutionalized bigotry (1999:
3). Outside the workplace, women are expected to do 80% of the housework in a typical
relationship (Cohen 2004: 241), are often poorly by male partners, and find their attractiveness
judged more harshly than the same trait in men (Wolf 1991; Hamermesh & Biddle 1994).
It might easily be argued that, given all this, women can logically be expected to display
lower levels of sex identity valuation than men (Mackie 1983). Vaughtner specifically contends
that male identity –the “masculinity” of men - is more highly valued than the feminity of women
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(1976: 128). She claims that this holds true among both men and women, and calls her
conclusion “one of the most consistent themes” in then-current research data (128). Similarly,
Barnard concludes that women “have accepted their own inferiority” and place a lower value on
their sexual characteristics than do men (1975: 10). Vaughter and Barnard’s pieces are classic
ones in terms of initial publication date, but modern feminist advocates make nearly identical
points about young women being “silenced (Hoff-Sommers 2000: 102),” and experiencing
lowered self-esteem and self-efficacy (105), as a result of experiencing their gender in a male
supremacist society. In fact, it is something of an academic commonplace to refer to “female”
traits – such as non-athletic beauty (Wolf 1991) or occupations favored by women - as devalued
(Cohen 2004: 240).8 The conclusion of most or all of above analyses is that women, as members
of an oppressed minority group, will display lower levels of attachment to female identity than
men do to male identity.
LGBT citizens are another group of Americans that have been described as living with
devalued in-group identities. It is indisputable that gays and lesbians face high levels of
discrimination (Jenness 1995; Meyer 1995; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; Ryan & Rivers 2003; HRC
Fact Sheet 2011), and has been argued that they can come to view their core characteristics as
deviant (Meyer 1995: 40-41; Ryan & Reynolds 2003: 111). Gay men and lesbians certainly do
experience discrimination as members of a minority out-group, and that some of this
discrimination is brutally violent in nature; thousands of bias motivated attacks on LGBT North
Americans have been recorded during the last two decades (Jenness 1995; Ryan & Rivers 2003).
Homophobic violence is generally considered the most frequent and socially accepted form of
“hate crime” (Berril 1992), and is not only one of the most quickly growing forms of hate crime
8

Unlike Wolf, Cohen does not use the exact word “devalued.” Thus, it does not appear in quotes here. However, in
a detailed discussion, he calls women’s’ traditional jobs “low status” and “low paying,” and argues that women
participating in them contribute to “patriarchy” (2004: 240-42).
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in the U.S.A but also the most diverse, with regular perpetrators ranging from criminals to police
officers (Dean, Wu, & Martin 1992). Anti-gay violence is often punished lightly by the courts; a
Florida judge once asked a district attorney prosecutor whether gay-bashing was a crime
(Jenness 1995: 148). Further, harassment of gay men and lesbians extends far beyond incidents
of street violence (Meyer 1995; West 2001; Dean 2008). In one study of gay young people,
conducted in urban schools on the West Coast, 39% of respondents reported experiencing
frequent teasing and mockery (Ryan & Rivers 2003: 104). An additional seven percent reported
pressure to change gender non-typical behaviors (2003: 104). Overall, one in three gay public
high schoolers had been bullied seriously enough to report because of their sexual orientation
(106). Among gay people nationwide, 44% report experiencing orientation-related threats, 30%
report being followed or chased, and almost all (80+%) report verbal abuse and chaffing (106).
As was historically the case for Blacks, there is some evidence that the abuse experienced
by sexual minorities results in devaluation of gay identity (Meyer 1995; Rivers 2001; Dean
2008). Recorded reactions to anti-gay victimization include post-traumatic stress disorder,
distaste for homosexual identity, and suicidal ideation (Rivers 2001). Gay youth often blame
themselves for the discrimination they face, which has been found to intensify feelings of selfhate (Ryan & Rivers 2003: 111). More than 75% of younger gay people identify a significant
fraction of their stress (one-seventh or more) as being specifically related to their identities as
lesbian women or gay men (2003: 113). Perhaps most notably, an entire subculture of urban and
minority gay men exists “on the down low” largely because of intense societal and localized
homophobia (Dean 2008). It would be difficult to argue that at least some gay people do not
devalue their orientation and tastes due to personal attacks and social bias, although it remains to
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be seen whether this translates to widespread devaluation among members of LGBT
communities today.
A final group of people that a TRA theorist would expect to undervalue their in-group
identities, and that have often been called likely to do so, are members of religious minorities.
Like Blacks or gays, Catholics, Jews, followers of the Islamic faith, and agnostic “free-thinkers”
have been subjected to considerable discrimination in the United States (Adorno 1950; Wilson
1996; Harris 2005; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann 2006; Baigent 2009).9 Stanford’s Sam Harris, in
an unbiased attack on all religions, argues that fewer Americans would vote for a member of
several large religious minorities – atheists and Muslims among them – for high office than
would vote for an open homosexual (2005). The quantitative literature largely bears out this
claim: Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann find that the two groups their respondents were least likely
to describe as sharing their view of American society were atheists (39.6%) and Muslims
(26.3%)(2006: 218). As a result of this rather open bigotry, religious minorities have been
stereotyped as eager to assimilate: for example willing to abandon religious traits like Jewish
identity in order to blend into mainstream society (Adorno 1950; Wilson 1996: 466).10 Several
modern studies provide anecdotal support for the thesis that this remains the case; American
Catholics in particular have been described both as seeing conspiracies against the Church all
around them (Perl and Bendyna 2002: 655) and of behaving in ways that may indicate a
defensive or devalued Catholic identity (661).11
As with other minority groups, it is not seriously disputed that religious minorities endure
discrimination (Wilson 1996; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann 2006; Schafer & Shaw 2009). Anti9

Wilson’s article focuses primarily on the minority-group experiences of Jews.
Because bigotry is not always logical, both Wilson and Adorno note that Jews have also been stereotyped as
“pushy” and resistant to assimilation (Wilson 1996: 466). Nonetheless, the idea that many Jews – and not a few
Catholics – badly want to assimilate is a central trope of the writing on religious minorities.
11
This point will be clarified and expanded over the next several pages.
10
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Semitic bigotry, in particular, has a long history in the United States (Wilson 1996: 466-8). High
levels of anti-Semitism were recorded here by 1875, and 41% of Americans viewed Jews as
clannish and overly powerful through the 1930s (466). Until the end of World War Two, more
than one third of Gentiles mentioned only unfavorable traits when asked to describe Jews (466).
Similar views of Catholics have been common throughout U.S. history, with Catholic
immigrants often being treated as a persecuted social minority (Reichley 1985). Such
discrimination is hardly a thing of the past. While the average contemporary American holds
some positive views of Jews, a large cohort of anti-Semites remains (Wilson 1996: 257-67).
More than 16% of white Gentiles oppose marriage between Gentiles and Jews, 12% would not
live in a neighborhood that contained many Jews, and 33% view Jews as unpatriotic or opposed
to key American aims (1996: 257). This prejudice is not waning. While 17.2% of people born
between 1946 and 1960 hold anti-Semitic opinions, 32.1% of those born between 1961 and 1972
hold such opinions (266). Like anti-Semitism, hostility toward American Catholics has survived
into recent years. Many scholars have concluded that anti-Catholic bias was a factor in the
electoral campaigns of Al Smith, John Kennedy, and even John Kerry (Reichley 1985; Perl &
Bendyna 2002; Kressling 2006; Novak 2007). Sweeping anti-Catholic statements also remain
part of American political discourse more broadly; a major evangelical university described
Catholicism as a “Satanic cult” during 2000, and the House of Representatives refused to
confirm a Catholic chaplain during the same year (Perl & Bendyna 2002: 654). Catholics are
aware of incidents like this, and more than 33% of them believe a strong anti-Catholic bias exists
in the United States (658).
Prejudice against those of minority faith also extends perhaps most notably to individuals
who are adherents of no faith at all, or of a belief system not traditionally common in the United
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States. Atheists, not to mention Wiccans or Satanists, face significant discrimination in the labor
market and political process (Harris 2005; Dawkins 2006; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann 2006;
Schafer & Shaw 2009). According to the latest Gallup data, 48% of Americans would refuse to
vote for “a generally well-qualified” atheist contender in a Presidential election (Cline 2007).12
In contrast, only 17% of Americans would not vote for a well-qualified Mormon – although 38%
would cast no ballots for a well-qualified Muslim (2007). Even LGBT Americans are more
electable than Hell-bound unbelievers; 63% of Americans would vote for a qualified gay
candidate for the Presidency (2007). Overall, only 32% of Americans describe their view of
atheists as “very favorable” or even “favorable,” while 52% describe it as unfavorable or
strongly so (Scahfer & Shaw 2009: 414). Out of “a long list of ethnic and cultural minorities,
Americans are less willing to accept intermarriage with atheists than with any other group, and
less likely to imagine that atheists share their view of American society (Edgell, Gerteis, &
Hartmann 2006: 216).” Members of the nation’s fastest-growing religious minority (Dawkins
2006; Guenther & Mulligan 2013) face levels of prejudice even more severe than those
confronted by Catholics, Muslims, or Jews
As with lesbians and gay men, there is some evidence that the experience of
discrimination leads to religious identity devaluation among members of religious minority
groups. Jews, of course, have been frequently stereotyped as wanting to abandon Jewish identity
and assimilate into mainstream society (Adorno 1950; Wilson 1996; Horowitz 2000). Among
Catholics, it has been hypothesized that those who live in largely non-Catholic areas, or are
otherwise subject to high levels of anti-Catholic bias, see themselves as an oppressed minority
and perceive external hostility from Protestants (Perl and Bendyna 2002: 656). While one test of
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Comparable percentage figures for Satanists, Buddhists, and Wiccans were not available from Gallup as of this
writing.

25

this hypothesis failed to confirm it, Catholics from low Catholic density areas are more likely
than other Catholics to perceive Evangelical Protestants as hostile (661). Among all Catholics,
perceptions of discrimination correlate with retreat behaviors like frequently attending mass and
interacting primarily with other Catholics (656). Perhaps most notably, atheists and agnostics as
a group appear to have been almost totally “in the closet” until the past 15 years (Zuckerman
2011; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). Literally measured, atheists have been a sizable population
group for some time: 14% of Americans name no religious preference (Hout & Fischer 2002),
and a sizable bloc of those individuals flatly disbelieve in God (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann
2006: 214). However, no organized atheist movement existed until “atheist public intellectuals
authored more than a dozen best-selling books decrying religion and promoting atheism” as an
intentional rallying cry (Guenther & Mulligan 2013: 458). Prior to 2006, the total atheist
presence on then-popular meetup.com consisted of “two groups with ten members (2013: 459).”
Although the case evidence here is circumstantial, such near-total silence about advocacy of
what many would consider to be basic scientific facts – Gods do not have sons, virgins do not
give birth (Harris 2005; Dawkins 2006; Baigent 2009) – almost certainly does reflect reluctance
on the part of politicians, businessmen, and other citizens to experience the prejudice directed at
open atheists (Harris 2005; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann 2006; Cline 2007).
A variety of scholars, most advocates of the TRA paradigm, do provide support for the
claim that minority status correlates negatively with identity valuation. However, this camp fails
to conclusively establish the overall validity of its hypothesis. First, many if not most attempts so
far to empirically examine the relationship between in-group status and identity valuation have
been based on inadequate data. This has particularly been the case with attempts to place a hard
value upon majority racial identities like whiteness. For example, Hunter supports her

26

conclusions about the positive link between light skin color and income with data collected 30
years ago, when racism was arguably far more severe (2002). The property rights Harris analyzes
when ‘quantifying’ the benefits of whiteness have not been linked to race for fifty years (1993:
1718-44).13 Rockquemore (2002) and Chen (1999) use then-current data, but base their
conclusions on small numbers of individual interviews.14 Even more empirically focused articles
have significant weaknesses; Hughes and Demo use an imperfect sample and focus their analysis
on self-esteem rather than identity valuation (1989) – although it should fairly be noted that an
analysis specifically of valuation was not their primary goal. Second and more importantly,
empirical contemporary tests of TRA theses by political scientists and sociologists – many
writing from within the Linked Fate/oppositional identities camp - generally fail to find
significant links between minority status and decreased identity valuation. While members of
majority groups enjoy indisputably enjoy some social advantages minorities do not (Lucal 1996;
West 2001; McIntyre 2002; Ryan & Reynolds 2003), there exists little proof that whites place a
higher dollar value on their race than Blacks or that women wish they were men (Mackie
1983).15Although there have been few studies precisely of identity valuation, the conclusions of
most empirical work dealing with valuation, collective self-esteem, and individual self-esteem do
not support the thesis that valuation is status dependent (Winter 1996; Horowitz 2000; Charles
2003; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003).
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This list includes: presumption of non-slave status (1993: 1718), the right to own land (1722), the presumption of
upper-middle class status (1734), and the right to vote in national elections (1745). It is simply no longer true that
Americans assume most blacks to be slaves or most whites to be rich.
14
Chen’s piece focuses on a total of nine interview subjects (1999).
15
It is indisputable that bigotry has some negative effects on women and racial minorities; this is admitted by every
serious scholar to challenge VWT (Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Lovejoy 2001; Charles 2003). No major paper in
political science, including this one, contests the argument that racism and sexism have negative effects on minority
citizens. This paper’s contention is only that it is scientifically important to calculate the actual – rather than
imagined – effects of bigotry, and that these do not seem to include intense self-hatred.
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In the context of race, Charles (2003) finds no evidence that Blacks value whiteness or
devalue Blackness during a major quantitative study of men and women in Caribbean North
America. Observing that many Jamaican teens bleach their skin to a lighter shade, Charles
initially attributed this behavior to self-hate: low self-esteem caused by devaluation of Black
identity (2003: 712). However, all of the many skin-bleaching teens with whom he spoke noted
that bleaching is not linked to any desire to be white (720). Apparently, some Caribbean Black
teens change their skin color much as some American and British white teens curl their hair, for
reasons of fashion (720). More important for this project, the scores Charles recorded for Black
skin bleachers on a series of Likert esteem scales were identical to those of non-bleachers (719),
and the mean esteem scores of both Charles’ samples were higher than the average for whites the degree of reference group orientation of these Black respondents was very high (718). For
Afro-Caribbean men, skin color and bleaching behavior are in no way linked to low personal
esteem (717) or racial devaluation (720).
While Charles’ study was local in application and contemporary in time frame, Jacques
and Chason (1977) came to similar conclusions after analyzing a Large-N set of respondent data
more than 30 years ago. These authors find that minority racial and age group statuses have no
effect on the valuation at least of individual identities among American minority group members,
after conducting a study based on the replies of 1,000 survey respondents. Overall, Blacks,
women, and the elderly had mean scores similar to those for male whites and young Americans
on several esteem scales; no correlation between minority status and lowered individual/personal
esteem was found by the authors (1977: 406). On most scales, esteem scores specifically for
Blacks exceeded those for white males (407). While education and occupational attainment did
have significant effects on mean levels of the dependent esteem variable, this was true for almost
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none of the other traits analyzed by Jacques and Chason (408). These authors’ work deals
primarily with the effect of minority status on individual self-esteem, rather than on the sort of
collective esteem more analogous to in-group identity valuation, but their findings certainly call
into question the thesis that racial minorities devalue their identities.16
More broadly, scholars have pointed out that the idea that members of minority groups
have lower levels of personal or collective esteem than adjacent dominant-group members is
generally false (Hughes & Demo 1989; Horowitz 2000; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003:
515). Ethnic minorities often have higher levels of collective self-esteem (to follow Hughes and
Demo (1989), the perception that their in-group is worthwhile and a good group to belong to)
than do majorities in the same region (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003: 520). Examples
abound: African-Americans have higher levels of collective (and personal) self-esteem than
whites, while Indian Muslims have higher levels of collective esteem than majority Indian
Hindus (520). This is not unusual; minority groups frequently develop oppositional identities
centered on language traditions, political cultures, and niche social arenas in which they
outperform the majority (West 2001; Cassanova 2004; Guenther & Mulligan 2013) – athletics
and the arts, in the case of Black and Irish Americans (Dean 2008; . Largely for this reason,
disconnect between majority views of a group X and the value X members place on their identity
is thus frequent (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003: 520). Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse,
along with other authors writing inside oppositional identification paradigms, provide global
empirical evidence that members of minority groups often place high fiscal and emotive values
on their racial/ethnic identity.
16

As the authors note, within the first two pages of their article, the finding that minorities have very high levels of
self esteem strongly implies that they do not disdain their core identities. Positive self-evaluation is a major
component of esteem, and individuals who dislike their race or class are unlikely to evaluate positively (Jacques and
Chason 1977: 399). Most other scholars agree, finding that racial self-esteem tends to increase as personal selfesteem does (Hughes &Demo 1989).
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To an even greater extent than in the context of race, few empirical analyses of male:
female differences in identity valuation have actually been conducted. However, none of the
studies that have taken place found any correlation between “minority” female gender status
(Wolf 1991; Faludi 1992; Hoff-Sommers 2000; Simein 2005) and the devaluation of sex identity
(Mackie 1983: 344). Prior to the mid-1980s, only two studies using quantitative methods to
examine the effect of gender on the valuation of gender identity apparently took place (1983:
344). Neither found major differences between genders in terms of the salience or importance of
gender identity (344). Mackie remarks that this is consistent with the larger literature on ethnicity
and self-concept: ascribed statuses like race are often non-predictive of collective self-esteem
(344). Her own conclusions about sex identity valuation further support that thesis. Using a
random sample of 797 North American adults, Mackie conducted the largest study of gender and
valuation up to that time (345), and apparently the largest so far. She discovered no relationship
between gender and either self-esteem or gender identity valuation. When asked to list personal
characteristics they viewed specifically as valuable, men cited their gender 34.5% of the time and
women cited their gender 34.3% of the time (346).17 Both sexes had a positive overall view of
their gender, and saw it as “important” (346). Further, neither sex was over-focused on this
aspect of identity; both males and females listed gender as less important than marital status,
class, and parental status (346). Responding to a related follow-up question, both sexes also
displayed almost exactly identical mean levels of self-esteem; males scored an average of 8.86
on Rosenberg scales and women scored an average of 8.82 (347). Subsequent studies largely

17

My own research replicates the finding that rates of identity valuation among men and women are not merely
similar but virtually identical. In response to my ordinal survey, 87.4% of men and 87.5% of women stated that they
would not/would never change their sex. In response to my List Experiment, 7.7% of men and 7.9% of women were
willing to change.
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support Mackie’s contention that healthy men and women have identical levels of self-esteem
and collective in-group esteem (Thompson & Keith 2001: 345).18
Similarly, there is significant empirical evidence that many gay Americans value their
LGBT sexual orientation. Gay men and lesbians suffer more discrimination and abuse than
virtually any other in-group (Herek 2003; Ryan & Rivers 2003; Dean 2008; Schafer & Shaw
2009), but this does not inevitably produce identity devaluation. Studies of LGBT individuals
past school age find that 80% have a positive view of gay identity and retain few if any
“residuals” of earlier trauma (Ryan & Reynolds 2003: 114).19 This conclusion will may well
strengthen with time; each new age cohort of gay teenagers has become aware of gay identity
earlier, come out of the closet earlier, and displayed a more positive view of gay identity than the
cohort before it (Herdt & Boxer 1993; Ryan & Reynolds 2003). Empirical qualitative scholarship
provides additional support for the claim that LGBT Americans do not devalue gay identity
continuing discrimination. Several authors have analyzed the rise of “Gay Pride” as exemplified
by events like Mix Party – New York City’s lavish annual gay film festival (Gamson 1996). The
founders of Mix specifically articulate their valuation of gay identity, encouraging gay men and
lesbians to “stand and celebrate our lives and culture” and stating that homosexual identity is “as
rich and diverse as the world itself” (1996: 232). Mix is hardly unique in promoting these goals;
New York alone boasts at least two other Pride film festivals – one of which supports “gayness
as an ethnicity” (242). The city is also one of many hosts for the quadrennial Gay Games, an allLGBT athletic event featuring upwards of 10,000 competitors (Klein 1999).

18

Mackie’s finding that women and men display similar levels of gender identification has, of course, not stopped
the debate about whether women value their gender identity less than men (Wolf 1991; Faludi 1992).
19
Recent work on bullying indicates that this is probably true for everyone past school age, as a note; the question of
whether “nerds,” “jocks,” and members of other competitive high-school in-groups retain residuals of scholastic
trauma may sound glib but merits genuine attention in the social sciences.
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As was the case in the Black and Hispanic communities, the development of positive
valuation-based perspectives on gay identity – often referred to as “gay pride” – has followed
quickly on the heels of relaxing socio-legal attitudes toward gay identity (Gamson 1996).
Throughout North and Latin America, vocal networks of gay pride organizations have sprung up
during the past two decades (Klein 1999: 239). Even in Brazil, for example, there are now gay
political organizations and commercial establishments in every city (1999: 241). There is a
sizable gay press, and the “straight” press covers topics like the anniversaries of the U.S.
Stonewall Riots (241). Gay civil rights legislation is currently up for approval at the national
level (241) – as is obviously true for the U.S.A., Canada, and other Western hemisphere nations
(Gamson 1996). Describing the situation throughout the New World, columnist Jackson A.
coined the phrase “The ghetto is over, darling!” as a statement of Latin gay pride (Klein 1999:
241). Changes like these probably make it more likely that a growing majority of lesbians and
gay men will not devalue their sexual identity, and empirical evidence exists that such
devaluation is not occurring (Herdt & Boxer 1993; Ryan & Reynolds 2003).
The empirical statement that minority status does not always or usually correlate
measurably with identity devaluation also seems to apply to members of religious minority
populations. Historically, members of some religious minority groups have arguably devalued
their in-group identities as part of an attempted process of assimilation or passing (Adorno 1950;
Wilson 1996; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). However, contemporary empirical work indicates
that religious minorities have a good deal of ethno-religious pride (Winter 1996; Dawkins 2006;
Baigent 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013), and may correspondingly value their religious
identities as much as or more than do Protestant Christians. Winter points out that 79% of
contemporary Jewish Americans consider Jewish identity to be important or very important to
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them (1996: 239). Most of these individuals take a strongly positive view of Jewish identity, with
38% of them stating that they have and prefer mostly Jewish friends, and roughly 40% scoring as
ethnocentric on standard mood scales (239). In contrast, only 7% of Jews consider Jewish
identity to be unimportant or worthless (1996: 235). Strong feelings of in-group political and
religious identification have also been observed among Catholics (Perl & Bendyna 2002: 654).
Finally, atheists and agnostics certainly – albeit only recently - engage in behavior indicative of
in-group identity valuation. At least a half-dozen authors have published highbrow best-sellers
mocking religion and making the case for atheism within the last decade (Harris 2005; Dawkins
2006; Hitchens 2007; Baigent 2009). There is now an organized atheist socio-political praxis,
centered around the idea that atheists are distinct from and superior to people with religious faith
(Guenther & Mulligan 2013: 463) and incorporating powerful NGO like the Freedom from
Religion Foundation (459). As in the Black and gay cases, the argument that atheist or Jewish
status today correlates with lowered identity valuation seems highly questionable and ripe for
testing.
As a brief note, the Catholic and Jewish cases - like the Black and Irish cases discussed
earlier - illustrate how the minority group members’ valuation of their in-group identities can be
boosted by the successes of compatriots outside their own subculture or even their own society
(Hartman & Hartman 2000; Ward 2006). For example, Jewish identity valuation has been
boosted even during periods of intense anti-Semitism by the success of the nation of Israel
(Winter 1996; Hartman & Hartman 2000). More than 14% of American Jews celebrate Israeli
Independence Day, and 60% have either visited the country or helped send an intimate there
(Winter 1996: 239). Among Jews, Israel is widely considered both a source of pride and an
international symbol of why Jewish identity should be valued (Hartman & Hartman 2000: 396).
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The symbol of the Vatican, and the power of the Pope, plays a similar role in the cosmology of
American Catholics (Perl & Bendyna 2002: 654). In fact, several authors have compared the
symbolic power of the Vatican to that of the Jewish state (Hartman & Hartman 2000: 396). Even
when oppressed in mainstream U.S. discourse, religious minorities draw down significant
oppositional pride from the success of peers elsewhere (2000: 396), and this process almost
certainly occurs during the process of identity formation for members of other minority groups
(i.e. Hispanics)(Tatum 1997).
So far, I have intentionally given only empirical examples of identity non-devaluation
among minority groups. However, scholars writing outside the TRA paradigm do not find it
difficult to explain the apparent non-correlation between most minority statuses and measurable
identity devaluation in terms of an organized theoretical framework. The primary thesis of
Linked Fate Theory is that minority group members often respond to majority hostility not by
developing self-hatred (Tajfel and Turner 1979) but rather by coming to view group cohesion as
necessary for survival (Simein 2005: 530), and engaging in social and political competition as a
unified group (Sanchez 2006; Block 2011; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012). During inter-group
conflict, fragmentation puts groups, particularly small ones, at a serious disadvantage (Horowitz
2000). Thus, oppression and other forms of intense group competition frequently lead to
increased levels of group unity based around the idea of “collective action as a necessary form of
resistance (Simein 2005: 530),” rather than to identity devaluation. Dawson speaks of this unity
in heuristic terms, arguing that Black Americans in particular associate their self-interests with
their racial group interests (2001: xi), and thus make decisions seen as benefitting the race even
when these do not benefit them as individuals (1994, 2001). This powerful sense of positive
ethnic group consciousness (Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012) has been conclusively associated
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with ethnic nationalism (Block 2011), and even linked to reduced class divisions within the
African American community (Winter 2007). Although often studied among African Americans,
Linked Fate has been found to have similar effects among other American racial minority groups
(McClain et al 2006; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008).
Political scientists have studied Linked Fate primarily as a predictor of ethnically-focused
political behavior (Dawson 2001; Chong & Rogers 2005; Sanchez 2006; Block 2011; Austin,
Middleton, & Yon 2012). Chong & Rogers (2005) conclude that, among African Americans,
group solidarity has traditionally provided “an additional source of motivation…to engage in
political activity (348).” Largely as a result, African Americans often participate in electoral
politics at rates higher than those for whites of equivalent SES (348). These authors find Linked
Fate to significantly predict a range of political behaviors, including giving money to preferred
candidates, petitioning, and direct action (364). Similarly, Austin, Middleton, & Yon (2012) find
that their codified measure of “group consciousness” – which is specifically equated to Linked
Fate in a passage citing Dawson (1994) – predicts increased Black political participation (529).
African Americans with high levels of positive group consciousness utilize specifically political
processes as ways to address discrimination – and again can participate more frequently than do
whites (631). In this study, Austin, Middleton, and Yon’s group consciousness variable
correlated positively and significantly with all forms of African American political activity:
rallying, contacting elected officials, donating money, meeting politicians, signing petitions
volunteering, and voting (2012: 632). As earlier noted, Linked Fate has also been associated with
ethnic nationalism (Block 2011), and even with reduced levels of hostility toward one minority
group among members of another (McClain et al 2006). There are few if any studies of direct
correlations between Linked Fate and identity valuation, which is why I am writing this one.
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However, many of the behaviors empirically linked to increasing Linked Fate – such as a greatly
increased chance of supporting candidates of one’s own race as opposed to Caucasian candidates
(McConnaughy, White, Leal, and Casellas 2010: 1205) – clearly indicate the existence of nondevalued minority identities.
Although not necessarily indicative of Linked Fate by Dawson’s classic measure (1994,
2001), behavior consistent with the hypothesis that minority groups can respond to oppression
and inter-group competition by creating oppositional identities (Simein 2005; Cornell &
Hartmann 2006; Block 2011) has been observed on a global scale (Stern 1995; Horowitz 2000).
While not a Linked Fate scholar in any coherent sense of the term, Horowitz (2000) outlines the
theoretical roots of the oppositional identity thesis. He notes that population groups tend to have
different mixes of attributes, and individuals tend to view their attributes of their own in-group as
superior regardless of the status level of that group (2000: 142). For example, Sri Lankan
Sinhalese are considered lazy by Tamils but consider themselves to be spiritual and properly
relaxed – while viewing Tamils as cruel, proud, and overly diligent (142). This is not unusual. In
general, members of ethnic groups classified by sociologists as backward – displaying less
mastery of colonial-era skills than rival “advanced” groups – view advanced group members as
ruthless, coarse, nepotistic, and miserly (169). In contrast, members of advanced groups see
backward group members as poor, indolent, feudal, and docile (169). Importantly, members of
both populations tend to ‘like’ their own in-group, attributing many more favorable traits to it
than to out-groups (168). In fact, members of backward groups are more likely to initiate interethnic violence, a passionate display of preference for one’s in-group over outsiders, than are
dominant group members. Here again, the reaction of minority populations to oppression appears
to be opposition and something akin to Linked Fate, rather than identity devaluation.

36

This question of whether minority status in fact correlates with the lowered valuation of
core characteristic identities has multiple political implications: it is a question that matters to the
discipline of political science. First, it is indisputable that many political and social scientists
have argued that identity devaluation among minority groups is occurring, and that political
solutions are necessary to correct this problem (Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum
1997; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McIntyre 2002). Hacker directly attributes his $50 million figure to
hyper-valuation of white identity relative to other racial identities, calling it “the value white
people place on their own skins (1992: 36)” in a “white country that expects you to think in
white ways (38).” In contrast, devaluation of Black identity is constant; Black Americans must
recognize even that “this nation feels no need or desire for your physical presence (37).” Given
the contrast between white and Black life-worlds, “no white American would change places with
even the most successful Black American (65).” Cheryl Harris (1993) makes the very similar
argument that white racial identity has value essentially as a form of property. Despite the fact
that the “capacity of whiteness to deliver” valuable goods reliably is diminished by the end of
racial caste politics, the social benefits of being distinguishable from minorities like Blacks and
Native Americans serve as potent compensation for even those whites lacking “money, power, or
influence (759).”
In contrast to Hacker and Harris’ primary focus on the fiscal value of white identity in a
competitive society, Tatum (1997) focuses primarily on the devaluation of minority identities
and the disempowerment of minority citizens. She argues that the cultures of subordinate groups
are often dismissed as “defective or sub-standard (1997: 23)” and that members of minority
groups will be targeted with these labels and thus often “find it difficult to believe in their own
ability (23).” An advocate of the TRA perspective, Tatum claims that “our self-perceptions are

37

shaped by the messages we receive from those around us,” and that young Black men and
women are forcibly exposed to dominant culture beliefs such as “the idea that it is better to be
white” than Black (55). Young Hispanics face similar pressures, as their language and culture are
“devalued” by the dominant society; some report being ashamed to be bilingual (140). Feminist
scholar Carol Gilligan, engaged extensively by Christina Hoff-Sommers in a conservative but
scholarly critique of contemporary feminism, makes nearly identical arguments in the context of
gender. Gilligan argues that young women, previously confident as girls, “hit the wall of
Western culture” later in life and become silenced or “go underground” (Hoff-Sommers 2000:
102). Gilligan specifically attributes this to a culture defined by male supremacy (2000: 102).
Women begin to view the confident assertion of feminity, or simply their occasional “insights
into clear-sightedness” as seditious or even dangerous (103), and are specifically described as
losing “self esteem” and personal efficacy (105). In contrast, at least in her earlier work, Gilligan
describes young men as “beneficiaries of the male culture that drives girls underground” and thus
as doing comparatively well (103).
All of the authors cited above propose extensive political remedies to deal with what they
perceive as the serious problems of white/majority group privilege and of extensive identity
devaluation among members of subordinate groups. Hacker, mentioning both identity
devaluation and practical problems within the Black community, proposes “radical remedies
(1992: 48).” He says bluntly that a variety of programs, “many of them quite expensive,” will be
needed if Blacks are to be brought to parity with whites (62); his list of these includes education,
health services, job training, foster care, birth control education, aid to ex-convicts, drug
treatment, and several varieties of “counseling” presumably targeted at the mental aspects of
oppression (62). Harris more clearly outlines the link specifically between devaluation of
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minority identities and her support of reparative programs for Blacks. She concedes that the
value of contemporary whiteness is in large part psychological or emotive (1993: 1758-59), but
continues to argue openly for strong affirmative action programs on the grounds that positive
discrimination s required on moral grounds to dismantle not merely the actual but also “the
expected privilege” that has gone along with white skin “since the founding (1779).”
Other authors, notably those writing from a psychological or political-psychological
perspective, focus primarily on forms of affective education as remedies for minority identity
devaluation and the accompanying problem of white privilege (Tatum 1997; McIntyre 1997;
McIntyre 2002). Tatum, for example, argues that battling the positive but racist sense of identity
which most whites develop is a major task, requiring actual training in both (1) the total
abandonment of individual racism and (2) the learned “recognition of and opposition to
institutional and cultural racism (1997: 95).” There are at least six stages to the process of
positive white identity development, including: “contact, disintegration, re-integration, pseudoindependence, immersion, and autonomy (95).” While whites engage these steps, Black authority
figures like parents and teachers should constantly present their charges with “cultural images
and messages about what it means to be Black (55),” in order to prevent identity devaluation
from occurring in the face of a dominant white culture (54-55). For all parties, participating in
formal workshops dedicated to “unlearning racism” may help with the process of healthy racial
identity development, and is encouraged by Tatum (95). Similarly, McIntyre (2002), argues that
the U.S. “ideology of perceived white dominance and superiority (32)” can be changed only
through reeducation (37). White scholars, in particular, need to be taught that that “there is no
positive in whiteness (39)” – as McIntyre defines it – and that racism is as pervasive in
contemporary society as it was during the Enlightenment (41). Many feminist scholars make
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similar claims, such as Katherine Hanson’s argument for the total revamp of the norms that men
should be “aggressive, powerful,” and generally less emotional than women (2000: 48). Hanson
argues that “our educational system is a primary carrier of the dominant culture’s assumptions
about male superiority (50),” and that – since the dominant culture is “sick” – the literal reeducation of young men is a moral imperative (50). These are explicitly political contentions:
when she made this argument, Hanson was the Director of a major enforcement center for the
Womens’ Equity Act (48).
The first and primary argument for the political relevance of this dissertation project
relates to the arguments just outlined. Multiple scholars have argued that broad-based social or
political remedies are needed to deal with the problem of minority identity devaluation (Hacker
1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; McIntyre 1997; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002). However, this
powerful argument rests on the assumption that widespread devaluation of minority identities in
fact is occurring in contemporary society – and there have been very few contemporary
quantitative tests (see Charles 2003) of whether this is actually the case. Obviously, strong
arguments both for and against affirmative action (Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Pike 2004;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009), much less multi-cultural education, can be made whether or not
minority identity devaluation is occurring. However, if many or most of these arguments are in
fact premised on the assumption that minority identity devaluation is prevalent, an empirical test
of whether widespread devaluation in fact is occurring makes a contribution to the contemporary
conversation about these inherently political programs.
This project makes an additional contribution to the discipline of political science by
examining the relationship between Linked Fate and identity valuation. Linked Fate, defined
using Dawson’s classic measure (1994), has been studied by political scientists as a predictor of
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political homogeneity among African Americans (Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Block 2011),
increased Black political participation (Chong & Rogers 2005; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012),
mobilized political activism and vote choice among non-Black minority groups (Sanchez 2006;
Junn 2008), nationalism (Block 2011), and even positive attitudes among members of one ingroup toward the members of another (McClain et al 2006). However, I can find no studies that
stress-test the question of whether causal relationships between Linked Fate and identity
valuation exist.20 I do test this question, with a particular focus on whether, if identity
devaluation is not occurring among most or all minority populations studied, Linked Fate is the
reason for this – a significant positive predictor of identity valuation. At the very least, this
project introduces Linked Fate Theory to a niche but new area of research.
Further, Linked Fate has been repeatedly found to significantly influence specific
political behaviors. Most famously, Dawson attributes African American bloc voting for the
Democratic Party to what he calls the Black Utility Heuristic: African Americans vote for the
party seen as most likely to help the Black community as a whole rather than merely advancing
their individual interests, because of Linked Fate (Dawson 1994; Brown-Guinyard 2013).
Admittedly, several more recent studies find at best spotty and inconsistent correlations between
Linked Fate and political behaviors like preferential partisan affiliation (Brown-Guinyard 2013;
Gay, Hochschild, & White 2014).21 However, the bulk of a sizable recent literature documents

20

Although my research techniques are not yet perfect, one probable reason for this is that relatively few of the
major studies dealing with identity devaluation and/or majority group “privilege” employ contemporary quantitative
methods or are primarily empirical in design (see Hacker 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1995; McIntyre
1997; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McIntyre 2002; Charles 2003; et al).
21
These results may be partly due to methodological issues. In her all-respondents model, Brown-Guinyard appears
to be testing the effect of Linked Fate on conservative partisan affiliation among a mixed population of white, Black,
Black Caribbean, and other respondents (2013: 194). This almost certainly minimized the measurable influence of
the variable on partisan selection, given the conclusion of Gay, Hochschild, & White (2014) that increasing Linked
Fate appears to correlate with Democratic preference for Blacks and Republican preference for whites. The
existence of inter-group differences of this sort was the primary reason for m decision to analyze my subpopulations of respondents separately as well as together.
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statistically significant correlations between Linked Fate and phenomena including donating
money to and contacting elected officials (Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012), voting along
ethnic in-group lines (McConnaughy et al 2008; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010),
preferring and pursuing neighbors of the same race (Krysan & Farley 2002; Gay 2004),
nationalist sentiment (Block 2011), and direct action (Chong & Rogers 2005) within the racial
minority groups among whom the concept has largely been studied. Even Brown-Guinyard
concludes that Linked Fate significantly increases the likelihood of respondents’ voting as
independents “when present in moderate levels (2013: 207).”
If I do find Linked Fate to have enough influence on the behavior of groups among which
it has not traditionally been studied to influence an important dependent variable, especially if
this finding is combined with the observation of levels of Linked Fate similar to those displayed
by racial minority groups (see Gay, Hochschild, & White 2014), it is reasonable to assume that
political behaviors similar to those previously observed among ethnic in-group members might
be predicted for these “new” populations. Such relationships should be tested where they have
not already been. For example, the political behavior of atheists remains very understudied
(Zuckerman 2011), despite a meteoric growth in the size of that population that has been called
the “new atheist movement (Guenther & Mulligan 2013).”
Finally, this dissertation makes two tertiary contributions to the discipline of political
science by providing another competently done study that examines (1) the relationship between
political conservatism and prejudice and (2) the potential transition of the United States to a postracial society. To the first point, many political scientists have noted – in a literature focused on
race issues – that despite the stated commitment of the vast majority of the U.S. population to
equality (Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Sparks and Watts 2009), large percentages of Americans
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and especially of conservatives remain opposed to pro-minority policies like affirmative action
(Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Pike 2004; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). Theorists within the
symbolic racism school attribute this dichotomy simply to sophisticated prejudice, combining
dislike of minorities with a reification of the American Dream (Wood 1994), and where criticism
of Blacks and the poor is replaced by code-worded criticism of “lazy people lacking self reliance
(Pike 2004: 7).” However, other authors have pointed out that conservatives – racist or not – can
be expected to oppose government giveaway programs simply to the extent that they are
conservative, or skeptical of the contemporary civil rights agenda (Kuklinski & Sniderman 1997;
Sinderman & Carmines 1999; Speakman and Moskowitz 2009). For example, Kuklinksi &
Sniderman openly concede that between 0-10% of Northern whites, and more than 40% of
Southern whites score as prejudiced in response to questions about various racial stimuli (1997:
407-08). However, they also find that 40% of non-Southern whites and 98% of Southern whites
– and presumably almost all conservatives (Sniderman & Carmines 1997: 79) – oppose
affirmative action (1997: 408). The debate about the extent to which Caucasian, and in particular
conservative, opposition to racially redistributive policies constitutes a form of bigotry continues
into the contemporary literature (Sparks & Watts 2009; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009).
My research design allows me to provide an imperfect but interesting test of the actual
relationship between political conservatism and out-group prejudice today. All of the linear and
logistic models I run during dissertation research will include two standard measures of political
conservatism – personal ideology and partisan political identification (Sears, van Laar, Carillo, &
Kosterman 1997; Pike 2004; Tarman & Sears 2005; Sparks & Watts 2009). Given the questions
on my primary survey instruments, inclusion of these conservatism variables will allow me to
measure not merely the relationship between conservatism and identity valuation, but also the
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relationship between conservatism and the frequency with which survey respondents stated that
they dislike out-group members, and the relationship between conservatism (as versus
liberalism) and attachment to core characteristic identities under covert List Experiment
conditions designed to produce total respondent honesty (Kuklinski & Cobb 1997; Sniderman &
Carmines 1997; Sparks & Watts 2009).
While simply finding a significant positive relationship between increasing personal or
partisan conservatism and increased identity valuation might demonstrate conservative
attachment to current traits (Sowell 2005) rather than prejudice, this result in combination with
the discovery of significantly more dislike of out-group members among conservatives would
support a contemporary conclusion that conservatism does correlate with bias. So would the
finding that rates of divergence between my standard non-List survey and a totally covert List
Experiment, in terms of the stated levels of identity valuation given by respondents, are larger for
conservative respondents than for liberal respondents. Although the unfortunate fact of only 85%
rather than 100% congruence between these two survey pools renders this second test imperfect,
that result – given that social desirability bias often causes respondents to lie in response to
direct questions about touchy subjects like race (McIntyre 2002; Krysan & Mick 2003;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009) – would further point to a current positive relationship between
conservatism and prejudice. This is not my primary focus, but the design of my dissertation
project will allow me to contribute to the discussion concerning potential links between
conservatism, identity valuation, and prejudice – and to extend my part of that conversation
beyond race to analyze conservative attitudes toward gender, orientation, and religious minority
groups.
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Similarly, this project allows me to make a small contribution to the discussion about
whether the United States is currently becoming a truly “post-racial” society. In recent years, and
especially following the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, multiple scholars have
addressed the question of whether America is moving past her traditional focus on race and on
ethnic group competition (Hutchings 2009; Donovan 2010; Redlawsk 2011). Individuals ranging
from CNN’s current senior policy analyst to “conservative intellectuals Stephen and Abagail
Thernstrom” claim that the election of a Black President by a fair margin is de facto evidence
that the “myth” that today’s white electorate is racist has been “destroyed (Hutchings 2009:
918).” There is some empirical evidence for this position. The percentage of Americans
unwilling to vote for a qualified African American Presidential candidate dropped from a
majority of respondents polled fifty years ago nearly to 0% by 1997 (Schuman et al 1997), and
President Obama won 4.6% more of the total electoral vote in 2008 than the very Caucasian John
Kerry did in 2004 (Donovan 2010: 864). Further, while most cohorts of Americans have in
recent years expressed greater support for measures of racial contact (Hutchings 2009: 919), the
movement toward a post-racial society is most often seen as youth driven and likely to continue
into the future. Redlawsk points out that the Civil Rights Act is itself only a few generations old,
and that the Obama election would have been “improbable at best (2011: 935)” in the very recent
past, while Ansolabhere & Stewart (2009) attribute Obama’s electoral success largely to the fact
that minorities and young whites gave the exciting candidate 10 million more votes than John
Kerry drew in 2004.
However, some scholars contend that race remains a palpable presence in daily life, and
has a significant influence on the political careers of minority candidates like the current
President (Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau 2010; Tuch & Hughes 2011; Schaffer 2011). Lewis-

45

Beck, Tien, & Nadeau argue that an electoral landslide was taken from President Obama because
of race prejudice (2010: 69). Obama did win 52% of the 2008 vote (69), but similar elections
featuring a strong challenger against an unpopular President produced historic Eisenhower and
Reagan landslides (70), and the authors’ jobs-based election predictor predicted a 56.6%
landslide win for Obama (71). Schaffer (2011) makes the similar argument that the salience of
race cost Obama about 3% of the white vote (Redlawsk 2011: 937). More broadly, and in
specific contravention of the youth-driven “post-racial” thesis, Tuch & Hughes argue that the
racial policy views of American whites have changed only slightly since the 1980s (2011: 134).
These authors contend that both “racial policy attitudes (141)” and what they call “racial
resentment (143)” have been stable within the U.S. population since 1986, and find evidence to
support this claim (145-47). However, Tuch & Hughes’ dependent variables represent opposition
to state sponsored redistributive policies like “preferences in hiring or promotion of Blacks
(136),” and their measure of racial resentment is composed from survey items measuring
opposition to affirmative action and belief in American egalitarianism (138). In the context of the
symbolic racism debate, many scholars have argued that these sorts of attitudes are more likely
to represent conservative or individualist perspectives than racism of any kind (Sinderman &
Piazza 1993; Wood 1994; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). As with
the national discourse over the relationship between conservatism and prejudice, the debate here
continues.
As in the case of testing relationships between political conservatism and out-group
prejudice, my dissertation’s linear and logistic regression models – which include age cohorts
ranging from “under 20” to “60-plus” and are based upon data gathered from a large university
known for its non-traditional student population (Southern Illinois University Facts 2007, 2011)
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– allow me to test not only whether youth correlates with reduced racial identity valuation but
also whether membership in a younger age cohort correlates with reduced dislike of out-group
members and reduced attachment to core characteristic identities under List Experiment
conditions. My research structure also allows testing of the relationship between youth cohort
membership and the valuation of non-racial identities: gender, orientation, and religion. Again,
this test is not the focus of the dissertation project, and it does suffer from some inherent
methodological limitations: even in a “non-traditionally” focused university setting, few
undergraduates are sixty-five. However, I will note that the respondent pool for my first and
primary survey includes double-digit numbers of respondents in every age cohort from “under
20” to “40-50;” the analysis of age cohort attitudes made possible by the inclusion of age as a
factor variable in my models lets this project make a small contribution to the passionate ongoing
conversation about America’s post-racial present and future (Hutchings 2009; Plant & Devine
2009; Donovan 2010; Redlawsk 2011; Tuch & Hughes 2011).
To explicitly clarify the limits of this project, it is by no means the goal of my dissertation
to analyze the in-practice effects of varying levels of identity valuation (or of Linked Fate,
conservatism, tolerance, etc.) on the actual political behavior of my respondents. I am testing the
impact of minority status and of Linked Fate on identity valuation, among a broader range of
groups than the Linked Fate and in-group identity literatures generally seem to study (Dawson
1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Sanchez 2006; Winter 2007; Junn 2008). However, I am not
then testing the impact of increasing Linked Fate, identity valuation, or any other variable on
political behaviors like voting and rallying – as many other authors have (Chong & Rogers 2005;
McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010; Austin, Middleton & Yon 2012). Very
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specifically, all of the questions that I tackle during this project are “first-stage” questions, and
this is a major brake on the reach of my research.
However, there is a place for first-stage questions, in that they help define the parameters
within which debates in the discipline are or should be taking place. If a major argument for
affective multi-cultural education or affirmative action is that identity devaluation is occurring
among minority groups in the context of white privilege (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum
1997; McWhorter 2000; McIntyre 2002), the discovery that devaluation is not occurring would
clearly provide a set of challenges for scholars engaged in that debate to confront. Similarly, if
Linked Fate has been found to predict increased political activity and activism among U.S. racial
minority groups (Dawson 2001; Chong & Rogers 2005; Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012), the
discovery of Linked Fate in operation among other sub-populations suggests new avenues of
research for scholars studying those groups. The goal of this project is to test the politically
relevant questions outlined above, at the first stage, with the goal of suggesting new avenues of
research to future scholars.
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CHAPTER 3
STRONG FOR ALL – A LINKED FATE THEORY OF IDENTITY VALUATION

My dissertation tests the question of whether members of minority groups value their ingroup identities less than members of majority groups, in the sense of being on average more
willing to change them. This overall question can be separated into four primary research
questions. First, do members of minority racial groups value their racial identities less than
whites? Second, do women value their biological sex less than men? Third, do members of the
LGBT community (lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents) value their sexual orientation less
than majority group straights? Finally, do members of religious minority groups (Catholics,
atheists/agnostics, Jews, Muslims, and followers of “other faiths”) value their faith traditions less
than Protestant Christians?
In tackling these questions, my project serves as an empirical test of the primary
hypothesis of the Reflected Appraisals paradigm, which is that members of dominant groups
value their core characteristics more than members of minority groups. The theory underlying
my project is that identity valuation does not depend upon in-group status. While the question
remains unsettled – and thus worth researching - many empirical reviews conducted thus far
provide more support for a Linked Fate or oppositional identification theory of identity valuation
than for the TRA hypothesis that identity valuation is status-determined. West Indians (Charles
2003) and African Americans (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003) post scores similar to
those of whites on tests of individual and collective esteem. Women do not value themselves less
than men (Mackie 1983), and Black women do not value themselves less than white women
(Lovejoy 2001; Sekayi 2003: 472). More extensive studies indicate that in-group identification
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tends to be similar across major groups (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003). These findings
call into doubt the accuracy of the Reflected Appraisals paradigm.
It is not only the case that TRA is opposed by many top scholars but also the case that
many studies cited to support the theory are methodologically flawed. While my goal is not to
attack this particular author, there are several major problems with the conduct of Hacker’s wellknown experiment (1992). During the experiment, Hacker posed questions about race to a class
he taught about race for a year, from a generally progressive-left perspective (1992: 32). The
administration of the parable included verbal commentary from Hacker (Discussion 3/25/2007).
Bias on the part of a survey administrator, much less the prompting of replies, obviously calls
into question the conclusions of the survey. Further, while contemporary surveys generally
provide respondents with scales of response alternatives (Schuman and Presser 2004); Hacker’s
students were told to write down simply one estimate of the value of white racial identity
(Discussion 3/25/07). The N of this experiment was the student body of a single college class
(Hacker 1992: 32). While the experiment was an innovative one, its results should not be taken
as indisputably valid.22
Given the methodological problems of studies like Hacker’s and the contrary conclusions
of better-designed studies, I do not expect to find support for the thesis that the valuation of
identity depends upon in-group status.23 The assumption that the primary theses of TRA are
incorrect leads to my four initial hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that racial minority status will
not correlate to a statistically significant degree with either the level of compensation demanded
22

It is worth noting that, although I critique it as a survey, Hacker’s experiment would also be poorly designed if
considered as a focus group. The parable test involved limited in-depth discussion, a group of participants larger
than 15, and an arguably biased moderator. It also, almost certainly, lasted less than an hour. All of these things
constitute flaws in focus group design (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook 2007).
23
While I choose not to extend this discussion at length, it must be noted that the unorthodox use of data and of
methodological techniques is far from rare in this U.S. race and ethnicity literature. For example, Hunter’s powerful
conclusions about the prevalence of race bias in U.S. society were based entirely on data that is 31 years old (2002).
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by respondents to change their race or the yes: no likelihood of respondent racial change.
Numerous authors have pointed out that levels of esteem are at least as high among American
Blacks as among whites (Phinney 1990; Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard 2001). While this is not
always true of other minority groups (Chen 1999: 599), members of groups like Chinese/Asian
Americans score high on self-efficacy scales and often express considerable pride in their
background (599). More broadly, authors studying in-group identification and group esteem
among American racial minorities (Dawson 1994; Simein 2005) and minority ethnic populations
globally (Spinner-Halev and Theiss Morse 2003) conclude that this is also high. Given these
findings, I do not expect race to have a significant effect on the valuation of racial identity.

H1: Minority racial group membership will not have a negative effect on the valuation of racial
identity.

My second hypothesis is that female sex will not have a statistically significant negative
effect on the valuation of sexual identity. Despite the undeniable abuse experienced by women
(Wolf 1991; Nelson & Bridges 1999), it is difficult to find empirical evidence that women place
lower values on their sex than men do (Mackie 1983). When asked to list personal characteristics
which they view as valuable, men cite their gender 34.5% of the time and women cite their
gender 34.3% of the time (1983: 346). Women are no more likely than men to have low levels of
individual or collective self-esteem (Mackie 1983; Thompson & Keith 2001). Given these
findings, I expect to find no significant differences between the value placed by men on male
identity and the value placed by women on female identity.

H2: Female sex will not have a negative effect on the valuation of sexual identity.
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My third hypothesis is that LGBT sexual orientation will not have a statistically
significant negative effect on respondents’ valuation of their sexual orientation(s). This, frankly,
is the most likely of all my hypotheses to be wrong. It is indisputable that lesbian and gay
Americans experience more devaluation and abuse than members of virtually any other group
(Ryan & Rivers 2003). Much of this abuse is violent in nature (Jenness 1995), and there is hard
evidence that it affects gay self-concept (Meyer 1995: 140; Ryan and Reynolds 2003: 113).
However, there is also evidence that most gays value their sexual identity; Ryan and Reynolds
conclude that 80% of post-adolescent lesbians and gay men retain “few residuals” of earlier
trauma (2003: 114). Although in/out status might well have some effect on gay identity
valuation, I hypothesize that I will find no statistically significant negative correlation between
minority sexual orientation and either of my two measures of sexual identity valuation.

H3: LGBT sexual orientation will not have a negative effect on the valuation of orientational
identity

My fourth hypothesis is that membership in a minority religious population will not have
a statistically significant negative effect on the valuation of religious identity. Again, there is
some evidence that religious minorities experience discrimination and that this bigotry can affect
individual levels of collective esteem (Wilson 1996). Again, however, there is little reason to
believe that remembers of these minority groups value their faith identities less than Protestant
Christians do. Jews provide a good example of this. Winter points out that 79% of Jewish
Americans consider Jewish identity to be “somewhat” or “very” important to them; most of these
respondents hold a positive view of Jewish identity (1996: 235). In contrast, only 7% of Jews
consider Jewish identity to be unimportant (235). Similar positions are common among minority
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religious groups like Catholics and atheists (Harris 2004). As with other minority/majority dyads,
I do not expect to find any significant correlation between religious minority status and the
devaluation of religious identity.

H4: Religious group membership will not have a negative effect on the valuation of
religious identity.

Obviously, the models in this dissertation will not simply measure the effect of one core
characteristic on the dependent variable of identity valuation. In addition to the core
characteristic variables (race, sex, orientation, and religion) which will be inserted in each of four
models as controls, I will test the influence of a number of other traits on valuation. As one goal
of this project is testing the predictive validity of Linked Fate Theory (LFT) as versus the more
prevalent Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA), a Linked Fate metric is the first factor variable
representing a non core characteristic trait that will be studied. I hypothesize that increasing
levels of Linked Fate will have a statistically significant positive effect on identity valuation
among all groups studied. As discussed earlier, Linked Fate is the idea that one’s life chances are
tied to the success or failure of one’s group as a whole (Simein 2005). I will note that this
concept is theoretically and substantively different from concepts of group identification, which I
will discuss shortly; Linked Fate is an independent factor which can exert an influence on
identification or valuation (Dawson 1994; Simein 2005: 542). Simply put, it is possible to feel
that one’s fate is determined by membership in a particular group without strongly identifying
with all traits common to that group – such as a fondness for strong coffee or “soul food.” Given
the strong linkage made in the literature between Linked Fate and traits indicative of identity
valuation (Simein 2005: 530), I expect increasing levels of Linked Fate to correlate positively
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with the amount of compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic
and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each
core characteristic.

H5: Increasing levels of Linked Fate will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial
identity, sex identity, sexual orientation, and religious identity
.
I next hypothesize that increasing levels of individual self-esteem will have a statistically
significant positive effect on the valuation of all four core characteristic identities being studied.
Levels of individual self-esteem vary among populations (Phelps, Taylor, and Gerard 2001), and
personal esteem can influence collective esteem (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003: 520).
While some scholars argue that the relationship between personal and collective self-esteem is
weak, few deny that this relationship exists and some see it as strong (Hughes and Demo 1989;
Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003). It is thus necessary to include esteem metrics in my
statistical analyses. As stated, I hypothesize that the relationship between increasing self-esteem
and identity valuation will be positive, and will be a strong one in terms of statistical and
substantive significance. Lowered self-esteem levels have been specifically documented to
negatively influence participation in behaviors such as political activity, which bring in-groups
together and should logically boost group identity valuation (Carmines 1978: 180). In sum, I
expect increasing levels of individual self-esteem to correlate positively with the amount of
compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate
negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core
characteristic.
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H6: Increasing levels of self-esteem will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity,
sex identity, sexual orientation, and religious identity.

I next hypothesize that increasing levels of in-group identification will have a statistically
significant positive effect on the valuation of all four identities being studied. Again, levels of ingroup identification vary among groups, making it necessary to include this variable in models
(Cornell and Hartmann 2006). More specifically, higher levels of identification have appeared in
past work to correlate with higher identity valuation. Hughes and Demo conclude that intense
forms of in-group identification like Black nationalism are predictors of “pride” regarding the
worth of Black racial identity (1989: 144), while Phelps, Taylor, and Gerard find “other group
orientation,” or identification with an in-group other than one’s own, to be negatively correlated
with at least personal/individual valuation (2001: 213). I expect I expect increasing levels of ingroup identification to correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by
respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate negatively with the percentage
chance of respondents agreeing to change each core characteristic.

H7: Increasing levels of in-group identification will have a positive effect on the valuation of
racial identity, sex identity, sexual orientation, and religious identity.

Moving past variables relevant primarily to scholars of identity, this project includes a
series of hypotheses relating to key demographic variables. These include political ideology,
political party affiliation, age, income, and level of education. I hypothesize first that both
increasingly conservative personal ideology and affiliation with an increasingly conservative
political party will have a statistically significant positive effect on identity valuation for all four
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core being studied. By definition, conservatives tend to be more resistant to change than liberals,
preferring to “preserve present or past” states of being rather than moving toward new ones
(Shannon 1962). Contemporary psychological research confirms this classic common-sense
description. Conservatives are far less likely than liberals to share changing social attitudes on
topics ranging from the acceptance of bisexuality (Herek 2002) to the reduced role of the church
in society (Kuo 2006; Schweikart 2011: 11-31); this is true to such an extent that political
conservatism has been described as “sharing elements” with symbolic racism (Henry and Sears
2002: 266). This behavior does not seem confined to one demographic group of conservatives;
Black conservatives like Louis Farrakhan display such traits as much as white ones, and religious
minorities can be more ethnocentric than members of religious majority groups (Winter 1996).

Thus I hypothesize:

H8: Increasingly conservative political ideology will have a positive effect on the valuation of
racial, sexual, and religious identities.
H9: Affiliation with an increasingly conservative political party will have a positive effect on the
valuation of racial, sexual, and religious identities.

The one exception to the hypothesis that conservatism will correlate with increased
identity valuation involves gay identity. Homophobia today unfortunately appears to be strongly
correlated with conservatism (Herek 2002). In a study focused on attitudes toward bisexuals,
Herek strongly confirms his hypothesis that heterosexuals will express more negative attitudes
toward gay sexual conduct “to the extent that they are politically conservative” (2002: 265). This
is typical; Finlay and Walther find that religion and political ideology both correlate with
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (2003). Conservative Protestants boast the
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highest homophobia scores on most scales, followed by moderate Protestants and Catholics,
Jews, and liberal Protestants and agnostics (2003: 370). The stereotypical homophobe appears to
be a strong traditional conservative. Thus, I expect both of my measures of conservatism to
correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by straight respondents to
change their sexual orientation and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of straight
respondents agreeing to change their sexual orientation. However, I expect these measures of
conservatism to have the opposite effects on identity valuation among LGBT respondents.

H10: Increasingly conservative political ideology will have a positive effect on the valuation of
sexual orientation among straights, and negatively influence the valuation of sexual orientation
identity among lesbians and gays.
H11: Increasingly conservative political party affiliation will positively influence the valuation
of sexual orientation among straights, and negatively influence the valuation of sexual
orientaton among lesbians and gays.

I next hypothesize that increasing age will have a statistically significant positive effect
on the valuation of racial identity, sex identity, and religious identity, and that increasing job
status and education will have statistically significant negative effects on the valuation of all four
identities being studied. In most studies of ethnocentrism and homophobia, increasing age
correlates with increasing intolerance. Herek, for example, finds age to be one of the major
predictors of negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (2002: 269). On a 100-point feeling
thermometer, individuals over 60 gave bisexual Americans an average rating of 38.3 (269). In
contrast, the youngest cohort tested - 18 to 26 year olds - gave an average rating of 45.6 (269).
Income and education had exactly the opposite effect. Respondents with a college or higher
degree rated bisexuals 13 points more favorably than did respondents with less than a high
school degree (269). Respondents with incomes over $70,000 rated bisexuals 11 points more
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favorably than those with incomes below $30,000. These differences are dramatic, and typical.
While I do not expect wealthy and well-educated individuals to “like themselves” less than
poorer or less-educated individuals, I do expect them to be on average more experienced and
tolerant, and thus more willing to consider experimentation with different ethnic or sexual
identities and to attach lower mean levels of valuation to core characteristics. Thus, I expect
increasing levels of education and job status to correlate positively with the amount of
compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate
negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core
characteristic. In contrast, I expect increasing age to correlate positively with the amount of
compensation demanded by respondents to change their race, sex and faith, and to correlate
negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change their race, sex, and
faith.
.
H12: Increasing levels of education will have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity,
sex identity, sexual orientation, and religious identity.
H13: Increasing levels of job status will have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity,
sex identity, sexual orientation, and religious identity.
H14: Increasing age will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial, sexual, and religious
identity.

As with conservatism, the one exception to the hypothesis that increasing age will predict
increasing identity valuation involves gay identity. Although this may no longer be the case, gay
identity has long been viewed as devalued (Yang 1997). Older lesbians and gay men have
experienced a much more sustained assault on their in-group identity than younger gay men and
lesbians; it is reasonable to assume that they will be more likely to devalue it. This thesis is
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supported by the finding that each new cohort of gay teenagers surveyed during recent years has
become aware of gay identity earlier, come out of the closet earlier, and displayed a more
positive view of gay identity than the cohort before it (Herdt & Boxer 1993; Ryan & Reynolds
2003). I expect age to be positively correlated with both measures of orientational identity
valuation for straights, and to be negatively correlated with both measures of with orientational
identity valuation for lesbians and gay men.24

H15: Increasing age will have a positive effect on the valuation of sexual orientation among
straights, and will have a negative effect on the valuation of sexual orientation among lesbians
and gays.

My final hypothesis also pertains specifically to the valuation of LGBT identity. I
hypothesize that closeted gay status will have a statistically significant negative effect on the
valuation of LGBT sexual orientation, while non-closeted gay status will have a statistically
significant positive effect on the valuation of LGBT orientation.25 Often, lesbians and gay men
who are “out of the closet” display high levels of pride in gay identity, while closeted lesbians

24

Several friendly reviewers have remarked on the fact that I expect increased age to predict decreased valuation of
gay identity, but not Black or female identity. Simply, this is because studies of Blacks dating back to the 1960s
(Hughes and Demo 1989: 133) and of women dating back to the 1970s (Mackie 1983) show that these groups have
levels of personal and collective self-esteem similar to those found among white men. A possible reason for this
finding, as versus the finding that gays experience minority stress and identity devaluation in the present day (Meyer
1995), is the fact that gay populations remained subject to open and direct abuse after this ceased for most other
groups. Direct physical attacks against gay men and lesbians were common until quite recently; a Florida judge
made headlines in 1995 for asking whether gay-bashing was a crime (Jenness 1995: 148). A few years earlier,
homophobic violence was the most common sort of hate crime in the U.S.A., despite the small size of the gay
community (Berrill 1992). Today, 30% of gay Americans report being “chased” or otherwise attacked (Ryan and
Rivers 2003: 106). Gianni Versace’s old saw that “gay is the new Black” remains largely accurate in the political
context; the struggle of lesbians and gay men for basic rights like freedom from violence parallels that of African
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s. As gays have only recently escaped the state of extreme oppression that can
predict identity devaluation, I expect age to affect gay identity valuation more than will be the case for (say)
Catholics.
25
I did not employ the word “significant” in this hypothesis, because I assumed that samples of closeted as versus
non-closeted gays might well be – as they proved to be – too small for statistically significant conclusions about the
effect of sexual openness to be drawn.
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and gay men display low levels of pride in gay identity (Gamson 1996). Among lesbians, the
more widely a woman discloses her sexual identity, the less anxiety, more positive affectivity,
and greater self esteem she tends to report (Jordan & Deluty 1998). Disclosures of
homosexuality to gay and lesbian friends, straight friends, and co-workers all correlate strongly
with self-valuation and perceived support (1998: 47). Given this, I non-closeted gay status to
correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by LGBT respondents to change
their sexual orientation and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of LGBT
respondents agreeing to change their sexual orientation.
.
H16: Increasing sexual openness will have a positive effect on the valuation of sexual orientation
among lesbians and gay men.

In sum, I hypothesize that (1) minority as versus majority racial group membership will
have no significant negative effect on the valuation of racial identity, (2) female sex will have no
significant negative effect on the valuation of sex identity, (3) LGBT status will have no
significant negative effect on the valuation of sexual orientation, and (4) minority religious group
membership will have no significant negative effect on the valuation of religious identity. These
four hypotheses are the primary hypotheses of this project. I also hypothesize that (5) increased
self-esteem, (6) increased levels of in-group identification, and (7) increased levels of Linked
Fate will have a positive effect on the valuation of all four core identities. On the other hand, I
hypothesize that (8) increasing income and (9) increasing level of education will have a negative
effect on the valuation of the four core characteristic identities. Next, I hypothesize that three
variables will have mixed effects. Increasing age (10) will have a positive effect on the valuation
of racial, sex, and religious identity and a positive effect on the valuation of orientational identity
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among straights. Increasingly conservative personal ideology (11) and affiliation with an
increasingly conservative political party (12) will have the same effects. However, increasing age
(13), increasing political conservatism (14), and partisan conservative political affiliation (15)
will all have a negative effect on the valuation of orientational identity among gays. Finally, I
hypothesize that (16) non-closeted status will have a positive effect on the valuation of gay
identity among lesbians and gay men.
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CHAPTER 4
DESIGN OF THE PROJECT AND METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED

I obtained the data needed to test the 16 hypotheses given above via survey research,
specifically the administration of two distinct surveys to more than 1,000 (N=1,404) individuals
enrolled in college in the state of Illinois. The instruments employed were a standard ordinal
survey (Survey A) designed to measure respondents’ levels of core characteristic identity
valuation and a List Experiment consisting of two surveys (Surveys B and C). The large majority
of respondents were students enrolled in undergraduate courses at Southern Illinois University
(SIU-C), a large Research One university with a student body diverse in race, gender, class, and
age terms (Southern Illinois University Facts 2008). A sizable but smaller number of
respondents were graduate students at Southern Illinois University, attendees at mandatory
fraternity meetings, or students enrolled in classes at Aurora University in Northern Illinois. All
survey administrations were conducted by me personally, in controlled settings such as
classrooms or mandatory meetings, and without prior discussion of the nature of the survey
project with respondents.
My primary sample was a snowball, purposive, sample. At or near the commencement of
the dissertation project, I was offered classroom survey opportunities by most of the Professorial
staff of my home Department and by numerous acquaintances in Adjunct or TA roles throughout
SIU-C. In typical snowball fashion (Meyer 1995; Berg 2006), many of these initial contacts
recommended other rooms with certain baseline characteristics (large, diverse student
population) in which I might survey. While I initially intended to employ a more randomized
method of respondent selection, I made the professional judgment call that there would be little
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demographic difference between the offered pool of roughly 1,000 students in a range of
academic settings and a randomized selection of SIU-C students; a sample of 1,000 was more
than 5% of SIU at the time I surveyed. This decision was the purposive component of sample
selection.
The final pool for my initial administrations of Surveys A, B, and C consisted of 19
Southern Illinois University classrooms, one Aurora University classroom, and five controlled
non-classroom settings on the SIU campus. The Southern Illinois University classes were
Architecture 101 (ARC 101: 82 surveys), Civil Liberties and Civil Rights (POLS 332i: 36),
Conservatism and Libertarianism (Seminar: 11), Constitutional Law (POLS 433: 24), Criminal
Justice (AJ 334: 38), English 102 (38), Ethnicity and Nationalism (POLS 352i: 32), Film History
and Analysis (CP 101: 72), International Politics (POLS 480: 19), International Political
Economy (Seminar: 27), Introduction to American Politics (POLS 114: 21), Introduction to
Forestry (Forestry 100: 76), Introduction to Legal Processes (POLS 330: 26), Linguistics 320
(Language, Gender, and Power: 71), Law in American Society (POLS 130: 46), Media in
Society (MCA 201: 114), Political Theory (POLS 304: 20), Political Thought (POLS 205: 43),
and Terrorism (POLS 370: 34).26 The Aurora University class was an Introduction to American
Politics course (PSSC 2110: 42 surveys).27 The five non-classroom administrations took place in
the CESL Lounge of Faner Hall (12 surveys), a meeting of the University’s Graduate and
Professional Student Council (GPSC: 31), an introductory barbecue hosted by Iraq Veterans
against the War (27), the Members Meeting and Spring Rush Meeting for the Sigma Alpha

26
27

This list should be identical or substantially similar to that submitted to Stephen Shulman via e-mail 11/26/2012.
This administration also included fraternity student volunteers from the AU campus.
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Epsilon (SAE) fraternity (37), and a meeting of the Public Table at Wakeland Graduate Hall
(24). The response rate for my initial round of administrations was 95.6%.28
While snowball or purposive samples are not ideal for reasons of reliability and validity
(Berg 2006), they are a near-normal throughout the American literatures on race and ethnicity,
and the literature dealing with in-out group relations more broadly. Due to the difficulty of
persuading large groups of strangers to discuss their ethnicity or bedroom practices, multiple
significant articles rely upon samples that were not only non-randomized in nature but also very
small (Chen 1999, Rockquemore 2002, Charles 2003; Wilkins 2004). Wilkins’ widely cited
study of “Puerto Rican wannabes” began with one middle-class girl (2004: 106), and expanded
using a convenience sampling pool that never exceeded 21 respondents (107). Larger-N studies
also frequently contain a snowball component; Meyer recruited 39% of his sample from
organized LGBT groups, and 61% using snowball techniques (1995: 42), while Jordan and
Deluty relied entirely on a sample of volunteers identifying as women who loved other women
(1999). A project based around the partly randomized administration of thousands of survey
instruments within a diverse Research One campus community of 20,000 is on par with many
research project designs in the discipline today.
Despite this, however, I conducted a fully randomized re-test of the results for my
primary survey on the advice of my dissertation panel, in an attempt to test and enhance the
reliability of my Survey A results. During the Spring 2013 term, I administered more than 400
“2.0” copies of Survey A to Southern Illinois University students selected at random. For this re28

Out of 1,047 total survey instruments which I distributed in the classrooms I selected, a total of 44 were returned
to me blank. While this is a high rate of response (Howard & Presser 2004), it is not necessarily a surprising one. All
of my survey instruments were distributed within closed academic settings already approved as suitable by the
instructor of or decision maker for the group, and dealt with topics that are currently controversial and widely
discussed (Hacker 1992; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; #ferguson), such as race, identity, and self-esteem. The
response rate for my second administration of Survey A (94%) was very similar to that for my first round of
administrations; all of my dissertation surveys remain available for examination.
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test of my thesis questions, I downloaded the 2013 SIU-C Catalog (accessible at:
https://opal.rocks.siu.edu/prod/bwckschd.p_disp_dyn_sched) to my laptop computer, contacted
the instructor for the first class listed under the first major to begin with the letter “A” in the
catalog, and requested permission to conduct survey research in her classrooms. I did the same
for the instructor of the first class listed under the first major to begin with the letter “B,” the
letter “C,” the letter “D,” and so on through the alphabet - and followed this technique (second
class listed under the second major beginning with “A”) until I assembled a representative largeN sample of respondents. During this second round of surveying, all respondents were current
SIU-C students surveyed during class in randomly chosen on-campus classrooms.
The final pool for my Survey A “2.0” administrations consisted of 16 SIU-C classrooms.
The classes surveyed were two sessions of Air Force ROTC Officer Training (AS 102: 8 and 12
surveys), College Algebra (Math 108: 24), an Education and Human Services seminar course
(SED 419: 15), Fashion Illustration and Fashion Production II (FDM 112 and FDM: 12 and 7
surveys), Health, Education, and Recreation (ESPY 100: 9), three sessions of Introduction to
Sociology (SOC 108: 110, 44, and 56 surveys), Nutritional Practices (Food/Nutrition 580c: 10),
three sessions of Sign Language (FL 120B: 10, 17, and 22 surveys), a Women’s and Gender
Studies seminar course (WGS: 9), and Special Issues In Social Work Practice (SOCW 350A:
24).29 The response rate for the 2.0 round of surveying was 94%.30 My primary hypothesis
concerning Survey A 2.0 was that this administration would replicate the effects of Survey A,
with (1) all variables to reach standard levels of significance during Survey A having coefficient
29

Fashion Illustration and Fashion Production II both appear in this listing because these were small classes with
largely over-lapping student populations taught by the same instructor, and she requested that I survey both. I
believe that the WGS Seminar I cite was a Feminist Research Methods course, but my notes do not include this
information and I was unable to find the listing for the course in the SIU-C Course Catalog. This course took place
from 8:00-8:50am MWF in the Lawson 221 classroom and was taught by Dr. Pomberg.
30
In total, I received back 401 survey instruments which were fully filled out by student respondents and 24 survey
instruments which were left blank by student respondents during the second round of surveying. The numbers cited
for each class represent filled out surveys handed back to me.
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effects in the same direction during the 2.0 survey and (2) at least 50% of these relationships
again reaching significance.
The same survey instrument (Survey A) was used during both the initial and “2.0” rounds
of surveying and is attached to the body of the dissertation as Appendix A. It is broadly typical
of survey designs in Political Science, employing ordinal scaling of response alternatives
(Schuman & Presser 2004; Manheim et al 2006). The focal items in this survey are four
questions asking respondents how much financial compensation they would require to change
their race, sex, sexual orientation, and religious faith. For example, the Race question reads: “If
this were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your
race? If you change, you will still have your personality and memories. However, you will be
White if you are a member of any non-white minority group, and Black if you are White.” All
other questions follow this format: men are asked about a change to female sex, straights about a
change to LGBT sexual orientation, and Protestant Christians about a change to the Jewish faith.
Members of all minority populations are asked how much money they would require to become
a member of the national majority group.31 Respondents are also allowed to state that they would
be unwilling to change their identity for any amount of money, thus making binary logistic
regression analysis of respondent (yes: no) change willingness possible. Analyzing the responses
to these four principal survey questions allows me to answer my primary research questions, by
examining the correlations if any between minority status and the valuation of core in-group
identities.
Given the modern American inclination to argue that things like life and beauty are
“priceless,” an explanation of the decision to use dollar units to measure my dependent variable

31

All questions included in my surveys appear in the Appendices to this dissertation, generally as part of the surveys
themselves.
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is necessary. Simply put, money is the best metric for measuring the extent to which respondents
value identities because financial valuation is the best metric – in this fallen world – for
determining the worth of just about anything. As economists have known for virtually as long as
there have been economists, the best test of how much an individual values an item or skill is
how much they are willing to pay to obtain it (Smith 1776: 14). The entire legal concept of
punitive damages is based upon the idea that even the non-tangible value of a thing (broken leg,
ruined fish-pond) can be estimated specifically enough to be presented to a jury (Viscusi 2000).32
For this reason, units of financial compensation have frequently been employed by scholars
attempting to place values on partly or wholly intangible qualities like race and beauty (Hacker
1992; Hamermesh & Biddle 1994; Hacker 1995; Hunter 2002). It might be argued that the value
of a dollar varies from person to person, making financial metrics unreliable. However, it is true
first that the value of any conceivable good varies from person to person and second that
including controls for variables like job status and ethnic background in models goes far toward
mitigating this problem. It is difficult to think of a better way to measure identity valuation than
using standardized units that exist entirely to measure the value of goods and ideas.
In addition to the four questions dealing with compensation, I include a number of other
items in Survey A. First, the instrument includes a common measure of Linked Fate. Again,
Linked Fate is the idea that an individual’s chances of success in life are tied to the success or
failure of that individual’s in-group as a whole (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005).
This concept is theoretically and substantively different from the concept of group identification;
it is possible to feel that one’s fate is determined by membership in a particular group without

32

Viscusi makes a point useful for my purposes, if not for his own. He concludes that jurors have no problem setting
punitive damage awards based on the plaintiff’s requested award, “anchoring appeals” by counsel, and “media
coverage of similar awards (2000: 39).” He does conclude that the very formalized set of deterrence-based jury
instructions he favors has little influence on damage awards (38), but this is not relevant here.
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feeling that one shares (for example) the social class or dietary preferences most common for
that group (McWhorter 2000; West 2001; Winter 2007; Gay, Hochschild, & White 2014);
Linked Fate is a distinct concept that can exert an influence on identification, strategic in-group
behavior, and presumably valuation (Chong & Rogers 2005; Simein 2005; Block 2011). As
one’s perceptions of the strategic importance of in-group identity can influence the degree to
which they value that identity (Cornell & Hartmann 2006: 59-60), and as I expect increasing
Linked Fate to be a strong predictor of increasing identity valuation in the American context for
reasons already discussed, Linked Fate is a specific concept that is tested in my models.
During Survey A, Linked Fate was measured using the standard and almost universal
post-Dawson metric used to measure the concept (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005;
Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008). Respondents were asked to what extent they believe that: “what
happens generally to (your people) in this country will have an effect on your life.” This should
be one of the least controversial of my primary items; Dawson’s question is the work-horse – or
better say the Army mule - “on which social scientists have relied” for the academic
measurement of Linked Fate (Simein 2005: 538). Four versions of this question were presented
to respondents: one measured perceptions of linked racial fate, another perceptions of linked sexgroup fate, a third perceptions of linked orientational fate, and a fourth perceptions of linked
religious fate. Answers to all four questions were scored on a 1 to 4 scale, with 1 representing
“affects me not at all” and 4 representing “affects me a great deal.”
Survey A also includes a popular measure of self-esteem. Individual self-esteem can
predict the extent to which one values group identities (Hughes and Demo 1989: 146), and levels
of self-esteem vary among in-groups (Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard 2001). It is thus necessary to
examine esteem effects when measuring variation in levels of identity valuation. The tool that
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was used to measure self-esteem is the Single Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE), which consists of
the item: “I have high self esteem” response-rated on a five point scale ranging from one to five
(Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski 2001).33 While it is a simple instrument, the SISE correlates
extremely highly with results for such older metrics as the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
among men and women, members of all major ethnic groups, and respondents at different levels
of education (2001: 151). The SISE is also highly correlated with such other multiple-item as
the 23 item Coopersmith Scale (Bagley 2005). Given this high level of congruence between
available measures, I employ the shortest and most current.
Survey A also contains a measure of identification with the four in-group identities being
studied. As with self-esteem, levels of in-group identification vary among groups and higher ingroup identification can correlate with increased valuation of membership in a particular ingroup (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003). It is thus necessary to control for identification
levels when measuring the effect of minority status and other variables on identity valuation. I
measure GroupID among respondents using the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM)
(Phinney 1992: 172). I chose to work within the MEIM because it is by far the most widely used
measurement of in-group identification, and its results gel well with those for other popular
metrics (Phinney 1992; Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard 2001).
I further chose to employ the Affirmation & Belonging sub-scale of the instrument,
which consists of four multi-item sub-scales answered on a 1 to 4 scale, because the items that
make it up (“I have a strong sense of belonging to my own group”) apply to members of sexual,
gender, and religious in-groups as well as to members of racial populations (1992: 172). In
contrast, the items making up other MEIM sub-scales like the Ethnic Behaviors and Ethnic
Identity Achievement scales (“I participate in cultural practices of my group, such as special
33

Possible answers on this five-point scale range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
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food”) are very specifically targeted at the scholarly study of ethnicity and lack broader
applicability (1992: 173). Using four iterations apiece of the Affirmation and Belonging MEIM
questions, eight items in total, I was able to measure levels of racial, gender, sexual, and
religious in-group identification among all respondents.
A fourth item appearing in Survey A, targeted specifically at lesbian and gay male
respondents, was a measure of sexual openness. I chose to include this item because being “out
of the closet” can have an extremely strong influence on the perception of gay identity among
LGBT individuals. Broadly speaking, the more widely a gay person discloses her sexual
orientation, the less anxiety and greater self esteem she tends to report (Jordan & Deluty 1998).
Among lesbians, disclosures of homosexuality to gay friends, straight friends, and co-workers all
correlate strongly with self-valuation and perceived support (1998: 47). Given the relationship
between self-valuation and identity valuation (Hughes and Demo 1989: 146), sexual openness is
a necessary independent variable in any model examining predictors of gay identity valuation.
Since simple in/out measures of openness concerning LGBT identity are generally considered
inadequate, I use a five-point scale ranking degree of disclosure of gay identity, with 1
representing “complete nondisclosure” and 5 representing “complete disclosure” (47).34
Survey A also incorporates a series of demographic questions, which produced the
information needed to generate other independent variables for my models. Respondents were
asked to provide their race, sex, sexual orientation, and religious identity; gathering this
information was obviously necessary to answer the dissertation’s primary questions.
Respondents were also asked to identify their political ideology, on the standard left-right
continuum generally employed within the discipline (Wright, Erikson, & McIver 1985;
34

Due to the small size of my gay and bi-sexual sub-samples, respondents providing “1” and “2” scores in response
to the orientation questions were analyzed together as closeted gays. This category was one of four categories in my
sexual orientation variable.
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Kuklinksi et al 1997; Tarman & Sears 2005; Sparks & Watts 2009). Like Wright, Erikson, &
McIver (1985: 471),35 I obtained an alternate measure of political positioning by asking
respondents to identify themselves as in partisan terms as Democrats, Independents, or
Republicans. Individual ideology and partisan affiliation correlate at best imperfectly for large
groups such as Black Americans and moderate Republicans (D’Souza 1995; Box-Steffensmier
and De Boef 1996; Bositis 2002; Frank 2004; Moser 2009), and partisanship and ideology can
independently influence dependent variables (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997;
Tarman & Sears 2005). I chose to measure political/ideological characteristics in the first place
because very strong correlations between political attitudes and attitudes toward out-groups often
exist (Herek 2003; Tarman & Sears 2005; Sparks & Watts 2009; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009).
Finally, respondents were asked to provide their age, job status, and level of education. These
variables influence a range of phenomena and attitudes studied by social scientists, and are
included in most survey instruments (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003;
Pike 2004; Schuman & Presser 2004). The full suite of questions I employed allowed me to
measure the way in which 11 factors affect identity valuation.
I analyzed Survey A data via linear and logistic regression analysis. The dependent
variable in my four primary linear regression models was respondents’ willingness to change
their race/sex/orientation/religion, defined in terms of the level of compensation demanded for
making these changes. The dependent variable in the four logistic regression models was
willingness to change defined in yes: no terms. Independent variables included race, sex, sexual
orientation, religion, self-esteem score, MEIM score, Linked Fate score, political ideology,
35

Given the growing influence of third party activism, I expanded Wright, Erikson, and McIver’s 3 choice
categories to five. Rather than simply “Independent,” respondents were allowed to identify as Greens, true
Independents, or members of a third party other than the Green Party. This proved to have a very limited impact on
my results. On Survey A, 14 respondents identified as Greens, 103 identified as true Independents, and 21 identified
as members of other third parties like the Libertarian Party.
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political party affiliation, age, level of education, and income. Running these models allowed me
to determine the effect of both minority status and other key factor variables on identity
valuation.36 In addition, running logistic models allowed me to calculate predicted probabilities
for the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable.
As the basis for a solid dissertation, Survey A could potentially stand alone. However, in
addition to the randomized 2013 re-administration of Survey A (“the 2.0 survey), I also
conducted a List Experiment using two additional instruments (Surveys B and C). My List
Experiment design was modeled on the experimental design employed by Sniderman and
Carmines (1999). While researching bigotry among whites, Sniderman and Carmines became
concerned that respondents would lie about their racial opinions, and utilized a two-stage covert
methodology to solve this problem (1999: 41). In their List work, Sniderman and Carmines first
presented a control group with a survey containing four-item questions about social problems,
and asked them to state how many items made them angry (48).37 A second group of respondents
was asked five-item questions, identical to those in the first survey except for the addition of one
item dealing with racial bias (48-9).38 Unaware that they could be identified as having expressed
racial prejudices, respondents answered the questions on the second survey honestly (49).
Sniderman and Carmines then measured the difference in the mean number of “makes me angry”

36

In my models, variables were coded as follows. The self-esteem variable was coded on a 1 to 5 scale, with one
indicating the lowest level of self-esteem and five indicating the highest. The MEIM variable was coded on a 1
(strongly non-identified) to 4 (strongly identified) scale. The Linked Fate variable was coded on a 1 to 4 scale,
ranging from low Linked Fate (“what happens to others affects me not at all”) to high Linked Fate. The political
ideology and partisan identification variables were coded on 3 and 5 point scales respectively (conservative,
moderate, liberal; Republican, Other Third Party/Libertarian, true Independent, Democrat, Green) (Wright, Erikson
& McIver 1985). Education, age and income were coded on 4-to-6 point ordinal scales, all ranging from low to high
values of the focal characteristic. Finally, race, sex, orientation, and religion received binary coding (male: female)
during statistical analyses. I designed these variables to measure differences in identity valuation between majority
and minority populations, and plain binary coding is the suitable technique for doing this. Obviously, finer
differences between racial and gender categories were analyzed during cross-tabulation.
37
The four items listed with each question were standard urban annoyances like “athletes asking for too much
money” (48). The survey was presented as part of the 1991 Race and Politics Survey (160).
38
An example would be: “do minorities asking for affirmative action benefits make you angry?”
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responses between the first survey and the second, and used this number to determine the exact
percentage of whites angered by affirmative action and diversity-forward policies (48).
My List Experiment survey administrations followed a nearly identical format. The
control survey (Survey B) asked respondents 10 four-item questions testing their willingness to
take adventurous risks or change characteristics for “any amount of money.39” In contrast, the
focal List survey (Survey C) asked ten five-item questions, including items dealing specifically
with willingness to change race, sex, sexual orientation, and religious tradition.40 Measuring the
differences in the mean number of responses to my focal questions between Survey B and
Survey C allowed me to determine the percentage of respondents willing to change core personal
characteristics under covert conditions. Surveys B and C themselves are attached as Appendices,
immediately following Survey A.
The goals of my List Experiment administrations were (1) to test the “Hacker question”
of whether minority status correlates with identity devaluation using a second sophisticated
method in addition to Survey A/A 2.0 ordinal surveying and (2) to see whether broad trends in
the data obtained using a covert technique designed to elicit respondent honesty (Kuklinski,
Cobb, & Gilens 1997; Kukilinski et al 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Streb, Burrell,
Frederick, & Genovese 2008) differ from broad trends in the data obtained using non-covert
surveying. Given my theory that minority status will not correlate significantly with the
devaluation of minority identities, I expect to find (1) that large majorities of all populations
studied (75+%) will continue to refuse identity changes during the List Experiment and (2) that

39

For example, a question beginning “how many of these things would you be unwilling to do for any amount of
money?” includes the items “join the Catholic priesthood;” “permanently abandon U.S. national citizenship;”
“destroy the White House;” and “abandon all contact with your biological family.” In informal practice runs among
colleagues, the mean number of responses to this question was 2.2.
40
The amended version of the question above includes the item: “permanently change your biological sex.”
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majority: minority differences in mean level of willingness to change identity under List
conditions will be statistically insignificant.
It is important at this point to mention several major limitations of my research design.
First, while Survey A and the List Experiment both provide interesting tests of essentially the
same question, their results are not perfectly comparable. Indeed, an exact re-test of Survey A
results would not be possible using a List Experiment. List designs measure only mean rates of
yes: no response among groups, and data from Surveys B and C never touched on how multiple
variables acting together might influence respondent behavior or veracity. Due to scheduling
conflicts, also, Surveys A, B, and C were not always administered together. To obtain data from
exactly comparable populations, the ideal technique would be administering Survey A to 50% of
the respondents surveyed in a specific venue and Surveys B and C in alternation to the other 50%
of respondents. In fact, Surveys A, B, and C were administered together in roughly 70% of
venues. I began surveying in in-department Political Science classes, and administered only
Survey A in POLS 114 (21 surveys), POLS 205 (43), POLS 130 (46), POLS 433 (24), and the
Conservatism and Libertarianism seminar taught by Dr. Bean (11). I received a total of 145
replies from classrooms where I administered only Survey A.
In contrast, only Surveys B and C were administered during four later administrations: in
Forestry 100 (76 surveys), the CESL Lounge of Faner Hall (12), a mandatory fraternity rush
meeting (37), and the introductory meeting for a Saluki Veterans group (27). I received a total of
152 replies from locales where I administered only Surveys B and C. Seven hundred and six
respondents (70.4%) were surveyed in classrooms where 50% of respondents received Survey A,
and 50% of respondents received Surveys B and C in alternation. Surveys B and C, obviously,
were always administered together, with 50% of respondents receiving Survey B and 50% of
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respondents receiving Survey C. While the lack of total population congruence with Survey A is
not a fatal flaw for a List project focused on testing my thesis questions from a different angle
with a different methodology, my process of administration did create different respondent pools
for Survey A and the List Experiment and this is not ideal.
More broadly, my reliance on a potentially atypical student sample for data might impact
the generalizabilty of results for all three of my surveys. Southern Illinois University is a large
and diverse public institution, and my samples were in fact representative of the national
population along several dimensions. For example, the racial diversity of all my survey
populations closely matched a SIU-C student body which is roughly 70% white, 14.8% Black,
13.7% Latino or other, and 2% Asian (Southern Illinois University Facts 2007). In comparison,
the population of the United States is currently 68% Caucasian, 15% Hispanic, 12% Black, 5%
Asian, and roughly 1% Native (www.census.gov).
However, it cannot be ignored that college student samples generally display atypical
distributions of age and education. Despite SIU’s role as a regional destination school for nontraditional students, the average age of Saluki graduate students is 32 and the average age of
undergraduates below 25 (University Facts 2007) – in contrast to a U.S. median age of 34
(census.gov). My samples, with a mean age of roughly 24, all reflect this reality of younger-thanaverage university student populations. Findings drawn from a young but diverse sample of
1,500 respondents still seem at least as likely to be generalizable as those very valuable prior
findings obtained in atypical survey locations like prison (Jacques and Chason 1977) or a single
community college in the Bronx (Hernandez and Ouellette 1998). However, educated young
people have been repeatedly found to be more liberal, socially and sexually open, and willing to
make changes than members of most other groups (Herek 2003; Pike 2004; Sowell 2005;
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Sessions-Stepp 2008), and this obviously has a potential impact on the generalizability of
anything I find.41
The final and most sweeping methodological limit of this project is that I am testing – and at
present my survey design allows me to test – only “first stage” questions that are not themselves
explicitly political. As I stated in the Literature Review chapter, my dissertation is explicitly
limited by the fact that I am not analyzing the in-practice effects of varying levels of identity
valuation (or of Linked Fate, conservatism, tolerance, etc.) on the actual political behavior of my
respondents. I test the impact of minority status and of Linked Fate on identity valuation, among
a broader range of groups than the racial minority populations on which scholars of Linked Fate
have traditionally focused (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Sanchez 2006; Winter
2007; Junn 2008). But, I do not then go on to measure the impact of increasing Linked Fate or
identity valuation on political behaviors like voting and rallying – as many other authors have
(Chong & Rogers 2005; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010; Austin, Middleton &
Yon 2012). There is a place for first-stage questions in science, in that they help define the
parameters within which debates in the discipline are or should be taking place. However, it must
specifically be noted that any arguments I make about the potential political impact of
phenomena like the non-devaluation of minority identities are largely speculative in nature, and
this is a major brake on the reach of my research.
Moving on to the structure of the project, my dissertation is ten chapters in length with a
four-chapter core. Following an Introduction, Literature Review, Theory chapter, and Methods
précis, the first core chapter discusses the influence of majority as versus minority race - along
41

In fact, a student sample is a logical tool for testing the specific questions I am interested in. Most of the bestknown studies in the American Reflected Appraisals tradition which I am challenging have been conducted using
students or young people (Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Chen 1999; McIntyre 2002; Rockquemore 2002; Charles
2003).
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with other characteristics - on the willingness of respondents to change their race. This chapter,
like all of my core chapters, is centered on analysis of results from both my linear and logistic
models and includes predicted probabilities derived from logistic regressions. The second core
chapter discusses the influence of sex and other characteristics on the willingness of respondents
to change their sex. The third core chapter discusses the influence of orientation and other
characteristics on the willingness of respondents to change their sexual orientation. The fourth
core chapter discusses the influence of religious status and other characteristics on the
willingness of respondents to change their spiritual beliefs. Survey A, Survey A 2.0, and List
results are incorporated into each chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
PREDICTORS OF THE VALUATION OF RACIAL IDENTITY

The first question I address is whether minority race correlates significantly with the
lowered valuation of racial identity. As will remain the case throughout my Sex, Orientation, and
Religion chapters, I test this question using (1) linear regression models analyzing the effect of
race and other factor variables on the level of compensation demanded by respondents to change
their race (2) logistic analyses analyzing the effect of my independent variables on a binary (yes:
no) dependent variable representing willingness to change race, and (3) List Experiment analysis
of the valuation of racial identity under covert conditions. This chapter incorporates analysis of
data gathered using my principal survey instrument during my first and primary survey
administration (Survey A), data gathered using the same survey instrument during a randomized
redux of my initial surveying (Survey A 2.0), and data gathered using my paired List Experiment
survey instruments (Surveys B & C).
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Table One: Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by Race (Survey A)42
Valuation Level

Whites

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

6 (.02)

All Racial
Minorities
7 (.05)

Blacks

Hispanics

Asians

(N=307)

(N=137)

3 (.03)
(N=87)

2 (.07)
(N=29)

1 (.07)
(N=14)

For $25 Million or Less 40 (.13)

8 (.06)

5 (.06)

0

2 (.14)

For $25-50 Million

17 (.06)

3 (.02)

2 (.02)

1 (.04)

0

For $50-75 Million

13 (.04)

3 (.02)

2 (.02)

0

1 (.07)

For $75-100 Million

10 (.03)

1 (.01)

1 (.01)

0

0

For $100 Million-Plus

33 (.11)

12 (.09)

5 (.06)

5 (.17)

1 (.07)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

188 (.61)

103 (.75)

69 (.79)

21 (.72)

9 (.64)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
Standard Deviation

5.71 (1.95)

6.15 (1.80)*

6.26 (1.69)*

6.27 (1.67)

5.57 (2.28)

Because variables often operate differently across different in-groups like racial and
ethnic populations (Pike 2004), and minority and majority populations certainly might value
their racial identities to different levels and because of different stimuli (Harris 1993; Hacker
1995; Horowitz 2000; McIntyre 2002; Sinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003), I conduct linear and
logistic analyses not only of the entire sample but also separately among both white and minority
sub-samples.
42

In all models appearing in this chapter, significance is measured using “stars” thus: one star indicates significance
at the .05 level, two stars indicate significance at the .01 level, and three stars indicate significance at the .001 level.
Stars appearing next to the mean response rates for minority group respondents indicate the significance of the
difference between these mean response rates and the mean response rate for majority group respondents. Also,
responses from a total of (7) Middle Eastern and Native American respondents are included in the “All inority
Respondents” column but are not independently analyzed in a column of this table.
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Table Two: Population Size and Rates of Identity Change Willingness by Race (2.0)
Valuation Level

Whites

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

9 (.05)

All Racial
Minorities
5 (.03)

Blacks

Hispanics

Asians

(N=198)

(N=147)

2 (.02)
(N=97)

1 (.05)
(N=20)

0
(N=14)

For $25 Million or Less 17 (.09)

2 (.01)

1 (.01)

1 (.05)

0

For $25-50 Million

4 (.02)

2 (.01)

3 (.01)

0

1 (.07)

For $50-75 Million

3 (.02)

2 (.01)

0

0

0

For $75-100 Million

10 (.05)

3 (.02)

2 (.02)

1 (.05)

0

For $100 Million-Plus

16 (.08)

7 (.05)

5 (.05)

1 (.05)

0

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

139 (.70)

126 (.86)

86 (.89)

16 (.80)

13 (.93)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
Standard Deviation

5.99 (1.88)

6.54
(1.36)**

6.69
(1.10)***

6.3 (1.72)

6.71 (1.07)

I treat a starting hypothesis as fully confirmed where (1) a factor variable that was
predicted to have a statistically significant effect on racial identity valuation did have that effect
in the primary (all respondents) linear regression model or primary logistic regression model
during Survey A, and (2) this effect was replicated during Survey A 2.0. I treat a hypothesis as
confirmed for Survey A respondents where the factor variable had a significant effect in the
predicted direction among Survey A respondents, but this effect was not replicated during
Survey A 2.0. Finally, I treat a hypothesis as confirmed for a particular sub-population of
respondents, but not for all respondents, where the factor variable had the predicted significant

80

effect only for that sub-population of respondents but not for others. As the List Experiment is
intended principally to test the relationship between my four core characteristic identities and
identity valuation, List results will not influence my analysis of the relationship between most
variables (age and conservatism being partial exceptions) and identity valuation. However, I do
examine List data while analyzing the success of my primary Race hypothesis; I would treat this
hypothesis as confirmed in the List context if minority status did not correlate with decreased
identity valuation under List conditions.
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Table Three: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (All)43
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.545 (.225)*
-.003 (.088)
.383 (.114)***
.114 (.101)
.139 (.148)
.197 (.092)*
.351 (.198)
-.257 (.250)
-.053 (.196)
-.141 (.112)
-.061 (.092)
.155 (.150)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .099
Number of Observations = 402

To outline my ordering scheme for this and all subsequent chapters, I first analyze the
effect of race and Linked Fate on racial identity valuation and discuss whether results for these
variables support my core theory. I next analyze the effect of those variables that had a
significant and hypothesized effect on identity valuation among all respondents across both
surveys. I then analyze the effect of those variables that had a significant effect among all
respondents but were not hypothesized to have such an effect. Next, I analyze the effect of those
variables significant among one of the two populations of survey respondents but not among the
other. Finally, I briefly analyze the effect of those variables significant only among one or more
sub-populations of respondents. Where a variable had a significant effect among both all
respondents and simultaneously among one or more sub-populations of respondents analyzed
independently, discussion of that variable’s effect obviously takes place during the section of the

43

As is standard in the discipline, in my regression models one asterisk “star” represents significance at the .05
level. Two stars represent significance at the .01 level; three stars represent significance at the .001 level.
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chapter dealing with whole-population effects. In this situation, a discussion of the variable’s
effect among all respondents is followed by a shorter discussion of its sub-population effects.
Across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0, my hypothesis that minority status would not
correlate with identity devaluation was confirmed. Within the Survey A respondent pool
(N=499), not only did minority race not correlate with lowered valuation of minority racial
identities, the reverse was actually true to a statistically significant degree. Simple crosstabulation analyses appear in Table One, and provide a good first-stage method of analyzing
white and minority levels of identity valuation. Overall, 38.8% of whites (119 Caucasian
respondents) were willing to change their race while 61.2% of whites were not willing to do so.
In contrast, 79% of Blacks (69 of 83), twenty-one of 29 Hispanics (72.41%), nine of 14 Asians
and Polynesians (64.28%), and all Native American respondents (100%) announced that they
would never change their race. While the mean number of units of compensation demanded by
whites to make racial changes – on a 1-7 scale – was 5.71, the mean figure for Blacks was 6.26
and for all minorities 6.15. These differences were both statistically significant at standard (.05)
levels. Survey A 2.0 responses were very similar. In response to that instrument, 70.2% of whites
but 89.1% of Blacks, 80% of Hispanics, and 80% of Asians to ever change their race,
transitioning from Caucasian to minority status increased the mean amount of compensation
demanded for changes by (.638) units, and this difference was statistically significant.
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Table Four: Linear Regression - 2.0 Survey Compensation for Racial Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.638 (.219)**
-.012 (.092)
.089 (.066)
.104 (.104)
.334 (.153)*
-.228 (.136)
.085 (.213)
-.262 (.233)
.103 (.209)
-.174 (.156)
.316 (.105)**
-.036 (.193)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .098
Number of Observations = 304

Regression results for Survey A and Survey A 2.0 further support the conclusion that
minority race does not correlate with lowered valuation of racial identity. In primary linear and
primary logistic regression models across both instruments, a minority race variable had a
substantial positive effect on both the amount of compensation demanded by respondents for
racial change and the likelihood of them agreeing to the change. The dependent variable in my
linear regression models was a seven-unit metric representing the level of compensation
respondents would require to change their race. Logistic regression models employed a binary
dependent variable measuring whether respondents would ever agree to change their race.
Variables in both models included race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, education, ideology,
political party affiliation, age, job status, level of racial identification, level of Linked Fate, and
self-esteem.
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Table Five: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (Whites)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.059 (.115)
.439 (.137)**
.081 (.129)
.203 (.197)
.195 (.106)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.277 (.252)
-.014 (.339)
.088 (.248)
-.183 (.144)
-.024 (.114)
.350 (.192)

R2 = .092
Number of Observations = 276

In Survey A’s linear model, membership in a racial minority group increased the mean
compensation demanded by respondents for changing race by roughly one-half one of the
dependent variable’s seven levels. Minority race had similar effects in the Survey A logistic
model depicted in Figure Five; the effect of the majority/minority race variable on that model’s
simplified binary dependent variable was again both statistically (.003; t= -2.93) and
substantively significant. Predicted probabilities drawn from this logistic model do a good job of
illustrating the practical effect of race on willingness to change racial identity. While the median
white respondent was roughly 44% likely to change their race, the median minority respondent
was only 26% likely to do so, a difference of 18%. Survey A 2.0 results were almost identical;
the minority race variable was again a significant predictor of increased identity valuation in both
primary linear and logistic (.001 level) regression models.
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Table Six: Linear Regression - 2.0 Survey Compensation for Racial Change (Whites)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.032 (.127)
.181 (.094)
.020 (.155)
.613 (.216)*
-.328 (.191)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.031 (.289)
-.379 (.426)
.466 (.299)
-.339 (.253)
.410 (.153)*
.167 (.277)

R2 = .120
Number of Observations = 181

In one sense, the apparent finding that racial minority status does not correlate with racial
identity devaluation in the American context is not completely surprising. Empirical research
finds that members of minority racial and ethnic populations often have high levels of personal
and collective esteem, even relative to majority group members in the same region (Mackie
1983; Horowitz 2000; Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse 2003; Guenther &
Mulligan 2013). However, it would be difficult to deny that much American social science
literature concerning issues of race has focused on the presumed subjugation of Blacks and
Latinos (Harris 1993; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002; Hunter 2002), and the presumed hypervaluation of white racial identity and devaluation of minority identities resulting from this
(Hacker 1995). Given this body of scholarship, the discovery of a positive correlation between
minority race and racial identity valuation – with roughly 40% of Caucasians but only 20-25% of
minorities willing to change race in the Survey A dataset – certainly is a notable one. This result
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is a direct challenge to the famous conclusion that the average white would demand $50 million
to change her race if this were possible. Under very similar classroom conditions, during another
Large-N experimental design including diverse populations, typical Blacks and Latinos
demanded much more.44
However, List Experiment results complicate the finding that the relationship between
American minority status and racial identity valuation is positive. As described at length in the
Methods chapter, List Experiments are a covert survey technique, employing a divided pool of
respondents, designed to prevent respondents from having to admit tough or unpopular attitudes
even to themselves (Sniderman & Carmines 1997: 41). These experiments have been utilized as
a best practice by researchers seeking to measure the true level of corruption in potentially
dangerous LDC states (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al 2012), support for female Presidential candidates
(Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese 2008), and actual animus toward a Back President
(Redlawsk, Tobert, & Franco 2008).

44

This is literally accurate. The fact that 79.3% of Black respondents and 72.4% of Latino respondents would never
change their race, and almost no members of these groups (only 3 Latinos, for example) would change their race for
less than $100 million means by definition that minority respondents gave estimates of their racial valuation far in
excess of the $50 million mean figure provided by white respondents in Hacker’s experiment (1992: 32).
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Table Seven: Mean Rates of List Experiment Response by Racial Group45
Mean Response
Survey B Mean/
Standard Deviation

Caucasians
1.68 (.95)
(N=181)

All Minorities
1.28 (1)
(72)

Blacks
1.23 (1.1)
(40)

Hispanics
1.56 (.73)
(9)

Asians
1 (.96)
(14)

Survey C Mean/
Standard Deviation

1.82 (1.24)
(N = 171)

1.57 (1.2)
(82)

1.49 (1.22)
(53)

2 (1.06)
(15)

1.55 (1.29)
(11)

Survey B/Survey C:
Difference in Mean
Items Selected

.14

.29***

.26

.44

.55

I employ a List Experiment modeled on those used by Sniderman (Kuklinksi &
Sniderman 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997) to (1) provide a second sophisticated
methodological technique of testing whether minority status correlates with identity devaluation
and (2) see whether results obtained using covert surveying differed dramatically from results
obtained using standard ordinal surveying within essentially the same community. My
hypothesis is that List results will support the thesis of this dissertation: minority status does not
correlate with decreased identity valuation. I expect to find that (1) large majorities of all
populations surveyed will again refuse to change in-group identities under List conditions,46 and
(2) there will be no significant majority: minority differences in mean level of willingness to

45

In all models appearing in this chapter, significance is measured using “stars” thus: one star indicates significance
at the .05 level, two stars indicate significance at the .01 level, and three stars indicate significance at the .001 level.
What is being tested is whether or not between-group differences in the increased number of mean answers for my
identity questions between Survey B and Survey C – which exactly indicate the level of willingness to change
identity for each group – are statistically significant. The data in Figure One was generated using Question Three on
List Experiment surveys B and C.
46
I define a “large majority” as a majority of greater than 75%. This is not an arbitrary standard; a 75%
preponderance/majority is viewed by definition as a “clear and convincing” margin in the law among other
disciplines (Mandel 2006). This is also a figure comparably similar to the percentages of racial and religious ingroup respondents unwilling to change during ordinal surveying.
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change identity.47 In mathematical terms, point (2) means I hypothesize that majority: minority
differences in (#Items Selected on Survey C – (#Items Selected on Survey B)) – an exact
measure of willingness to change identities – will not be statistically significant.
List results pertaining to racial identity valuation did not confirm these hypotheses, and
were somewhat surprising in light of the conclusions of Survey A and Survey A 2.0. A large
numerical majority of both majority (86%) and minority (71%) respondents remained unwilling
to change their race; Hypothesis (1) was confirmed for whites, and African Americans missed
the 75% cutoff threshold by 1%. However, Hypothesis (2) completely failed; minority status
correlated negatively and to a statistically significant degree with racial identity valuation. In
response to Survey B, the control instrument, the mean score for whites replying to Question 3
(the question to which I added an item dealing with race on Survey C) was 1.68. The mean score
for Blacks was 1.23. Means for the other racial groups sampled were fairly similar to these two
averages. Among Hispanics, the mean score was 1.56. Among Asian Americans, the mean score
for the sub-sample was 1. Middle Eastern and Native American respondent pools were too small
– 6 and 3 persons respectively – for a useful quantitative analysis of these respondents to be
conducted during this chapter. However, for purposes of comparison, the mean for the Middle
Eastern sample was 1.17 and that for the Native sample was 2.67.

47

I test statistical significance in the List context by using a difference-of-means t-test to measure the extent to
which levels of increased willingness to change the core characteristic in question differ between groups in response
to Survey C.
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Table Eight: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (Minorities)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.092 (.131)
.200 (.209)
.529 (.161)***
.158 (.231)
.160 (.228)

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.522 (.315)
-.497 (.357)
.053 (.312)
-.021 (.177)
-.091 (.153)
-.252 (.239)

R2 = .185
Number of Observations = 126

All of these means obviously changed between surveys B and C, in response to the
addition of an item dealing with willingness to change racial identity to Question 3.48 Within the
Caucasian sub-sample, the mean score for whites in response to Question 3 grew to 1.82, an
increase of .14 from the mean response of 1.68 on Survey B. This difference indicates that
roughly 14% of whites were willing to change race in response to Survey C.

48

As a note, all changes in the mean number of responses given to each question between Surveys B and C – as
opposed to the difference in increased willingness between groups answering each question – were statistically
significant at at least the .001 level. This obviously indicates that the differences between (say) the mean number of
answers for Question 3 on Survey B and the mean number of Question 3 answers on Survey C reflects actual
respondent attitudes rather than random chance.
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Table Nine: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Racial Change (Minorities)

Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.020 (.131)
-.064 (.086)
.155 (.130)
.011 (.189)
-.296 (.223)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.023 (.217)
-.087 (.246)
-.371 (.292)
.045 (.180)
.229 (.137)
-.272 (.275)

R2 = .092
Number of Observations = 123

In response to Survey C, members of all minority groups were on average more willing to
change their race than Caucasians, both absolutely and to a statistically significant degree.
Among African Americans, the mean number of (Q3) responses was 1.49, up from a mean of
1.23 in response to the equivalent question on Survey B. This indicates that roughly 26% of
Blacks were willing to change their race in response to Survey C. Among the Hispanic sample,
the mean number of responses to the Survey C question was 2.00, up from a mean of 1.56 on
Survey B. This difference of .44 indicates that 44% of Latino respondents were willing to change
their race in the List scenario, while 56% were not. Results for the Asian sample were similar,
with the changes even more dramatic. The mean number of Survey C answers given by Asians
was 1.55, up from a mean of 1.00 on Survey B. This difference means that 55% of Asians agreed
to change their race in response to my List Experiment question. Overall, 29% of minority
respondents agreed to change their race in response to Survey C. Hypothesis (1) was not
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confirmed for the minority sample as a whole (75% > 71%). Hypothesis (2) was also not
confirmed; the difference between Caucasian and minority levels of mean willingness to change
race was significant at the .0005 level, and all differences in identity valuation between the
Caucasian sub-sample and individual minority sub-samples were also significant.
List Experiment results pertaining to the valuation of racial identity are, to say the least,
interesting. Although I will not compare the numerical results of differently worded instruments,
it is obviously noticeable that Caucasian status correlated to a statistically significant negative
degree with racial identity valuation across both the Large-N snowball sample for Survey A and
the Large-N randomized sample for Survey A 2.0. In fact, Caucasians were more likely than any
other racial group to consent to racial changes. In response to the List Experiment, however,
Caucasian status was a significant positive predictor of refusal to change race. This result
potentially indicates the continued operation of social desirability bias among American whites.
Dozens of studies have concluded that Caucasian respondents often give dishonest or vague
answers to questions dealing with race, out of fear of admitting socially unacceptable attitudes to
others or to themselves (Kuklinski & Cobb 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; McIntyre 2002;
Krysan & Mick 2003; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). List Experiments can serve as a best
practice for uncovering the true extent of attitudes toward such touchy topics among respondent
populations (Kuklinski & Cobb 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Redlawsk, Tolbert, &
Franco 2008; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese 2008). Assuming that openly expressing a
strong preference for Caucasian status is currently a socially unpopular position to take (D’Souza
1991; Taylor 1992; D’Souza 1994; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002; Safran 2014), it may well be
that most whites recognize that their racial status has value (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995) or simply
enjoy being white – but feel most comfortable saying so under covert conditions.
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Table Ten: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (All Respondents)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Status
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.810 (.277)**
-.056 (.103)
-.425 (.134)**
-.013 (.122)
-.349 (.181)
-.094 (.109)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.516 (.241)*
.251 (.293)
.103 (.235)
.175 (.135)
-.056 (.111)
-.327 (.194)

R2 = .085
Number of Observations = 403

Dealing with the strong but repressed racial identity valuation of whites may well be a
critical task to confront the United States during this century. Among conservative scholars, it is
taken as a given that educated American whites are asked to praise essentially every culture but
their own – D’Souza provides a poignant description of crowds chanting “Hey-Hey, Ho-Ho –
Western culture’s got to go!” on Standford’s serene main lawn (1991: 59) – and respond to this
by publicly pretending to agree with multi-cultural tenets they in fact ignore or disdain (Steele
1990; D’Souza 1991; Taylor 1992; Eastland 1994; D’Souza 1994; Kors & Silverglate 1998;
Foskett 2004; Sowell 2005; Williams 2006). This thesis is not mere ideological speculation. List
Experiments and other covert studies by senior scholars have found that real levels of anger at
(for example) affirmative action approach 100% among segments of the white population
(Kuklinski & Sniderman 1997: 408), and that white liberal claims to support these programs are
essentially lies (Sniderman & Carmines 1997: 79).
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Table Eleven: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (All Respondents)
Variable Level

Chance of Racial
Change

White
Non-White

43.94%
26.33%

Male
Female

43.94%
32.68%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

43.94%
50.14%
58.89%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

41.29%
43.94%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

39.69%
48.35%
52.73%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

52.60%
43.94%
35.84%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

46.23%
43.94%
39.48%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

43.94%
36.63%
30.28%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

46.78%
43.94%
42.59%

Low Racial Group Identification
High Racial Group identification

60.08%
25.77%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

44.47%
43.74%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

47.88%
45.24%
42.68%
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Table Twelve: 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (All Respondents)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

-1.325 (.357)***
.043 (.135)
-.103 (.095)
-.113 (.154)
-.758 (.238)***
.329 (.200)
.046 (.313)
.334 (.332)
-.246 (.331)
.240 (.237)
-.431 (.159)**
.143 (.280)

Minority Status
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .111
Number of Observations = 304

Some hidden anger or unstated in-group identification among whites may be attributable
to sophisticated forms of bigotry like “symbolic racism (Wood 1994; Tarman & Sears 2005;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009).” However, contemporary levels of actual expressed bigotry
approach all-time lows (Schuman et al 1997; Plant & DeVine 2009; Schafer & Shaw 2009); in a
nation which recently elected a Black man President by a near-landslide (Lewis-Beck, Tien, &
Nadeau 2010; Redlawsk 2011). Almost certainly, many whites honestly feel that they cannot
express discomfort about failed social policies (Murray 1980; Eastland 1994; Williams 2006), or
a healthy attachment to their own identity (McIntyre 2002), without being attacked – and this
causes anger.49 My results certainly do not provide conclusive evidence of hidden hypervaluation of racial identity among whites: racial minority status was a positive predictor of
identity valuation during two of my three tests.
49

McIntyre, while arguing that many white junior scholars display unconscious “privilege,” also points out that
whites speaking honestly about race or identity valuation even in classroom settings fear being labeled racist and
failed (2002: 34). This may well be a rational fear. McIntyre is no shrill fanatic, but a stated goal of her pedagogy is
to make junior scholars understand “the excruciatingly difficult fact” that “there is no positive in whiteness (2002:
39).
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Table Thirteen: 2.0 Survey Probability of Racial Change (All Respondents)
Variable Level

Chance of Racial
Change

White
Non-White

17.51%
5.53%

Male
Female

16.83%
17.51%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

17.51%
23.28%
30.76%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

21.47%
17.51%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

17.51%
26.10%
31.61%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

30.91%
17.51%
9.49%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

12.05%
15.40%
19.94%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

19.75%
22.86%
26.56%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

31.10%
17.51%
12.47%

Low Racial Group Identification
High Racial Group identification

24.94%
14.82%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

21.14%
16.17%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

16.15%
16.89%
18.30%
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However, I also find that Caucasian status was a positive predictor of identity valuation
during my one covert test, and that no more than roughly 30% of Caucasians were willing to
change race during any test. If Caucasians in fact display levels of in-group identification and
identity valuation similar to those for other groups, but feel constrained from expressing this, an
honest national discourse on race needs to tackle this problem along with others.
Like Caucasians and unlike other minority groups, African Americans displayed high
rates of identity valuation in response to the test condition of the List Experiment (Survey C).
Hypothesis (1) was in fact confirmed for African Americans, if the 74% rate of refusal to change
race among Black respondents is rounded up by 1%. The difference between this and the
Caucasian change rate did reach significance (p =.016), but the difference between the two
groups in substantive willingness was only about 12%. Interestingly, the percentage of African
Americans willing to change their race was remarkably consistent across Survey A, Survey A
2.0, and Survey C – varying between 20% and just about 25%. Without comparing instruments,
all of my Large-N survey administrations record the fact that between 74% and roughly 80% of
Black Americans would be totally unwilling to change their race. This is itself a significant
finding, in that it rebuts the hypothesis that oppression causes many or most Blacks to devalue
their racial identities (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997). Overall, African Americans were
significantly less likely than whites to change their race during two tests, and slightly but
significantly more likely to do so during a third. This finding of consistently high levels of
honestly stated racial identity valuation among Blacks gels with the well-attested concept of
oppositional African American identities centered on Linked Fate (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001;
Simein 2005; Block 2011).
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Table Fourteen: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (Whites)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.033 (.127)
-.416 (.153)*
.141 (.144)
-.403 (.219)
-.068 (.119)

Sex
Sexual Preference
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.310 (.284)
.080 (.367)
.209 (.275)
.247 (.161)
-.083 (.127)
-.485 (.229)*

R2 = .067
Number of Observations = 275

List Experiment results for Hispanic and Asian respondents diverged sharply from results
for while and even Black Americans. Under List conditions, Caucasian status was a positive
predictor of racial identity valuation. While this was not true for African American status, Black
respondents continued to display stable and high levels of identity valuation. In contrast,
Hispanic and Asian respondents displayed levels of valuation lower than those measured among
any non-LGBT group during the List Experiment. Fully 54.5% of Asians taking the List
Experiment survey were willing to change their race, along with 44.4% of Hispanic Survey C
respondents.

98

Table Fifteen: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (Whites)
Variable Level

Chance of Racial
Change

Male
Female

38.86%
31.71%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

38.86%
41.00%
43.40%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

34.42%
38.86%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

33.32%
44.86%
50.93%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

48.71%
38.86%
30.06%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

42.01%
40.40%
36.03%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

38.86%
28.38%
20.44%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

43.87%
38.86%
36.55%

Low Racial Group Identification
High Racial Group identification

59.03%
22.33%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

35.69%
45.72%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

36.96%
38.13%
39.67%
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Table Sixteen: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (Whites)

Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.153 (.163)
-.116 (.117)
-.051 (.190)
-.915 (.318)
.363 (.244)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.080 (.365)
.773 (.581)
-.715 (.377)
.401 (.309)
-.391 (.194)**
-.187 (.357)

R2 = .101
Number of Observations = 181

The literature dealing with immigrant-origin minorities may help explain this result.
Multiple scholars have contrasted native-born American minorities (such as African, Native, and
Appalachian Americans) with foreign immigrants more likely to seek social assimilation (Hacker
1992; Sowell 1994; McWhorter 2000; McClain et al 2006). As opposed to members of nativeborn minority groups who construct oppositional identities during decades of internecine conflict
(Dawson 2001; Simein 2005), immigrant-origin minorities often identify with mainstream
American culture and “forcefully resist” designation with groups like Blacks (McClain et al
2006: 573) The archetype of the assimilation-seeking ethnic or minority immigrant is so
prevalent within both American culture and the discipline, indeed, that a question commonly
used to measure symbolic racism against Blacks is: “Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other
minorities overcame discrimination and worked their way up – should African Americans do the
same without any special favors (Speakman & Moskowitz 2009: 8)?”
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Like most archetypes, this one seems to hold more than a kernel of truth. In reports from
the field, Tatum (1997) quotes Hispanic teenagers as feeling embarrassed about their dual
language fluency (40), and an assimilationist Japanese American as thinking of himself “as a
middle-class white person (165),” while Chen interviews Chinese men who call themselves
“white boys” and admit sometimes wanting to be white (1999: 596). To be clear, there is also
extensive evidence of Linked Fate and healthy levels of identity valuation among immigrant
origin minorities (Tatum 1997; Chen 1999; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008). Hispanics and Asians
displayed slightly higher levels of identity valuation than whites during Survey A and Survey A
2.0, and I did not expect Asian or Hispanic status – or minority status, due partly to low levels of
identity valuation among Hispanic and Asian respondents – to be a significant negative predictor
of valuation during the List Experiment. The discovery of a significant negative relationship
between minority status and identity valuation under List conditions flatly contradict my starting
hypotheses, while also clashing with Survey A and Survey A 2.0 results. However, established
literatures concerning assimilationist trends among immigrant minority groups (Hacker 1992;
Sowell 1994; McClain et al 2006), and respondents’ increased likelihood of admitting touchy
truths under covert conditions (Kuklinski et al 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Kane,
Craig, & Wald 2004; Redlawsk, Tolbert, & Franco 2008), provide a potential explanation for the
unexpected relationships between minority (and white) status and identity valuation which I
uncover under List conditions.
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Table Seventeen: Survey A - Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (Minorities)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

-.261 (.196)
-.565 (.309)
-.522 (.262)*
-.395 (.391)
-.457 (.388)

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Preference
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-1.248 (.525)*
.296 (.575)
-.225 (.499)
-.231 (.302)
.014 (.244)
.289 (.410)

R2 = .163
Number of Observations = 126

Like the results concerning the impact of minority status on racial identity valuation, my
results for the impact of Linked Fate on valuation were mixed. During Survey A, Linked Fate
was a statistically and substantively significant predictor of valuation among respondents who
were members of racial minority groups. Linked Fate was non-significant in both the allrespondents linear and all-respondents logistic regressions during Survey A, but reached
significance as a positive predictor of racial identity valuation in both linear and logistic
regressions among minorities. The effect of Linked Fate on valuation was sizable in substantive
as well as statistical terms. While I did not standardize coefficients, it is notable that this multi
(4)-unit variable had the largest (B) coefficient among all variables (.529) in linear regression
among minorities, along with one of the smallest standard error terms (.161). Any one-unit
change along the continuum used to measure Linked Fate thus increased the amount of
compensation respondents demanded for racial changes by more than ½ level.
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Table Eighteen: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (Minorities)
Variable Level

Chance of Racial
Change

Male
Female

25.29%
9.87%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

9.87%
13.40%
19.38%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

11.69%
9.87%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

9.87%
6.76%
6.15%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

13.80%
9.87%
7.66%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

15.31%
9.87%
5.22%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

9.87%
13.74%
19.30%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

9.87%
9.99%
10.35%

Low Racial Group Identification
High Racial Group identification

36.46%
6.52%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

23.00%
6.58%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

20.08%
12.50%
7.93%
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Table Nineteen: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Likelihood of Racial Change
(Minorities)

Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

- .271 (.288)
-.033 (.192)
-.044 (.296)
-.456 (.436)
.272 (.465)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.361 (.755)
-.041 (.565)
1.123 (.747)
-.058 (.416)
-.719 (.354)*
1.027 (.620)

R2 = .092
Number of Observations = 123

As Table Eighteen indicates, Linked Fate had a similar strong positive effect on racial
identity valuation among minorities when valuation was measured using a logistic rather than
linear dependent variable. In predicted probabilities drawn from Survey A logistic runs, a median
minority respondent at the lowest level of Linked Fate would be 22.99% likely to change her
racial identity, while a median minority respondent at the highest level of Linked Fate would be
only 6.58% likely to do so. In contrast, Linked Fate had no statistically relevant effect on identity
valuation among whites – being “significant” at the .531 level with a t-value of - .63 in linear
runs. Survey A data indicate that Linked Fate has a significant positive influence on identity
valuation among members of racial minority groups, while I find no evidence of a similar
relationship between Linked Fate and valuation among American whites.
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Obviously, finding a significant positive relationship between Linked Fate and identity
valuation among minority respondents to Survey A did not fully confirm my hypothesis that
Linked Fate would positively influence identity valuation among all respondent populations.
However, this finding does provide empirical support for a key hypothesis of this dissertation:
that minority status will not predict in-group identity devaluation due largely to the operation of
Linked Fate among minority group members. As noted, the central claim of Linked Fate Theory
is that members of minority in-groups often respond to oppression or ethnic competition by
coming to view group unity as necessary for survival (Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Walker 2007;
Block 2011), rather than with the identity devaluation some scholars have suggested (Hacker
1992; Tatum 1997; Chen 1999). While Linked Fate can exist among all groups, and was
hypothesized to positively influence identity valuation among all groups, the concept is generally
associated with minority populations (Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008). Finding that
Linked Fate in fact did specifically predict identity valuation among a Large-N population of
minority group members is a conclusion consistent with and additional to Linked Fate Theory.
However, this finding must be presented with a caveat. While the influence of Linked Fate on
valuation was in the expected positive direction in all six regression models based on Survey A
2.0 data, coefficients for this relationship did not reach standard levels of statistical significance
during the 2.0 survey. There is almost literally no doubt that increasing Linked Fate has a
positive influence on identity valuation, especially among minorities. However, further research
to determine the strength of this relationship is needed.
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The dichotomy between Linked Fate’s role as a significant predictor of identity valuation
(among minority respondents) during Survey A and as a positive but non-significant predictor of
valuation during Survey A 2.0 also existed for several other variables. All told, six factor
variables other than minority race were significant predictors of racial identity valuation during
either Survey A (GroupID, political partisanship, female sex, increasing age among whites) or
the 2.0 survey (personal ideology, job status), but none reached significance during both
administrations. Obviously, this was unexpected and unwelcome. However, 2.0 results for
almost all of my variables do not indicate that Survey A results were statistical aberrations. Eight
of the ten unique variables to reach significance during model runs based on Survey A data (for
example, GroupID during OLS regression among all respondents) had effects in the same
direction in the same model during the re-survey, and most of these variables again had a large
substantive impact on valuation.
In addition to minority race as an independent variable in both the linear and logistic
regressions among all respondents and the Linked Fate variable in the linear regression among
minorities, variables to perform in this manner included the in-group identification variable in all
four models in which it was previously significant and the age variable in the Caucasians-only
logistic regression. All told, only the minority race variable running in the primary logistic and
OLS regressions reached significance across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0, but the effects of
8/10 unique variables significant during Survey A were again in the expected direction during
the 2.0 survey.
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Group identification provides perhaps the best example of a factor variable displaying
varying levels of significance but consistent direction of effect across the two survey
instruments. During Survey A, group identification was a significant positive predictor of
identity valuation among all respondents in both linear and logistic regression models. These
identification effects were sizable in substantive terms; a median individual at the lowest level of
racial identification had a 60.08% chance of agreeing to change his race, while a median
respondent at the highest level of racial identification had only a 25.77% chance of agreeing to
change race. In addition to reaching significance among all respondents, the in-group
identification variable also reached statistical significance as a positive predictor of racial
identity valuation among white respondents analyzed alone. Among whites, a median
respondent at the lowest level of racial in-group identification had a 59.03% chance of agreeing
to change his race, while a median respondent at the highest level of identification had only a
22.33% chance of agreeing to do so; the change willingness differential between low and highidentification white respondents was 37%.
Despite the fact that there were roughly twice as many white respondents as minority
respondents in my Survey A sample, Table Fourteen illustrates that a variable measuring group
identification also came very close to standard levels of significance in the logistic regression
among minorities alone (.067; t= -1.83). This effect of in-group identification on valuation
among minorities was also a substantive one. In predicted probabilities models among
minorities, the median respondent at the lowest level of in-group identification was 36.46%
likely to change her race, while the median respondent at the highest level of identification was
only 6.52% likely to change hers.
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During Survey A, group identification did not approach significance when analyzed as a
predictor variable in linear regressions among minorities (.346; t= .096), and the group
identification variable clearly had a more reliable overall effect among whites than among the
smaller sub-population of minority respondents. More importantly, group identification did not
reach significance as a predictor of racial identity valuation in any model during Survey A 2.0.
However, the effect of the group identification variable was in the expected positive direction in
five of six models during the 2.0 retest, and the variable came within .005 of repeating as
significant among the Caucasian sub-population. Had my models been run as one-tailed tests, or
had I opted to measure statistical significance at the (.10) rather than (.05) level, group
identification would have been a significant predictor of identity valuation in several models in
which it technically was not – including the logistic regression among minorities during Survey
A and the linear regression among Caucasians during Survey A 2.0. As with Linked Fate, further
research is needed to determine the in-practice strength and significance of the relationship
between in-group identification and group identity valuation. However, after 11 of 12 models
produced this conclusion, there seems little doubt that it is a positive one.
My results pertaining to the influence of racial in-group identification on racial identity
valuation were obviously less conclusive than expected, especially among the minority subpopulation and during Survey A 2.0. However, the overall conclusion that the relationship
between identification and valuation is a positive one – with identification reaching significance
at the (.05) level in four models and at the (.10) level in two more, across surveys, as a predictor
of increasing identity valuation – was as hypothesized. It seems nearly a truism that people are
more likely to identify strongly with traits they value than those they despise. Empirical research
supports this point: vanishingly small percentages of people identify as evil (Arendt 1968;
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Hitchens 2007), openly racist (Kuklinksi et al 1997; Pike 2004; Tarman & Sears 2005), poor or
lower class (Fussell 1983; Tiexiera & Rogers 2000) or even unattractive (Cassanova 2004; Reilly
& Battle 2008). In the context of ethnicity and race, several previous authors have concluded that
in-group identification correlates with one or more elements of identity valuation (Hughes &
Demo 1989: 144), and that increasing levels of group identification can predict increased
attachment to sub-national identities and hostile feelings toward out-groups (Huddy 2001;
Cornell and Hartmann 2006). While it provides less sweeping support for my hypothesis than I
hoped and expected, the finding that in-group identification did predict identity valuation in
roughly half my models does gel with a substantial literature as well as with common sense.
Conservatism was another factor, broadly conceptualized, to exert influence across both
of my survey instruments. However, across the two surveys, my two measures of conservatism
were never both significant among all respondents in the same model. Of the two, the personal
ideology metric had the more consistent impact. During Survey A, increasingly conservative
personal ideology reached significance at the (.054) level as a positive predictor of racial identity
valuation. This effect was more statistically significant during the 2.0 survey, when ideology
reached standard levels of significance as a positive predictor of valuation in both the allrespondents linear and logistic regression models. During both administrations, the substantive
impacts of increasing conservatism on valuation were sizable. During Survey A, the median
liberal was 52.60% likely to change his race while the median conservative was 35.84% likely to
do so. Similarly, during the 2.0 survey the median ideological liberal was 30.9% likely to agree
to racial changes, while the median ideological conservative was only 9.5% likely to do so. In
both cases, results were similar for whites analyzed alone as a sub-population.
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While personal ideology had some influence on racial identity valuation across both
Survey A and Survey A 2.0, partisan affiliation was a significant predictor of valuation only
during Survey A. In the linear regression model depicted in Table Three, the variable
representing increasingly conservative partisan affiliation – Green, Democrat, independent,
Libertarian, Republican – reached significance as a positive predictor of identity valuation
among all Survey A respondents. However, this relationship did not reach significance during
Survey A logistic regression, and correlations between conservative partisanship and racial
identity valuation were actually negative during some 2.0 survey models. In contrast, coefficients
representing the effect of conservative personal ideology on valuation were in the expected
positive direction in all 12 models run during both surveys.
I have no definite explanation for this unexpected dichotomy, but will note that
substantial divergences between individuals’ preferred political party and stated personal
ideologies have been recorded for sizable groups including African Americans and Southern
whites (West 2001; McWhorter 2000; Foskett 2004; Moser 2009), and that several authors have
found ideology to predict shifts in policy preferences where partisanship does not (Sears, van
Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997; Tarman & Sears 2005). This makes a sort of intuitive sense;
of the two variables, actual ideology is logically the more precise measure of conservatism and
more likely predictor of variable relationships influenced by conservatism. But, overall, finding
that conservative ideology was a positive predictor of identity valuation across all twelve models
while often reaching significance, and that conservative partisanship was a significant positive
predictor of compensation demanded for racial change during Survey A, supports my starting
hypothesis that conservatives are change resistant (Shannon 1962; Henry & Sears 2002; Herek
2003; Sowell 2005) and thus less likely than others to change core characteristics. However, I
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freely admit that this support was again both less sweeping and less conclusive than I
hypothesized.
One interesting note about the effect of conservatism on racial identity valuation across
respondent populations concerns minority conservatives. A consistent theme in the literature
dealing with American race relations is the idea that minority conservatives are self-hating dupes
(Steele 1993; D’Souza 1994; McWhorter 2000; West 2001; Foskett 2004; Sowell 2005). This
heuristic is so prevalent that the names of leading ethnic conservatives, such as “Shelby Steele”
or Clarence Thomas, are often used as synonyms for “sell-out” in middle-class Black or Latino
discourse (McWhorter 2000: 3); I have heard this happen myself. However, my results strongly
indicate that there is no negative correlation between conservatism and devaluation of minority
racial identities. The influence of increasing personal conservatism was in the expected positive
direction in all four linear and logistic regressions run among minority respondents. At least
during Survey A, the same was true for conservative partisanship. Among that sample, the
median Black or Latino Green was 15.31% likely to alter her race, but the median minority
Republican was only 5.22% likely to change his. This effect was not replicated during the 2.0
survey, but the influence of partisanship on valuation during that survey administration was
insignificant and in fact negative for whites as well as minorities.
All of the positive relationships between conservatism and minority racial identity
valuation which I observed were statistically unreliable, being measured among medium-N subsamples of minority respondents analyzed alone. However, these correlations were not small in
substantive terms. Logistic regression coefficients for the effects of conservative personal
ideology (across both surveys) and conservative partisan affiliation (during Survey A) on racial
identity valuation were generally larger than both their standard errors and the equivalent
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coefficients for white respondents. In the context of race, the very old saw that conservatives
tend to be attached to “present states of being” and unwilling to change them (Shannon 1962)
seems to hold true for Blacks and other minorities as well as whites. In fact, the population most
likely to describe themselves as willing to alter their race during my study was white liberals.
During Survey A, the median individual in this category was 48.71% likely to agree to change
his identity, and several individual respondents attributed this to unfortunate events in European
or colonial history. These findings gel with my initial hypothesis that conservatism would be
positively correlated with valuation for holders of all racial identities, but contradict much of
what has been written about minority conservatism (McWhorter 2000; Foskett 2004; Sowell
2005).
Finally, after recording the generally positive impact of conservatism on racial identity
valuation, I also tested the impact of my two conservatism variables on respondents’ (1) level of
expressed dislike for out-group members and (2) level of attachment to core characteristic
identities under List Experiment conditions. Many scholars have argued that individuals often
hold “conservative” positions like opposition to affirmative action because of old-fashioned or
symbolic racism (Edsall & Edsall 1991; Pike 2004; Tarman & Sears 2005; Sparks & Watts 2009;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009), and I used several techniques to test for a possible relationship
between conservatism and bigotry. Assuming that greater attachment to currently held
characteristics among conservatives is not de facto evidence of prejudice (Shannon 1962;
Snidermna & Carmines 1997; Sowell 2005), I fund no definitive evidence of a link between
conservatism and race prejudice. In response to the single open-ended question on Survey A,
only 19 respondents explained their decision not to change race by citing dislike of the out-group
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to which they would be changing, and there were no significant predictors of this hostile
response.
However, conservatism was a highly significant positive predictor of identity valuation
during the List Experiment. Among white respondents, the difference in mean rates of response
between Survey B and the test condition Survey C – indicating willingness to change racial
identity – was 32% (2.17 – 1.85) for liberals, 3% for moderates (1.64 – 1.61), and in fact
negative for conservatives (1.42 – 1.28). The same pattern obtained for the effect of partisanship
on valuation among white respondents; 23% of liberals were willing to change race in response
to Survey C (2 – 1.77), while the mean number of conservative responses to the item actually
declined slightly between Surveys B and C. Results were very similar for minorities, with 0% of
minority conservatives (1.1 – 1.1) agreeing to change race in response to Survey C as versus
31% of minority liberals (1.65 – 1.34). All of these differences in liberal: conservative rate of
response were significant inside the (.05) level. This data does not suffice to demonstrate links
between conservatism and race prejudice, but does provide very strong support for the Survey A
and Survey A 2.0 conclusions that the relationships between increasingly conservative personal
or political ideology and racial identity valuation are positive ones.
In contrast to the fairly sweeping effects of minority status, group identification, and
various measures of conservatism across survey instruments, several other variables had more
localized effects on racial identity valuation. For example, female sex was a positive predictor of
valuation during Survey A, in the logistic regressions among both all respondents and minority
respondents taken alone. This effect was driven by minority respondents; the coefficient for the
effect of sex on valuation was (-1.248) among the minority sub-population and (-.516) among the
entire sample even including that sub-population. Among all respondents, the median man was
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43.94% likely to change his race and the median female respondent 32.68% likely to change
hers, while among minority respondents the median woman was only 9.9% likely to change her
race and the median man was 25.3% likely to change his. This result was unexpected. Scholars
like Simein (2005) have argued that the experience of dual race and gender oppressions may
cause minority women to more strongly identify with both their racial and sexual identities, but
few empirical pieces dealing with the valuation of minority identities seem to conclude that this
is true or even test the thesis (Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; McIntyre 2002; Rockquemore 2002).
Further, I can find no explanation in the literature for a weaker but real version of the same effect
among white women. However, following the 2.0 survey, it seems likely that this was a “oneoff” or aberrational result. Among all respondents during Survey A 2.0, as Table Eleven
indicates, female sex was a completely insignificant predictor of valuation, with a beta
coefficient of (.046) and a standard error of (.313). I will include female sex as a factor variable
in future models measuring influences on racial identity valuation, but do not expect to find it
predictive.
Another variable to reach significance during one of my two survey administrations,
despite having almost no influence during the other, was job status. During Survey A, job status
was completely insignificant as a statistical predictor of racial identity valuation; an unemployed
respondent was 46% likely to change his race, while a respondent with a stable full-time job was
43% likely to change his. In contrast, during Survey A 2.0, the job status variable was significant
in both linear and logistic regressions among all respondents, as well as reaching significance in
both independent regressions among Caucasians and approaching it in both regressions among
minorities. Table Seventeen illustrates the substantive size of the impact of job status on
valuation during predicted probabilities results. Like the influence of sex on valuation during
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Survey A, this effect was unexpected. Survey A results for job status have already been noted,
and the variable was originally predicted to have – if anything – a negative effect on the
valuation of racial identity. However, a time-specific probable explanation for this finding
presents itself. Between 2008-2009, when I first surveyed, and my later 2013 survey
administrations, the United States suffered the worst recession in five decades and remaining
middle-class has become a difficult task (Cahill 2014). As both whites and minorities attribute
some labor market successes to race (Cose 1993; Harris 1993; D’Souza 1994; Eastland 1994;
McWhorter 2000; Hunter 2002), it is very possible that this effect causes employed members of
all races to view race as one perceived tool for keeping jobs and value it more highly. More
research here remains to be done.
A final factor to achieve at least localized significance as a predictor of racial identity
valuation was increasing age, which was a positive predictor of valuation among whites during
Survey A. As earlier noted, age was a factor variable of particular interest to me, given the recent
scholarly discourse about whether the United States is becoming a “post-racial” society
(Hutchings 2009; Plant & DeVine 2009; Donovan 2010; Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau 2010),
with this move driven by younger age cohorts (Ansolabhere & Stewart 2009; Redlawsk 2011).
Given this conversation, and the frequent correlation between increasing age and more
conservative attitudes toward change and risk (Pike 2004), I hypothesized that age would be a
positive predictor of identity valuation. This was in fact the case during Survey A. A variable
representing increasing respondent age had a significant positive effect on valuation in the
primary logistic regression among Caucasian respondents, and fell exactly .02 short of
significance in the whites-only linear regression. The effect of age on valuation among whites
was large as well as statistically significant. In predicted probabilities runs, the median white
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respondent under 20 was 50.84% likely to change his race, while whites between 20 and 30 were
38.86% likely to make racial changes. In contrast, whites between the ages of 30 and 40 were
only 28.38% likely to change race, whites between the ages of 40 and 50 were 20.44% likely to
change, and whites between the ages of 50 and 60 were 14.89% likely to do so. This last result,
along with change-willingness results for the miniscule group of white respondents over 60,
represents one of the highest levels of valuation of any core characteristic to be displayed by any
group of whites.
Merely finding a significant positive correlation between increasing age and racial
identity valuation does not suffice to prove the post-racial thesis. Elder Americans are often
described as being more conservative than younger ones with regard to most perspectives and
decisions (Herek 2003; Pike 2004). My own results specifically indicate that this is true. In
response to Survey B, the mean number of List items which respondents under 20 stated they
would do was 1.65, in contrast to 1.36 for respondents between 31-40 and 1.14 for respondents
between 41-50. In this context, a positive relationship between increasing age and identity
valuation might simply indicate the greater reluctance of older individuals to make most changes.
Further, I found no significant correlations between youth and decreased open bigotry and no
consistent significant correlations between membership in a younger age cohort and decreased
valuation of racial identity under List conditions.50 However, one aspect of the data, particularly
during Survey A, does strongly imply that a significant positive change has taken place in
American race relations during recent years. In a sentence, the reason that increasing age was not
a significant positive predictor of identity valuation among all respondents during Survey A,
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To be specific, the change in the mean answer rate from Survey B to Survey C of the List Experiment was .18 for
respondents under 20, .25 for 21-30 year old respondents, .06 for 31-40 year old respondents, flat or negative for 4160 year old respondents, and .99 for respondents over 60. Some of these relationships were individually significant,
but there was no consistent pattern across them.
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despite the variable’s strong showing among the Caucasian sub-population, was that increasing
age had a substantively strong and near-significant negative impact on the valuation of minority
racial identity.
While this relationship did not in fact reach significance during Survey A and will not be
discussed at great length, the effect of the age variable on valuation was negative in both the
minorities-only linear and logistic regressions, with this influence approaching significance at the
.200-level in the linear model. Predicted probabilities results reflect this; a median minority
respondent under 20 was less than 7% likely to change his race and a median respondent
between the ages of 20 and 30 was less than 10% likely to do so. However, a median respondent
between 30 and 40 was 13.74% likely to change race, a median respondent between 40 and 50
was 19.30% likely to change, and a median respondent between 50 and 60 was 25.67% likely to
do so. The typical minority respondent over the age of 60 was 31.74% likely to change his race.
The median Black or Latino respondent in the oldest measured age category was nearly 25%
more likely than an under-20 peer to change their race, while the median white respondent in the
oldest measured category was 30% less likely to change their race than a younger peer. Both this
negative relationship and the positive relationship between increasing age and identity valuation
among whites were again observed in all group-specific models run during Survey A, although
neither relationship reached standard levels of significance during that survey administration. .
Unlike those for whites, minority-specific results indicating a positive correlation
between youth and increasing valuation of racial identity do not initially appear to support the
post-racial hypothesis. However, given the usual correlation between age and resistance to
change – which I specifically observed for both minorities and whites – an obvious probable
explanation for these results is the that the frequency of identity devaluation among minority
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group members is decreasing as American racism lessens in intensity. While not a given, identity
devaluation certainly can occur during periods of sufficiently intense oppression or violence
(Stern 1995; Cornell & Hartmann 2006), and it is not seriously disputed that members of
minority groups endured brutal oppression during much of America’s historical past (Taylor
1992; Harris 1993; D’Souza 1994; Dawson 1994; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Dawson 2001;
McClain et al 2006; Ruck 2011). While not perfectly statistically reliable, my Survey A and
Survey A 2.0 results seem to indicate that identity devaluation did occur in the past among some
members of American minority groups, but that minority valuation of racial identities has now
stabilized at levels at least on par with those recorded for whites. For example, I observe only a
6% difference in levels of change willingness for median respondents across my younger three
age cohorts.
Future research results will support the post-racial thesis if, from this stable base, levels
of racial identity valuation and of bigotry continue to decline for both white and minority
members of future youth cohorts when other variables are controlled for. An interesting alternate
hypothesis is that, given the combination of white reluctance to honestly discuss racial issues
(Kuklinski & Cobb 1997; Kuklinksi et al 1997; McIntyre 2002; Krysan & Mick 2003; Speakman
& Moskowitz 2009) and the participation of many minority students in greviance-based
programs of affective education (Sowell 1993; D’Souza 1994; Gross 1999; Hoff-Sommers 2000;
Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003), stated levels of racial identity valuation may continue to
decrease for whites while continuing to increase for Blacks and other minorities. In either case,
my somewhat unreliable results for the age variable do not suffice to prove or rebut the postracial thesis, but do suggest avenues of future research for other scholars.
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While most variables included in my statistical models were significant among all
respondents during at least one survey administration, four personal or group characteristics had
no effect on the valuation of racial identity among any group of respondents. These factors were:
sexual orientation, religion, education level, and level of self-esteem. Most of these results were
not surprising and do not merit extensive comment. Religion and sexuality were introduced into
the models as control variables, and were not predicted to have significant effects. There is little
reason to expect gays or Protestants to be less attached to being Hispanic than straights or
Catholics, and they are not. Education was expected to have significant negative effects on
identity valuation, as this characteristic is seen as a measure of sophistication and has been found
to correlate with decreased bigotry across the literature (Fussell 1983; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo,
& Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003); it was somewhat surprising that this did not occur. However,
coefficients for the education variable were in the expected negative direction in almost every
model, and these trends were pronounced enough not to be taken as statistical aberrations (in a
typical example, education was significant at .204; t = -1.274 in linear regressions among
whites). This variable simply failed to reach standard significance levels as a multi-unit metric
running in multivariate models.
Results for the self-esteem variable do merit some comment. Self-esteem is a constant
presence in ongoing American discourses of race. Minority activists often attribute Black and
Hispanic struggles with education and socialization to low self-esteem or similar demoralization
(D’Souza 1991; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Gross 1999; Hoff-Sommers 2000), while
conservative scholars argue that there is little empirical evidence for this thesis (Sowell 1993;
McWhorter 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003). More empirical work tackles the question of
whether mean levels of self-esteem and self efficacy differ between majority and minority
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populations, and examines the relationship between personal esteem and collective esteem
(Jacques & Chason 1977; Hughes and Demo 1989; Horowitz 2000; Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev
& Theiss-Morse 2003). Given the massive corpus of work claiming connections between selfesteem on the one hand and group pride or collective esteem on the other, it was more than
defensible to expect correlations between esteem and racial identity valuation. However, such
correlations do not appear to exist.
First, my results do indicate that young Americans of all races boast remarkably high
average levels of personal esteem. Among those respondents to answer the esteem question on
Survey A, 190 (38.08%) identified as having the highest measurable level of self-esteem while
only 18 (3%) identified as having the lowest level of esteem. Second, I find little or no empirical
support for the claim that members of racial minority groups suffer from any deficit of individual
self-esteem relative to whites. Across respondents of all races, the median esteem score for all
respondents on a five-unit variable metric was four, with younger respondents scoring even
higher than this and 14 respondents describing themselves as “already perfect” in response to my
open-ended question. However, while some respondents did cite potentially esteem-linked
attitudes along the lines of “loving myself” as reasons not to make racial identity changes, a
widely used self-esteem metric was insignificant in every model as a predictor of identity
valuation. Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse use the word “weak” to describe relationships
between personal esteem and broader self-concepts (2003: 520), and this appears to be accurate.
Self-esteem in fact has little measurable influence on test scores (Sowell 1993; Gross 1999;
Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003), and how people feel about themselves also does not appear to
be a major predictor of how much they value their race.
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Analysis of the effect of race and other characteristics on racial identity valuation
supported some of my initial hypotheses while challenging others. Most importantly, racial
minority status proved not to be a negative predictor of racial identity valuation during two of my
three survey administrations. List Experiment results do indicate that contemporary American
whites may continue to understand the “value” of their racial identity (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995;
Tatum 1997), but be most comfortable discussing this under covert conditions (Kuklinski &
Cobb 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese 2008;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). However – directly contra Hacker (1992, 1995) and similar
authors – I found that no more than 25% of the largest minority group surveyed (African
Americans) would consent to racial changes even under List conditions and that racial minority
status was in fact a positive predictor of valuation during all non-List tests.
My hypotheses concerning the overall positive impact of group identification, personal
ideology (during Survey A and Survey A 2.0), and partisan affiliation (during Survey A) on
valuation also received significant support – although none was completely confirmed across all
respondent populations. Hypotheses concerning the impact of age (among whites), and Linked
Fate (among minorities on one instrument) on valuation received partial support. However,
several findings were not as expected. I hypothesized that age would correlate with increased
levels of identity attachment among all populations and was surprised to find levels of racial
identity valuation to be correlated with decreasing age among minorities but with increasing age
among whites. The effect of sex on valuation was entirely unexpected. I did not - to say the least
- predict that female and particularly minority female respondents would be on average less
willing to change their race than men. Survey A 2.0 results for the positive impact of increasing
job status on identity valuation were similarly surprising. Overall, however, the most hypothesis
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of the chapter was confirmed in the majority of cases. Most simply put, both whites and
members of minority groups demanded more compensation than Dr. Hacker’s famed $50 million
to change their race, and minorities usually demanded more compensation than whites.
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CHAPTER 6
PREDICTORS OF SEX IDENTITY VALUATION

After analyzing which factors variables affected respondents’ valuation of their racial in
group-identities, I next examine which factors influence the valuation of sexual identity.
Experimental design and chapter formatting follows the structure used during the Race chapter,
which is discussed in detail on pp.86-88. As was the case during two of the three analyses
conducted for the Race chapter, the hypothesis that minority status (here female sex) would not
operate as a significant negative predictor of in-group identity valuation was strongly confirmed.
Among the 277 men to answer the Survey A question dealing with sexual identity valuation –
rather than providing a “don’t know” opt-out answer– only 35 (12.6%) were willing to change
their biological sex in exchange for any level of compensation. Among women, 24 of the 189
respondents to answer the valuation question (12.6%) were willing to change their sex. Survey A
2.0 results were essentially identical; 90% of male and 91% of female respondents refused to
ever change biological sex during the 2.0 survey. Both these sets of percentages are not only
statistically identical but almost literally indistinguishable in practice; Table One immediately
below demonstrates the statistical “significance” of Survey A male: female differences in rate of
willingness to change sex, while Table Two does the same for Survey A 2.0.
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Table Twenty: Survey A Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by Sex
Valuation Level

Men

Women

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

4 (.01)
(N=277)

2 (.01)
(N=189)

For $25 Million or Less

7 (.02)

5 (.03)

For $25-50 Million

4 (.06)

2 (.01)

For $50-75 Million

4 (.06)

2 (.01)

For $75-100 Million

4 (.06)

3 (.02)

For More Than $100 Million

12 (.04)

10(.05)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever Change
This Identity

242 (.87)

165(.87)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
(Standard Deviation)

6.61
(1.21)

6.64
(1.14)

Regression results bear out the conclusion that female sex does not correlate with sexual
identity devaluation. Across both Survey A and the 2.0 survey, the sex variable was entirely
insignificant in all models. While I normally do not discuss specific coefficient effects in detail,
some idea of this variable’s influence can be obtained by noting that it was “significant” at the
.980 level, with a Beta of .003 and a t-value of .03, during Survey A linear regressions. Similarly,
in predicted probabilities models drawn from logistic regression data; the median male
respondent to Survey A was 12.20% likely to change his sex, while the median female
respondent was 13.91% likely to change hers. For Survey A 2.0, the equivalent figures were
respectively 10.1% and 12.2%.
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Table Twenty-One: 2.0 Survey - Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by
Sex
Valuation Level

Men

Women

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

3 (.02)
(N=133)

5 (.02)
(N=213)

For $25 Million or Less

5 (.04)

1 (.005)

For $25-50 Million

0

2 (.01)

For $50-75 Million

2 (.02)

0

For $75-100 Million

1 (.01)

5 (.02)

For More Than $100 Million

2 (.02)

6 (.03)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever Change
This Identity

120 (.90)

213 (.92)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
(Standard Deviation)

6.60
(1.34)

6.75
(1.04)

Cross-tabulation, linear regression, and logistic regression results across two Large-N
surveys indicate that there is no significant negative correlation – and indeed almost no
correlation at all – between female sex and sex identity devaluation. Although the conclusion
that members of a minority group boast high levels of group identity valuation is not inherently
shocking (Horowitz 2000; Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Mores 2003), my
conclusions in the specific case of gender – as in the case of race in the American context – call
into question a large body of work detailing history’s abuses of women (Wolf 1991; Faludi 1992;
Browne 1999; Harris 1999; Baunach 2002; Cohen 2004; also see Simein 2005) and specifically
arguing that female sexual identity devaluation occurs (Vaughter 1976; Hoff-Sommers 2000).
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Table Twenty-Two: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Sex Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.101 (.143)
.053 (.056)
-.091 (.065)
.070 (.064)
.027 (.095)
.091 (.059)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.003 (.125)
-.531 (.150)***
.191 (.124)
-.163 (.072)*
.079 (.058)
-.074 (.096)

R2 = .081
Number of Observations = 407

In the context of sex, List Experiment results gelled almost perfectly with Survey A and
Survey A 2.0 results, providing strong support for the hypotheses that under List conditions (1)
high percentages of men and women will remain unwilling to change their sex, and (2) female
sex will not predict sex identity devaluation. Well over 75% of respondents of both sexes refused
to change their biological sex under covert conditions, and female sex did not significantly
correlate with decreased valuation of sexual identity. On Survey B, the mean number of List
question items selected by men was 1.21 while the equivalent number for females was 1.02.
Mean numbers of “yes” responses for the two sexes increased to a similar degree in response to
the test condition question (#1) on Survey C. The mean score for males on Survey C was 1.29;
the mean score for females was 1.08. The overall increase between Surveys B and C was .077 for
men and .058 for women. This indicates that roughly 8% of males as versus roughly 6% of
females were willing to change sex in response to covert List Experiment questions. The
difference between these two means was not statistically significant at the (.05) or (.10) level.
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Table Twenty-Three: Mean Rates of Survey B & C Response by Sex
Mean Response

Females

Males

Survey B Mean/
Standard Deviation

1.02 (.85)
(N=140)

1.21 (.94)
(113)

Survey C Mean/
Standard Deviation

1.08 (1.02)
(N=139)

1.29 (1.03)
(114)

Survey B/Survey C:
Difference in Mean
Items Selected

.06

.08

Interestingly, while the hypothesis that female sex would not be a negative predictor of
sex identity valuation was confirmed, results pertaining to the valuation of sex identity did not
provide strong support for Linked Fate Theory. This finding stands in contrast with results for
the impact of Linked Fate on racial identity valuation, at least among minorities. Linked Fate
was not wholly without influence as a predictor of gender identity valuation; coefficients for a
Linked Fate variable were in the expected direction in four of six models during both Survey A
and Survey A 2.0, and the variable closely approached significance in one model during Survey
A. However, it is notable that the effect of Linked Fate on valuation among women was actually
in a negative direction in all models run during Survey A and Survey A 2.0, despite the fact that
Linked Fate is generally analyzed as a predictor of in-group cohesion and collective self-esteem
among members of minority groups (Simein 2005; Chong & Rogers 2005; Junn 2008; Austin,
Middleton, & Yon 2012). Further, virtually no female or male respondents made statements in
response to the open-ended survey question which implied that a feeling of group cohesion
(Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Walker 2007; Block 2011) was a major motivator for the refusal
to make sex identity changes, while such statements - “I stand with my people during this rat
race (Survey Instrument #216)” - were fairly common in the racial context.
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Table Twenty-Four: Linear Regression - 2.0 Survey Compensation for Sex Change (All
Respondents)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.011 (.156)
-.022 (.065)
.074 (.043)
.040 (.071)
.186 (.107)
-.168 (.097)
.089 (.152)
.342 (.180)
-.058 (.146)
-.150 (.113)
.053 (.074)
-.002 (.134)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .056
Number of Observations = 302

Many respondents seemed to value their sex in a primordial sense, rather than because of
the strategic calculation that group cohesion is necessary for competitive success (Simein 2005:
530; Block 2011: 29). Primordialism is currently less popular as an explanation of identity
formation and valuation than LFT or oppositional perspectives. However, many serious analyses
of ethnicity and other core characteristics discuss primordial theory (Diamond 1994; Horowitz
2000; Cornell & Hartmann 2006), which seems definable as the thesis that individuals often
value traits like tribe and family in a non-strategic manner as basic components of who they are.
Kinsley, for example, describes the “best sort” of nationalism as a love of the landscape, culture,
folkways, and behavior of the “common people” of one’s homeland (1987: 210). Such
primordial valuations of identity can occur independently of political or financial calculation; my
own List research indicates that rather few respondents would abandon their family or country
for money.
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Table Twenty-Five: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Sex Change (Males)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
MinorityRace
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.195 (.193)
.055 (.071)
-.075 (.094)
.146 (.082)
-.084 (.125)
.171 (.072)*

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.319 (.189)
.219 (.162)
-.196 (.100)
-.006 (.078)
-.062 (.141)

R2 = .102
Number of Observations = 248

Respondents discussed attachment to their biological sex in a similar non-strategic
manner, often stating that they would never change sex for financial or tactical reasons because
this trait is such a core component of who one is as a human being. In response to the openended question on Survey A and Survey A 2.0, one female respondent said that she would not
alter her sex because “DNA is special (Survey Instrument #257) ” relative to ascribed traits like
religion and race (Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Rockquemore 202; Harris 2005; McClain et al
2006). Another respondent, a white male, said even more bluntly that a sex change would be “a
living nightmare” that would make one choose between homosexuality and near-rape
(Instrument #236), while a third female respondent pointed out that a “sex change” would alter
her biologically and make preferred marriage practices impossible (Instrument #189). A
medium-N sampling of responses to one open-ended question does not provide conclusive
evidence of which motive forces most often shape individuals’ valuation of their gender identity.
However, the concentration of non-strategic explanations by respondents for their refusal to
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change sex, combined with the statistical irrelevance of Linked Fate as a predictor of sex identity
valuation, at least indicates that an argument can be made for the resurrection of primordialism in
the context of purely bio-genetic traits.
While sex was not a significant predictor of sexual identity valuation, a number of other
factors certainly were. Chief among these was respondent sexual orientation, which had such a
statistically and substantively significant effect on the valuation of sexual identity that I break
format and analyze this factor first, although its effect was not specifically hypothesized. Across
both Survey A and the 2.0 survey, LGBT status had a significant negative effect on sex identity
valuation among all respondents and among females analyzed alone, as well as a negative if
insignificant effect on valuation among males analyzed alone. In the Survey A linear regression
among all respondents, openly gay respondents demanded 1.6 units less compensation than
straight respondents to make sex changes.51The sexual orientation variable also reached
significance in the whole-sample logistic regression and in both independent regressions among
females taken alone; it missed formal significance but reached the .1 significance level (.093)
among males taken alone. Survey A 2.0 results were very similar. During that survey
administration, the projected median straight respondent was 12.2% likely to change her sex,
while the median gay respondent was 38.71% likely to change hers. Among women, the median
straight woman was 11.1% likely to change sex, while the median gay woman was 29.73% likely
to change. Across instruments, LGBT status had an extremely significant and extremely strong
negative effect on sex identity valuation.

51

This is, rather obviously, a significant difference. With one exception, my units were blocks of $25,000,000.
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Table Twenty-Six: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Sex Change (Males)

Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.005 (.325)
-.180 (.146)
.152 (.081)
.218 (.148)
.019 (.206)
-.135 (.185)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.203 (.300)
.194 (.317)
-.333 (.219)
-.024 (.151)
-.121 (.271)

R2 = .140
Number of Observations = 109

The finding that bisexuals and gays seem on average to value their biological sex less
than heterosexuals is interesting and noteworthy. However, this is a conclusion that is internally
logically congruent: to some extent, it simply makes sense. By definition, both gay men and
lesbians pursue embers of their own sex as partners, while bisexuals as normally defined seek out
lovers of both sexes/genders (Herek 2003). This “queerness” of interest has led directly to
frequent and intensive gender-bending play (i.e. camp or serious presentation of gender traits
generally associated with the opposite sex) within the gay community (Gamson 1996; Klein
1999; Chasin 2000; Dean 2008). My results doubtless reflect this fluid interaction with
conceptions of gender on the part of large segments of the LGBT community.
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Table Twenty-Seven: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Sex Change (Women)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.402 (.216)
.055 (.094)
-.064 (.093)
-.009 (.106)
.154 (.147)
-.051 (.103)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.860 (.261)***
.210 (.197)
-.114 (.109)
.152 (.080)
-.066 (.133)

R2 = .140
Number of Observations = 159

At an even more basic level, results indicating a negative relationship between LGBT
status and sex identity valuation in the context of my study reflect the fact that a bisexual or gay
respondent could change his sex without being forced to consider significantly changing the pool
of partners to which he is currently attracted. My surveys state that a respondent agreeing to
change a core characteristic will retain all memories, preferences, and aspects of their personality
except for the core characteristic under review; this means that a respondent agreeing to change
her sex would retain her sexual preference in the sense of being attracted to men (or women).
Otherwise, the proposed change would in essence be a change of both sex and sexual
orientation/partner group. Several respondents stated that this strategic reality influenced their
behavior, with a bisexual Latina woman stating: “I am already attracted to women and would
change this (sex) because I have no preference (Survey Instrument #279).” In this situation, why
not accept $100,000,000 to alter gender?
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Table Twenty-Eight: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Sex Change (Women)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.083 (.169)
.042 (.067)
.013 (.050)
-.044 (.077)
.256 (.120)*
-.182 (.100)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.460 (.226)*
.219 (.162)
-.007 (.157)
.121 (.081)
.037 (.145)

R2 = .072
Number of Observations = 194

On a less witty note, a third and final contributory explanation for the negative
correlation between LGBT status and lowered sex identity valuation suggests itself. LGBT
populations comprise one of the most abused and targeted minority groups in contemporary
America (Jenness 1995; Herek 2003; Kuo 2006; Dean 2008; Schafer & Shaw 2009); literally
thousands of bias motivated attacks on lesbians and gay men have been reported during the past
several decades (Jenness 1995; Ryan and Rivers 2003). It is horribly likely that some gay
respondents concluded that changing their sex would simply allow them to continue pursuing
essentially their current pool of partners free of social ostracism and threats of harm. The fact
that, among both men and women, gay respondents are more likely to agree to sex changes than
bisexual respondents, and closeted gay respondents are more likely than any other group to agree
to changes, lends credence to this extension of the hypothesis.
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Table Twenty-Nine: Logistic Regression Survey A Yes/No Chance of Sex Change (All
Respondents)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.678 (.371)
-.266 (.128)*
.115 (.170)
-.013 (.164)
-.266 (.248)
-.112 (.155)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.158 (.309)
.624 (.282)*
-.384 (.310)
.260 (.171)
-.223 (.140)
.180 (.229)

R2 = .076
Number of Observations = 408

As was the case in the Race chapter, several factor variables had effects on the valuation
of sex identity that were more localized than the sweeping effects of orientation and – in terms of
predicted non-performance – female sex. During Survey A, the five-unit education metric (less
than high school degree (i.e. GED), high school degree, two-year college degree, undergraduate
college degree, college graduate degree) was a significant negative predictor of the financial
valuation of sexual identity in the all-respondents linear model. The variable’s effect was also in
the expected direction in the all-respondents logistic model and all other models run; it reached
significance at the (.51) level in my two-tailed test among males taken alone. Predicted
probabilities reflect this; among all respondents, the median high school graduate was 9.78%
likely to agree to a hypothetical sex change while the median holder of a graduate degree was
19.46% likely to change. Among males taken alone, the same figures were respectively 12.20%
and almost 30% (28.80%) likely to change.
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Table Thirty: Survey A Probabilities of Sex Change (All Respondents)
Variable Level

Chance of Change

White
Non-White

12.20%
6.85%

Male
Female

12.20%
13.91%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

12.20%
20.68%
30.04%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

16.92%
12.20%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

9.78%
15.39%
19.46%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

15.25%
12.20%
10.13%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

13.85%
12.20%
9.81%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

12.20%
14.61%
17.77%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

17.97%
14.78%
12.20%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

10.13%
15.63%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

10.29%
13.75%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

23.78%
15.31%
9.76%
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Table Thirty-One: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Sex Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

-.612 (.480)
-.084 (.181)
-.270 (.119)*
-.137 (.211)
-.598 (.321)
.673 (.286)*
.210 (.432)
.778 (.370)*
.226 (.439)
.478 (.327)
-.024 (.236)
-.374 (.423)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .106
Number of Observations = 302

The education variable did not reach statistical significance as a predictor of sex identity
valuation during Survey A 2.0, but had coefficients in the expected negative direction in every
model, and again approached significance among males. In fact, the effect of education on
valuation, while statistically inconsistent, was in the expected negative direction in all twelve
models run. Although significantly weaker than expected, this consistent direction of influence
was as hypothesized. Education has been found repeatedly to correlate both with increased
acceptance of atypical sexual/gender behavior (i.e. male bisexuality) and with greatly increased
tolerance overall (Fussell 1983; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003; Pike
2004). My education variable did not display ideal levels of significance - or of variance: (3
GEDs, 238 high school graduates, 140 2-year college graduates, 89 four-year college graduates,
29 graduate school degree holders) - but it reached significance as a negative predictor of
identity valuation during one Large-N survey administration, and I would hypothesize this effect
again in the future.
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Table Thirty-Two: 2.0 Survey Probabilities of Sex Change (All Respondents)
Variable Level

Chance of Change

White
Non-White

12.17%
7.27%

Male
Female

10.10%
12.17%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

12.17%
22.92%
38.71%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

10.12%
12.17%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

12.17%
27.41%
38.04%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

20.46%
12.17%
7.42%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

4.07%
6.87%
21.52%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

9.18%
7.80%
7.37%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

12.70%
12.17%
12.40%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

29.42%
7.66%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

13.91%
10.09%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

15.64%
13.00%
11.63%
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Table Thirty-Three: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Sex Change (Males)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.384 (.495)
-.295 (.168)
.020 (.245)
-.166 (.218)
-.141 (.322)
-.240 (.196)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.004 (.413)
-.562 (.406)
.365 (.237)
.035 (.198)
.221 (.344)

R2 = .076
Number of Observations = 248

A third factor significant among all respondents during Survey A was self-esteem. The
self-esteem variable reached significance at the .037 level (t= -2.09) in the logistic regression run
among all respondents. During predicted probabilities, a median respondent at the lowest level of
self-esteem was 23.8% likely to change his sex, while a median respondent at the median level of
esteem –notably the second highest of all possible– was 12.2% likely to agree to changes and a
median high-esteem respondent 9.8% likely to do so. This was again not an aberrational or
chance result – something to watch for in an analysis including twelve major models. During
Survey A, the effect of the esteem variable was in the expected direction in all models, and the
variable came within (.03) of significance in the males-only logistic regression. Although I
expected to find a more consistent relationship between esteem and valuation, this is broadly
speaking what was hypothesized. The relationship between personal and collective esteem has
previously been documented (Jacques and Chason 1977; Hughes and Demo 1989) and I
expected to observe it.
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Table Thirty-Four: Survey A Probabilities of Sex Change (Males)
Variable Level

Chance of Sex
Change

White
Non-White

16.21%
12.09%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

16.21%
16.98%
19.10%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

25.65%
16.21%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

12.20%
21.76%
28.80%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

17.98%
16.21%
15.41%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

20.42%
16.20%
5.20%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

16.20%
20.09%
25.18%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

15.21%
15.53%
16.21%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

16.14%
18.32%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

18.70%
13.07%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

32.19%
20.59%
12.80%
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Table Thirty-Five: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Sex Change (Males)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.108 (.807)
.727 (.483)
-.297 (.189)
-.429 (.424)
-.422 (.512)
.786 (.523)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.571 (.614)
1.261 (1.047)
.626 (.487)
.345 (.415)
.619 (.584)

R2 = .218
Number of Observations = 108

However, while I certainly find some evidence of a positive relationship between
personal esteem and identity valuation, I will again note that the effect of esteem on valuation
seems to be considerably smaller and less reliable than previous scholars have surmised. The
esteem variable was not significant during the 2.0 survey, and actually had coefficients in a
negative direction in four of six models. Even during Survey A, the variable reached standard
levels of significance in only one of the two primary models. This variable performed similarly,
and in fact had less impact on valuation, during the Race chapter – and did not reach significance
again during this dissertation. While it has real and measurable influence, how people feel about
themselves as individuals was simply not a particularly strong predictor of willingness to change
racial, sexual, and – looking forward through the chapters – other core characteristic identities, in
models including coherent measures of in-group identification and Linked Fate.

140

Table Thirty-Six: 2.0 Survey Probability of Sex Change (Males)
Variable Level

Chance of Change

White
Non-White

11.13%
11.19%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

11.13%
18.28%
29.73%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

4.26%
11.13%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

11.13%
27.34%
39.79%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

15.94%
11.13%
8.90%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

4.56%
6.50%
21.03%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

11.13%
20.97%
34.16%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

7.13%
11.13%
15.61%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

28.60%
7.09%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

15.87%
7.15%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

3.30%
6.42%
20.67%
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Table Thirty-Seven: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Likelihood of Sex Change (Women)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-1.13 (.620)
-.351 (.227)
.146 (.245)
.145 (.282)
-.589 (.436)
.101 (.281)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

1.57 (.571)***
-.401 (.524)
.076 (.280)
-.460 (.230)*
.087 (.354)

R2 = .178
Number of Observations = 160

The discovery that individual self-esteem has a limited effect on identity valuation across
survey instruments is fairly significant. The American debate about identity formation among
and competitive performance by minority groups has sometimes been nearly dominated by
discussions of esteem. Dozens of scholars have argued that low self-esteem and similar indices
of demoralization among minority group members correlate with phenomena from devaluation
itself to poor scores on quantitative examinations (Sowell 1993; Hacker 1995; McIntyre 1997;
Tatum 1997; Gross 1999; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McWhorter 2000), while conservative academics
contend that there is little empirical evidence of these relationships (D’Souza 1994; McWhorter
2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003).
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Table Thirty-Eight: Survey A Probabilities of Sex Change (Women)
Variable Level

Chance of Sex
Change

White
Non-White

9.35%
3.47%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

9.35%
31.64%
63.27%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

12.79%
9.35%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

9.35%
10.68%
12.19%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

15.49%
9.35%
6.32%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

9.27%
9.35%
11.09%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

9.35%
10.74%
12.96%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

19.15%
9.35%
6.74%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

8.06%
12.45%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

7.80%
11.04%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

22.08%
12.36%
7.26%
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While I do not claim to permanently resolve this question, my statistical results do
indicate that members of most majority and minority populations have nearly identical levels of
individual esteem (3.9 on a 5-point scale for whites, 4.1 for minorities; 4 for men, 3.9 for
women) and that esteem is not highly correlated with identity valuation. Models like Table Ten
do illustrate that there is some relationship between esteem and valuation, but this link seems to
be – as Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse (2003) notably called it – “weak.”
A third variable to reach significance as a predictor of sex identity valuation among all
respondents during at least one of my two survey administrations was in-group identification,
which was a significant positive predictor of valuation during Survey A 2.0. During the 2.0
survey, my MEIM-based GroupID variable reached significance during the all-respondents
logistic regression, and had an influence on identity valuation which was in the expected positive
direction and substantively sizable in all six models run. In predicted probabilities runs, the
median respondent at the lowest level of sexual in-group identification was 29.4% likely to
change his sex, while the median respondent at the highest level of identification was only 7.7%
likely to change his. Interestingly, this strong positive influence of in-group identification on sex
identity valuation was not observed during Survey A. During that administration, the
identification metric actually had a negative influence on valuation in the slight majority (4) of
models. However, given my original theoretical framework and the very consistent effect of
heightened levels of in-group identification on the valuation of racial and religious identities, it
seems more likely that Survey A results for the identification variable were aberrational than that
Survey A 2.0 results for the variable were aberrational. Results for the effect of identification on
valuation during the 2.0 re-test were almost exactly what I hypothesized when I began my
research, and what I expect to see during future research.
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Table Thirty-Nine: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Sex Change (Women)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-1.091 (.667)
-.275 (.220)
-.318 (.178)
.117 (.290)
-.635 (.457)
.610 (.394)

Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

1.672 (.584)***
.122 (.579)
.597 (.524)
-.275 (.303)
-1.406 (.782)

R2 = .199
Number of Observations = 194

My two conservatism variables also both had influence among the respondent pool,
although in very different ways. The influence of increasingly conservative personal ideology on
identity valuation was in the expected positive direction in 11 of 12 models. During the 2.0 retest, conservative ideology was a statistically significant predictor of increased compensation
demanded by women to change sex, and the ideology variable also closely approached
significance in the larger linear and logistic regressions among all respondents. These results
were statistically more reliable than those from Survey A, where ideology missed significance as
a predictor variable, but in the same direction and substantively similar. During Survey A, the
median liberal respondent was 16% likely to change her sex while the median conservative
respondent was 6% likely to change hers; during the 2.0 survey, the median liberal respondent
was 12% likely to change her sex, while the median conservative respondent was 4% likely to
change. As was the case for many of my variables, the influence of personal conservatism on
valuation was weaker than hypothesized, but otherwise of the type and direction expected.
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Table Forty: 2.0 Survey Probabilities of Sex Change (Women)
Variable Level

Chance of Change

White
Non-White

7.02%
2.96%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

7.02%
27.35%
60.02%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

6.45%
7.02%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

7.02%
22.85%
35.33%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

11.92%
7.02%
4.76%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

4.79%
7.02%
19.61%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

2.26%
11.58%
8.96%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

11.38%
7.02%
6.03%

Low Sex Group Identification
High Sex Group identification

21.37%
4.21%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

6.31%
8.12%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

14.62%
8.78%
5.81%
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In contrast to the consistent if not consistently significant effect of ideology on sex
identity valuation, the impact of partisan affiliation on valuation varied across my two survey
instruments. During Survey A, a variable representing conservative partisan affiliation was the
most statistically reliable in the model (.020; t= 2.34) in the linear regression among males, while
also boasting a not-insignificant substantive effect (B= .171: four-unit metric). The same variable
had a fairly strong effect in the expected direction in the men-only logistic regression, which can
be measured using predicted probabilities: the median Green Party member was 20.42% likely to
consider changing his sex, while the median Democrat was only 16.20% likely to do so and the
median Republican less than 6% likely to make the change.
However, the same partisan affiliation variable was significant among all respondents as
a negative predictor of sex identity valuation during Survey A 2.0 (logistic regression model). In
fact, and in contrast to the positive and substantive effect of ideology on valuation, conservative
partisanship had a negative effect on identity valuation in all six 2.0 regression models. This is an
interesting result to say the least, and simply was not hypothesized. Navneeth Iyengar of Loyola
University, a friendly reviewer of this dissertation, suggests one possible methodological
explanation. The large majority of respondents in the 2.0 sample were women, and any
regressions with all values but those of the focal variable set at the median would thus
technically have taken place among a female sub-sample. It has frequently been argued that the
contemporary Right can be a chilly place for women (Faludi 1992; Hoff-Sommers; Kuo 2006;
Rosin 2008). It may be that, if the conservative dislike of change represented by my personal
ideology variable is adjusted for, Republican women display slightly lowered levels of sex
identity valuation as versus their Democratic counterparts.
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The conclusion that conservative partisanship correlates with devaluation of female sex if
personal conservatism is controlled for, however, would be a very sweeping conclusion to draw
from one unexpected one-off result. This is especially the case given that List Experiment results
support the contention that the relationship between conservatism and sex identity valuation is
positive and significant. As in the Race chapter, conservatism was not a significant predictor of
out-group bigotry for either population studied, due largely to the very small sample size of
respondents openly stating that they would not change sex due to dislike of the opposite sex.
However, conservative personal ideology and conservative partisan affiliation were both
significant predictors of increased identity valuation in univariate t-tests based upon List
Experiment data.
The increase between Survey B and the test condition Survey C in the number of List
items selected was (.10) for ideological liberals (1.26 – 1.16) and (.18) for self-identified
Democrats (1.23 – 1.05). In contrast, the difference between the two instruments in number of
items selected by both conservatives and Republicans was essentially flat. In both cases, the Left:
Right difference in (Survey C – Survey B) number of items selected reached statistical
significance. In the absence of demonstrable links between conservatism and stated bigotry, this
result means essentially just that conservatives and Republicans continued to display higher
mean levels of identity valuation than liberals and Democrats under List conditions designed to
elicit respondent honesty. That result, however, supports my starting hypothesis that both
measures of conservatism would correlate positively with sex identity valuation. While further
research into this relationship remains to be done, my results taken as a body that the relationship
between conservatism and sex identity valuation is generally a positive one.
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A final variable to influence sex identity valuation among any population of respondents,
in this case women analyzed alone during Survey A, was job status. During Survey A, a fourunit employment status variable reached significance as a positive predictor of sex identity
valuation in the primary logistic regression model among women, and closely approached it (B=
.152, standard error (.080) in females-only linear runs. Logistic coefficients for the employment
variable were large (-.460) and more than twice the size of the accompanying standard error term
(.230), indicating substantive effect as well as statistical significance. In the Survey A female
sub-sample with all factor variables held at their median, an unemployed woman was nearly 20%
likely to agree to change her sex, a woman with a stable part-time job or student work-study only
9.35% likely to do so, and a woman with a full-time job only 6.74% likely to do so. The
relationship between job status and sex identity valuation was also in a positive direction for
female respondents in both models during Survey A 2.0, although this relationship did not reach
significance during the retest. In contrast, job status was a totally insignificant identity valuation
among males; the status variable reached “significance” only at the .860 level (t= .18) in logistic
regressions among men even during Survey A.
Finding a positive relationship between job status and the valuation of female sex
identity, especially the significant positive relationship between these variables measured during
Survey A, was unexpected. Following past authors (Fussell 1983; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, &
Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003; Pike 2004), I expected “sophistication” variables like education
and job status to predict increased tolerance and openness to change – and thus decreased
identity valuation – among all groups of respondents. It should be noted, however, that the
literature does provide a possible explanation for the positive impact of job status on identity
valuation among women; I simply expected it to be wrong. A consistent theme in the work of
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scholars analyzing gender discrimination is that women as a group work worse and lower-paying
jobs than men, and that this is not primarily a product of personal choice (Faludi1992; Baunach
2002; Cohen 2004; Hegeswisch et al 2011). Largely because of institutionalized bigotry, the
average working woman makes significantly less money than the average man (Nelson &
Bridges 1999: 3). Quite possibly, women working sporadically or for little money are willing to
consider sexual changes because ‘making it’ appears easier for men. In contrast, women in solid
full-time jobs would have less incentive to do so.52
While any employment status measure used with a student sample will produce imperfect
results, and the statistical unreliability of the positive relationship between job status and
valuation during Survey A 2.0 cautions against overbroad interpretation of my results, in-depth
analysis of respondent replies provides some support for the status-contingent theory of female
identity valuation. The large majority of my female respondents, enrolled in a university known
as a mecca for non-traditional students (Southern Illinois University Facts 2007), were fairly full
participants in the workforce when I surveyed them - with 60.08% working a full-time job or
working in a stable part time-position or career-track internship in addition to attending college.
However, respectively 29% and 10% of female respondents did not work or worked in sporadic
seasonal positions.
Sometimes literally the half-employed art majors of stereotype, women in these
categories were very prone to say that they would change specifically to receive financial
reward. During Survey A, nearly 30% of respondents willing to change their sex - 25 persons
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It might be argued that I am making too much of my results concerning the influence of job status on identity
valuation, given that these were obtained among a largely collegiate survey population and not all college students
work. However, SIU-Carbondale is a regional Mecca for non-traditional students; the average age of the
undergraduates I surveyed was 25 and that of the graduate students was 32 (University Facts 2007). Further, this is a
recessionary period during which students/young people are engaged in an intense competition for jobs and
internships. Perhaps as a result, 57.2% of respondents were working when I surveyed them.
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concentrated among females - cited financial incentives as their motivator in response to an
open-ended survey question. A white female said bluntly that she would “change everything for
a high enough price (Survey Instrument #282)” and an Asian female respondent noted even more
colorfully that she “wouldn’t mind getting money to do men and women” or change here gender
(Survey Instrument #271). Several female respondents specifically mentioned the ongoing global
recession as an incentive for changing sex to receive benefits – free money becomes even more
attractive when work is hard to find, and work is often harder to find for women than men.
In contrast, of the sizable group of fully employed female respondents – often graduate
students and area businesswomen enrolled in upper-division classes – 91.67% remained totally
unwilling to change their sex during Survey A, and none mentioned financial factors as a weight
on one side or the other of their decision in response to either instrument. These findings are a
reminder that, while women value female sex itself as highly as men value male sex, the reality
of existence as a minority population no doubt does have effects on how women view
themselves and their gender.
Four factors analyzed as potential predictors of sexual identity valuation –religion, age,
minority race, and Linked Fate– did not reach significance when analyzed as independent
variables. Age, a variable of interest to me, did not significantly influence valuation for the
simple reason that only tiny minorities of all age cohorts including the youngest were willing to
consider sexual changes. Coefficients for Linked Fate were in the expected direction in eight of
twelve models, with the variable approaching significance (.076; t=1.78) in the Survey A linear
regression among males alone. This result is indicative of two traits concerning the performance
of Linked Fate as a predictor of identity valuation which I will discuss at extensive length in
upcoming chapters: (1) the fact that Linked Fate effects generally seem weaker among members
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of in-groups definable entirely in biological terms (i.e., men are not women entirely because we
have an xy rather than xx chromosome) than among members of politically or socially defined
groups like most races and religions (Hacker 1992; D’Souza 1994; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997;
McClain et al 2006) and (2) the fact that Linked Fate appears to operate among all populations
that feel themselves to be threatened by outside competitors, rather than merely among minority
populations. The other variables merit little comment; there is no particular reason to expect the
religious or ethnic backgrounds of respondents to have any significant effect on levels of sexual
identity valuation, and they did not.
Analysis of the effect of sex and other characteristics on sexual identity valuation
corroborated several of my starting hypotheses. Most importantly, female sex was not a negative
predictor of identity valuation. The percentages of men and women willing to change sex were
close to identical across my three surveys. The effects of education, group identification, selfesteem, and – with one glaring exception for partisanship during the 2.0 survey – my measures of
conservatism were also in the direction expected, although almost universally weaker than
hypothesized. Several other results were not as expected. Sexual orientation had a massive and
non-hypothesized effect on sexual identity valuation. While this makes a certain kind of sense, it
was not predicted; orientation was a control variable in the sex-valuation models. Also, as noted,
Linked Fate was not a significant prediction of identity valuation among the whole sample,
among women, or among men. None of these trends was initially hypothesized, nor was the
significant positive influence of job status on valuation among at least one Large-N pool of
female respondents. However, the primary hypothesis of the chapter was, like that of the
previous chapter, confirmed. Sexual minority status has no significant effect on the degree to
which individuals value their biological sex.
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CHAPTER 7
PREDICTORS OF LGBT AND STRAIGHT IDENTITY VALUATION

After concluding the analysis of what factors affect the valuation of biological sex, I next
analyze the factors affecting the respondents’ valuation of their sexual orientation(s). The format
for this chapter follows that for my analysis of race and sex. I again analyze the influence of my
set of 12 independent factor variables on identity valuation among all respondents and separately
among subsamples of straight, bisexual, and gay-identified respondents.53I first analyze the effect
of orientation itself and of Linked Fate on orientational identity valuation and discuss whether
results for these variables support my core theory. I next analyze the effect of those variables to
reach statistical significance among all respondents across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0 (only
biological sex, in this chapter), and finally analyze the effect of those variables that were locally
significant during one survey administration or among one sub-population of respondents.
For the first time the preponderance of the stochastic evidence did not support my
hypothesis that minority status is not negatively and significantly correlated with identity
valuation. During Survey A, differences in mean levels of identity valuation between LGBT and
straight respondents were significant at the (.01) level in a stand-alone t-test, the results of which
are illustrated in Figure One. Among heterosexuals, three hundred seventy three of 435
respondents (85.7%) declared that they would never change their sexual orientation for any
amount of money. The mean number of levels of compensation demanded by straights in
exchange for changing their sexual orientation was 6.53. In contrast, only 60% of LGBT

53

Because of the relatively small size of the gay and bisexual sample (30), logistic regression of the LGBT subsample taken alone was not conducted.
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respondents stated that they would never change their sexual orientation, and the mean number
of units of compensation demanded by these respondents was only 5.24.
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Table Forty-One: Survey A Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by Orientation
Valuation Level

Straights

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

7 (.02)

(N=435)

All LGBT
Bisexuals
Respondents
1 (.04)
1 (.08)
(N=13)
(N=25)

Gay
Respondents
1 (.08)
(N=12)

For $25 Million or Less 15 (.03)

6 (.24)

5 (.38)

0

For $25-50 Million

10 (.02)

1 (.04)

1 (.08)

0

For $50-75 Million

6 (.01)

1 (.04)

0

1 (.08)

For $75-100 Million

7 (.02)

0

0

0

For $100 Million-Plus

17 (.04)

1 (.04)

1 (.08)

0

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

373 (.86)

15 (.60)

5 (.38)

10 (.83)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
Standard Deviation

6.53 (1.35)

5.24
(2.37)***

4.23
(2.55)***

6.33 (1.61)

Although it approached them, the relationship between LGBT status and devaluation of
sexual orientation as an identity did not reach any standard level of significance during Survey A
(-1.50; t= .135). However, LGBT status did reach significance as a negative predictor of the
valuation of sexual orientation during the 2.0 survey. During that survey administration, the
mean number of units of compensation demanded by straights for orientation changes was 6.63
as versus 4.92 for LGBT respondents, 46% of LGBT respondents were willing to change their
orientation, and the negative influence of LGBT status on valuation was significant well inside
the (.05) level.
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Table Forty-Two: 2.0 Survey Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by Orientation
Valuation Level

Straights

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

7 (.02)

(N=332)

All LGBT
Bisexuals
Respondents
6 (.25)
5 (.36)
(N=14)
(N=25)

Gay
Respondents
1 (.10)
(N=10)

For $25 Million or Less 9 (.03)

2 (.08)

2 (.14)

0

For $25-50 Million

1 (.005)

0

0

0

For $50-75 Million

3 (.01)

0

0

0

For $75-100 Million

5 (.02)

1 (.04)

0

1 (.10)

For $100 Million-Plus

12 (.04)

2 (.08)

1 (.07)

1 (.10)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

295 (.89)

13 (.54)

6 (.43)

7 (.70)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
Standard Deviation

6.63 (1.24)

4.92
(2.70)***

4.07
(2.92)***

6.1 (1.92)

Like those for race and unlike those for sex, List Experiment results for sexual orientation
also indicate a correlation between minority status and lowered identity valuation, causing my
List Experiment hypothesis (2) to again fail. Among straights responding to Question Five on
Survey B, the mean number of “yes” responses given was 1.35. On the test condition Survey C,
the mean number of Question Five answers for straights was 1.41. Almost exactly 6% of
straights would agree in confidence to change their sexual orientation. In contrast, the mean
number of Survey B responses for LGBT respondents was 1.31, while the mean number of
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Survey C responses was 2. The difference between this 68.7% level of willingness to change
orientation and the 6% level of change willingness for straights was significant at the (.001) level
despite the small size of the LGBT sub-sample.
Several interesting trends are observable for the Survey A, Survey A 2.0, and List
Experiment data pertaining to the value of sexual orientation. First, a large percentage of the
negative correlation between LGBT status and identity devaluation was driven by bisexual
respondents. Across at least the two non-covert surveys, the large majority of open and closeted
gay respondents were unwilling to change their sexual orientation. Admittedly, conclusions
about the existence and significance of relationships made on the basis of a sample as relatively
small-N as my sample of LGBT respondents do not have ideally unlimited generalizability.
However, during Survey A, gay respondents were no more willing, in absolute numerical terms,
to consider changes to their sexual orientation than straight respondents. Specifically, 80% of
openly gay respondents, 85% of straight respondents, and 100% of a small closeted gay sample
(2) refused to change orientation. The mean number of levels of compensation demanded by gay
respondents in exchange for changing their sexual orientation was 6.33, and the difference
between this and the mean levels of compensation demanded by straight respondents was not
statistically significant. Similarly, during the 2.0 Survey, slightly over 70% of all gay, rather than
bisexual, respondents refused identity changes.
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Table Forty-Three: Mean Rates of Survey B & C Response by Orientation
Mean Response

Straights

Survey B Mean/
Standard Deviation

1.35 (1.02)
(N=237)

LGBT
Respondents
1.31 (.95)
(16)

Bisexuals

Gays

1 (1)
(5)

1.45 (.93)
(11)

Survey C Mean/
Standard Deviation

1.41 (1.11)
(N=237)

2 (1.51)
(16)

2.13 (1.81)
(8)

1.88 (1.25)
(8)

Survey B/Survey C
Difference: Mean
Items Selected

.06

.69***

1.13

.43

Bisexuals, on the other hand, proved an exception to the general rule of strong attachment
to in-group core characteristics among almost all respondent populations. During Survey A,
61.5% of bisexual respondents were willing to change their sexual orientation for some level of
compensation. The mean number of levels of compensation demanded by bisexuals in exchange
for making orientational identity changes was 4.23, in contrast to 6.53 for straights. During the
2.0 survey, similarly, 56% of bisexual respondents were willing to change their sexual
orientation and the mean number of units of compensation demanded for doing so was only 4.07.
The same trend carried over to the List Experiment, where the difference in mean number of
responses for bisexual subjects actually increased by more than 1.0 (2.13 – 1) between Survey B
and Survey C. This level of willingness to change core characteristics is a result unique in my
research across the chapters – more than ten percentage points ahead of the second highest level
of willingness to change which I measure, 49.5% among Roman Catholic respondents. Simply
put, the extraordinarily high level of willingness to change a core in-group identity among
bisexuals was one primary reason that differences in mean levels of identity valuation between
straight respondents and LGBT respondents overall reached statistical significance.
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Table Forty-Four: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Orientation Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.084 (.184)
.054 (.071)
.150 (.086)
-.073 (.076)
.130 (.124)
.100 (.080)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.534 (.162)***
-.288 (.192)
-.171 (.158)
-.028 (.096)
-.014 (.074)
.034 (.123)

R2 = .081
Number of Observations = 383

The correct explanation for the “bisexual exception” seems to also be the obvious and
logical explanation. By definition, bisexuals are individuals who are attracted to and often pursue
sexual partners of both major genders (Chasin 2000; Herek 2003; Dean 2008). It thus makes
sense that the median bisexual respondent to a survey like mine would be less attached to her
sexual orientation as an identity than the median straight or gay respondent, since a shift to a
purely hetero- or homosexual orientation would not deprive the bisexual respondent of alreadypreferred potential partners. Respondent replies to my one open-ended question seem to bear out
this thesis. Most bisexual respondents stated that they would change their sexual orientation to
heterosexual, given compensation, because they are already attracted to members of both sexes
and the change would cause little inconvenience. To give specific examples: one Latina
respondent stated that she would change easily because she had “no preference anyway (Survey
Instrument #279),” while two white females literally said “I am bi, so this is not a big deal.” I did
not expect this result, but quite arguably should have.
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Table Forty-Five: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Orientation Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.115 (.202)
-.117 (.086)
.196 (.059)***
-.051 (.093)
.161 (.145)
-.058 (.132)
-.351 (.195)
-.604 (.205)**
-.049 (.193)
-.132 (.147)
.050 (.094)
-.017 (.176)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .096
Number of Observations = 288

While noteworthy, the fluidity of concepts of orientation and gender attraction among
bisexual respondents (Chasin 2000; Dean 2008) was not the only reason for the correlations
between LGBT status and the devaluation of orientational identity. While levels of recorded
valuation for specifically gay respondents were fairly high during Survey A and Survey A 2.0,
the difference between the 30% rate of willingness to change orientation for LGBT respondents
and the 11% rate recorded for straights during the 2.0 survey itself approached standard levels of
significance. Much more notably, 42% of gay respondents and 68.7% of all LGBT respondents
agreed to change their orientation in response to Survey C; extremely high levels of willingness
to change orientation among LGBT respondents in the covert List context were not simply
confined to bisexuals. The difference between the 42% level of change willingness for gay
Survey C respondents taken alone and the 6% level of change willingness for straight
respondents was independently significant inside the (.05) level.
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Table Forty-Six: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Orientation Change
(Straights)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.119 (.180)
-.029 (.070)
.066 (.083)
-.045 (.074)
.200 (.120)
.095 (.076)

Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.360 (.159)*
-.197 (.153)
-.025 (.092)
-.042 (.073)
.074 (.119)

R2 = .059
Number of Observations = 359

The probable reasons for this latter finding are unpleasant. More than almost any other
contemporary group (Schafer & Shaw 2009), LGBT Americans experience extremely high levels
of stable and aggressive bigotry (Meyer 1995; Chasin 2000; Herek 2003; Ryan & Rivers 2003;
Kuo 2006; Dean 2008; Rosin 2008). This prejudice often manifests itself as the sort of direct
aggression members of most racial minority groups have arguably not encountered for decades
(Steele 1993; McWhorter 2000; Richburg 2009). In one study of urban gay youth, 39% of
respondents reported being frequently teased and mocked while an additional 7% reported
pressure to change gender atypical behaviors (Ryan & Rivers 2003: 104). More broadly, 80% of
LGBT citizens nationwide report verbal abuse, 44% report experiencing orientation-related
threats, and 30% report actual attacks - being followed or chased (106). This behavior has been
directly linked by both scholarly and best-selling authors (see Dean 2008) to a “down low” gay
culture almost exactly analogous to previous instances of “passing” among American Blacks and
other minority Americans (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; McClain et al 2006).
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Table Forty-Seven: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Orientation Change
(Straights)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.025 (.186)
-.093 (.080)
.196 (.053)***
-.043 (.083)
.117 (.129)
-.026 (.118)

Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.146 (.176)
-.039 (.175)
-.066 (.131)
-.038 (.087)
-.003 (.157)

R2 = .069
Number of Observations = 266

My own respondent pool provided unexpectedly strong evidence of widespread anti-gay
bigotry. Twenty-seven heterosexual respondents to my open-ended item stated bluntly that they
would not change their orientation because they dislike homosexuals or because it is wrong to be
gay. These respondents used harsh language not employed by members of any other group
studied, including whites and African Americans speaking anonymously. One white male said
simply that it is “never cool to be a faggot (Survey Instrument #195).” Another said that he
would “NEVER want to be gay for any amount” – while actually denouncing most bigotry
(Survey Instrument #246). A third cited the Lord above, saying: “God made me, and it is wrong
to…alter myself. It is also specifically wrong to be gay (Survey Instrument #235).” All told,
nearly 10% of the respondent pool displayed strongly anti-gay feelings, in contrast to (for
example) the six respondents who expressed dislike of other racial groups. While few if any
respondents in the relatively small-N pool of LGBT individuals to agree to identity changes and
answer the open-ended item specifically cited anti-gay bias as a reason for their devaluation of
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LGBT identity, the intensity of the prejudice expressed by straight respondents combined with
the frequently observed reality of passing as an LGBT coping strategy (Meyer 1995; Jordan &
Deluty 1998; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; Dean 2008) and the observation of greater levels of LGBT
change willingness under List conditions designed to elicit truthful opinions about sensitive
feelings (Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997; Kane, Craig,& Wald
2004) certainly points to lived prejudice as a probable explanation for LGBT identity
devaluation. Under conditions of stable and extreme oppression rather than relatively fair intergroup competition, in-group identity devaluation certainly can occur (Harris 1993; Stern 1995;
Cornell & Hartmann 2006; McClain et al 2006). To the extent that this is occurring among
LGBT Americans today, ending the gay community’s “time on the cross (Genovese 1972)”
seems a laudable goal for perhaps the primary civil rights movement of today (Gamson 1996;
Chasin 2000).
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Table Forty-Eight: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Orientation Change (LGBT)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

-1.09 (1.25)
.867 (.458)
.827 (.633)
-.415 (.649)
.828 (1.20)
-.143 (.663)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-3.65 (1.59)*
-.595 (1.26)
-.421(1.06)
-.204 (.516)
-.082(1.05)

R2 = .656
Number of Observations = 24

As was the case for sex identity valuation, Linked Fate conventionally measured
(Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 205) had no effect on the valuation of sexual orientation
as an identity. It is notable that, again like the valuation of sex and unlike the valuation of the
two ascribed traits (race and religion) which I study, respondents discussed their valuation of
sexual orientation in biological or primordial terms (Kinsley 1987; Diamond 1994; Horowitz
2000; Cornell & Hartmann 2006) rather than in terms (i.e. “we need to stick together”) indicative
of the sort of pragmatic or strategic behavior often associated with Linked Fate (Dawson 1994;
Chong & Rogers 2005; Winter 2007; Block 2011).54

54

By describing race and religion as ascribed traits, I mean simply that these are categories into which we place
ourselves or are assigned by other humans, rather than being placed by nature. Race, obviously, is largely an
ascribed characteristic. It may be true that people of purely African, Caucasian, and East Asian descent look
different on the average (D’Souza 1995: 449). However, it is also true that an apparently white - or East Asian person with a 1/8 African genetic background would have been classified as black for virtually all of U.S. history,
while huge numbers of Blacks have historically been able to “pass for white” (Harris 1993). Racial/ethnic categories
like “Hispanic” and “Asian” are even more broad and vague, including individuals from different genetic
backgrounds and regions of the world (Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997). Religion, of course, is a purely ascribed/assigned
characteristic, changing this trait requires literally nothing more than a personal loss of faith, and individuals
frequently more from a Catholic to Protestant Christian house of worship (Cevallos 2004) or from a religious to an
agnostic perspective (Harris 2004).
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Table Forty-Nine: Linear Regression - 2.0 Survey Compensation for Orientation Change (LGBT)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.437 (1.637)
-.113 (.526)
1.028 (.910)
-.809 (1.280)
.095 (2.282)
.180 (2.167)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-3.896 (3.072)
.047 (1.672)
-1.460 (1.996)
.767 (.743)
.482 (2.077)

R2 = .324
Number of Observations = 24

To give specific examples, one respondent who refused to change both sexual orientation
and biological sex – but agreed to change religion for free – explicitly stated that “DNA is
special” and that she would be unwilling specifically to change genetic characteristics like sex
and orientation (Survey Instrument #258). Another contrasted orientation and sex with race,
mentioning that he had “strong connections with different races” and would change his race, but
would “not want to be gay for any amount” or ever make a sex change (Instrument #246). While
I will not quote them at length, nearly a dozen (11) respondents quite explicitly discussed the
psychological difficulties that would accompany learning to have pleasing intercourse with a
member of the same sex, or the continued possession of hundreds of memories involving sexual
encounters with the previously preferred sex. Quite probably as a result of this tendency among
respondents to define attachment to their sexual orientation in genetic rather than in politicostrategic terms, coefficients for the effect of Linked Fate on valuation did not reach significance
in any model run during Survey A or the 2.0 survey, and were generally in a negative direction.
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Table Fifty: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Orientation Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.163 (.321)
-.162 (.123)
-.250 (.157)
.254 (.139)
-.401 (.232)
-.262 (.170)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.943 (.295)***
.143 (.291)
.364 (.303)
.110 (.175)
-.007 (.135)
-.206 (.236)

R2 = .106
Number of Observations = 383

Simply put, Linked Fate had no significant influence on respondents’ willingness to
change sexual orientation, as was the case for sex. While several respondents analyzed in the
context of race said things like “I stand with my people during this rat race” (Survey Instrument
#216), respondents discussing orientational identity valuation said simply “I like girls/women
(or) boys/men (40-plus respondents).” These results, combined with those for sex identity
valuation and contrasted with those for race and religion, seem to indicate that the degree to
which individuals feel socially and politically tied to members of their in-group can indeed
influence the valuation of ascribed traits like religion and race but may not significantly
influence the valuation of genetic and largely non-malleable core characteristics.
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Table Fifty-One: Survey A Probabilities of Orientation Change (All)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

13.62%
11.98%

Male
Female

13.62%
28.52%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

13.62%
15.74%
18.77%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

10.13%
13.62%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

12.50%
15.10%
16.97%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

18.98%
13.62%
8.59%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

17.31%
13.62%
8.59%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

13.62%
11.67%
10.37%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

13.92%
13.62%
13.69%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

20.87%
9.13%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

11.03%
20.86%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

20.88%
15.66%
11.91%
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Table Fifty-Two: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Orientation Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.080 (.388)
.225 (.174)
-.349 (.109)***
.007 (.184)
.161 (.145)
-.466 (.284)
.999 (.431)*
.873 (.310)***
-.247 (.382)
.131 (.277)
-.064 (.184)
-.037 (.348)

Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age
R2 = .119
Number of Observations = 288

Unlike Linked Fate, a few variables did unambiguously influence the valuation of sexual
orientation. Most notably, female sex had a significant negative effect on identity valuation
among all respondents during both Survey A and Survey A 2.0. This influence was substantive
as well as formal; the sex variable had the largest coefficients – albeit non-standardized and
amplified by the binary nature of the variable – in every model in which it ran. Predicted
probabilities serve to illustrate the size of this effect. During Survey A, the median male was
13.62% likely to change his sexual orientation while the median female respondent was 28.52%
likely to change her orientation. Among straights, the average man was 15.33% likely to change
sex, while the average woman was roughly 26% likely to do so. This effect was slightly weaker
and slightly less reliable during the 2.0 survey, but the sex variable again reached significance in
the primary logistic regression model run among all respondents. While the median male
respondent was 5% likely to change his sex, the median female respondent was more than 12%
likely to change hers.
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Table Fifty-Three: 2.0 Survey Orientation Change by Respondent Category (All)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

12.33%
13.45%

Male
Female

5.18%
12.33%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

12.33%
25.22%
44.21%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

15.15%
12.33%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

12.33%
16.27%
19.27%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

18.29%
12.33%
8.54%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

11.81%
11.82%
13.44%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

13.02%
14.69%
17.19%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

13.84%
12.33%
12.03%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

35.76%
6.82%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

12.53%
12.74%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

7.38%
10.20%
15.08%
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Table Fifty-Four: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Change (Straights)55
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.259 (.345)
-.063 (.135)
-.143 (.168)
.238 (.146)
-.537 (.251)**
-.262 (.178)

Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.675 (.314)*
.467 (.321)
.110 (.183)
.053 (.145)
-.264 (.260)

R2 = .092
Number of Observations = 359

Just as LGBT status correlates with decreased valuation of sex identity, female sex
appears highly correlated with decreased valuation of sexual orientation as an identity. Straight
women in particular were much less attached to their sexual orientation than straight men across
Survey A and Survey A 2.0. During the former, 23.24% of the majority-straight female subsample was willing to change sexual orientation as versus barely 10% of straight males. For their
part, LGBT women were much more likely to be self-identified bisexuals willing to change than
were LGBT men. This observation of significantly lower levels of orientational identity
valuation and higher levels of bisexuality among females almost certainly reflects the greater
social acceptance of sexual fluidity among women. While gay men are stigmatized to such a
point that they endure “minority stress” and “fag-bashings” (Meyer 1995; Jenness 1995; Gamson
1996; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; Dean 2008), LGBT women do not necessarily endure similar
stigmatization.

55

Because of the small size of the LGBT sub-sample, logistic regressions did not run successfully among gays and
bisexuals; this will be the last table of logistic analysis in the chapter.
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Table Fifty-Five: Survey A Probabilities of Orientation Change (Straights)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

15.33%
12.39%

Male
Female

15.33%
25.90%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

10.35%
15.33%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

14.07%
16.97%
19.01%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

23.49%
15.33%
10.08%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

19.43%
15.33%
9.69%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

15.33%
12.53%
10.63%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

14.32%
15.33%
16.12%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

19.61 %
12.68%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

12.60%
22.88%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

18.75%
16.27%
14.57%
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Table Fifty-Six: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Change (Straights)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.180 (.454)
.234 (.209)
-.386 (.117)***
-.006 (.204)
-.414 (.317)
.042 (.288)

Sex
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.584 (.453)
-.308 (.425)
.086 (.295)
.087 (.218)
-.031 (.386)

R2 = .093
Number of Observations = 266

It is s no exaggeration to say that it is often considered attractive for a young woman to
be bisexual or sexually flexible. Mass-market and even highbrow mens’ magazines frequently
run laudatory (and hopeful?) pieces about female bi- or homosexuality: an article titled “BiSexual Hottie Megan Fox Sits with Maxim” has been accessed more than 2,000,000 times online
(www.maxim.com). Hugely popular mainstream websites are devoted to largely to pictures of
women kissing in taverns (www.nightclubchix.com; www.voyeurstyle.com) and female
bisexuality is an accepted part of a collegiate ‘hookup’ scene that has generated scholarly
analyses (i.e. Sessions Stepp 2008).56 This hypothesis about the effects of public tolerance on
female openness about bisexuality is not a glib one; it is strongly supported by trends in my data.
Among female respondents identifying as members of the LGBT community, 13 of 17 (76.5%)
identified as bisexual, the other four as gay and entirely open. No female respondents felt a need

56

I note the above two websites, and am familiar with them, because these were the top two search results for
“young female bisexuality” when that search was conducted via Google in 2010. The search proved to be an
entertaining one.
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to engage in closeting or passing behavior, while 20% of gay males did and only four of a pool
of 295 male respondents (1.3%) chose to identify as bisexual.
Although not themselves conclusive, responses to my open-ended item further support
this point. While multiple male respondents stated their dislike of “faggots”(Survey Instrument
#195 among others), multiple female respondents said things like “I would NOT mind getting
paid to ‘do’ men and women” (Instrument #271) and “I am hetero, but have had girl-on-girl”
experiences (Instrument #184). Without making light of these revealed experiences, it is difficult
to imagine the same tolerant remarks coming today from a sizable bloc of heterosexual college
males. Males saying things of this kind, much less attempting to market them to a general
audience, could expect a rather chilly reception (Jenness 1995; Chasin 2000; Herek 2003; Dean
2008). Just as visible abuse of male homosexuals causes men to cling fiercely to straight
identities, or oppositional gay ones, relatively tolerant treatment of LGBT females may well
allow women a more flexible sense of sexual identity.
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Table Fifty-Seven: 2.0 Survey Orientation Change by Respondent Category (Straights)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

10.78%
12.64%

Male
Female

6.49%
10.78%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

14.09%
10.78%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

10.78%
13.49%
15.85%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

15.58%
10.78%
7.76%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

10.49%
10.78%
11.67%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

10.54%
11.37%
13.05%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

9.68%
10.78%
11.89%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

35.66%
5.49%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

11.09%
11.02%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

6.42%
8.82%
13.44%
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Although sex was the only factor variable to predict the valuation of sexual orientation
among all respondents across both survey administrations, two other variables – personal
ideology and group identification – were significant predictors of increasing identity valuation
among at least one Large-N population of respondents. During Survey A, the personal ideology
variable reached significance at the .01 level in the logistic model including only straight
respondents and approached standard levels of significance (.097; t= 1.66) in the straights-only
linear model. This was not an aberration; the effect of conservative ideology was in the expected
positive direction in all five Survey A models, and approached significance inside the (.10) level
in the all-respondents logistic model. Among all respondents, the median liberal was 18.98%
likely to change his sexual orientation and the median conservative only 9.97% likely to change
his. Among straights alone, the median liberal was 23.49% likely to change orientation and the
median ideological conservative only 10.08% likely to change. The effect of personal
conservatism on valuation fell from significance during the 2.0 survey, but coefficients for the
ideology variable were in the expected positive direction in four of five Survey A 2.0 models.
This relationship also retained substantive influence. Among all respondents, the median liberal
remained nearly 20% likely to change sexual orientation, while the median conservative was
only 8.5% likely to do so.
Across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0, as was the case in the Race chapter, the effect of
conservatism on identity valuation was positive among minority as well as majority group
respondents. To state the case mildly, several scholars have argued that conservatives are more
likely than liberals to be racist and homophobic (Hacker 1992; Hacker 1995; West 2001; Finlay
& Walther 2003; Herek 2003; Pike 2004), and that minority conservatives are often dupes
internalizing secret self-hatred (Steele 1993; D’Souza 1994; McWhorter 2000; Foskett 2004;
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Sowell 2005). While I did not specifically hypothesize that the impact of increasing personal
conservatism on identity valuation would be less significantly positive among minority group
members than among majority group members for all four populations I study, I did make this
exact assumption in the context of sexual orientation – hypothesizing that LGBT conservatives
would in fact devalue their “gay” sexual orientations. While alleged relationships between
conservatism and racism may well be overblown (Wood 1994; Sears, van Laar, Carillo, &
Kosterman 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997), there obviously is at least some relationship
between today’s conservatism and anti-gay feeling (Finlay & Walther 2003; Herek 2003; Kuo
2006; Rosin 2008). Kuo, for example, flatly describes limiting gay rights as the “almost peerless
priority” for conservative and Evangelical members of the U.S. House (2006: 164).
However, I found no significant correlations between increasing conservatism and
decreasing valuation of sexual orientation among LGBT respondents to either Survey A or
Survey A 2.0. In the one regression model to run successfully among LGBT respondents during
Survey A, the personal ideology variable had a strong if unreliable positive influence on identity
valuation, with a (B) of .828 and a standard error of 1.2; the partisan affiliation variable did have
a weak negative influence on valuation but was totally insignificant in statistical terms. During
the 2.0 survey, the effect of both variables on valuation was positive and the multi-unit metrics
had substantive coefficients of reasonable size. As was the case within the Black conservative
sub-population of respondents, the effect of personal conservatism never reached statistical
significance among minority group respondents, but certainly had no negative influence on
valuation. Again, while they are often accused of doing exactly this (Steele 1993; Hoff-Sommers
2000; McWhorter 2000; Sowell 2005), I find no evidence that minority conservatives are
significantly more likely than majority group conservatives to devalue core characteristics.
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Even more intriguingly, my List Experiment results did reveal a significant and
substantively large correlation between personal conservatism and increasing willingness to
change sexual orientation among majority group “heterosexual” respondents. This was an
unexpected finding, to say the least. In an attempt to analyze both overall respondent honesty and
relationships between conservatism and actual bigotry (see pp. 26-40), I analyze the relationships
existing between conservatism and identity valuation under List conditions as part of each
chapter. During both the Sex and Race chapters, significant positive relationships between
personal conservatism and increased identity valuation which existed during ordinal surveying
were largely replicated under List conditions. This was emphatically not the case for the
relationship between conservative personal ideology and the valuation of sexual orientation.
List Experiment data, if taken as accurate, indicate that virtually no heterosexual liberals
(Survey C 1.64 – Survey B 1.64) or moderates (1.24 – 1.24) would change their sexual
orientation if offered the chance under absolutely covert conditions, but that nearly 25% of
conservatives (1.12 - .90) would do so.57 This finding is unlikely to be the result of statistical
aberration; the gap between conservative and liberal rates of change willingness under List
conditions was statistically significant at the (.001) level, and the result was derived from a
sample including at least medium-N populations of liberal (119), moderate (98), and
conservative (33) respondents.
This result is, to say the least, unexpected and interesting. But, again assuming that I have
actually made a replicable discovery, it makes a sort of practical sense. Many quite serious
scholars have noted that under the most pigeon-breasted three piece suit beats the heart of a
57

I confine my analysis to heterosexual conservative respondents here because there were exactly two gay
conservative respondents to both Survey B and Survey C, and the mean number of items selected increased by this
population increased by three between Survey B and Survey C. I decided to drop these respondents from my
analysis of the impact of conservatism on valuation during the List Experiment, rather than including obvious outlier
cases.
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beast; sexual desires seems to cross the gamut of quirks across Americans of all classes and
backgrounds (Russell 1975; Patterson & Km 1991; Friday 1998). Assuming that conservatives
are no less likely to be gay than anyone else, the constant devaluation of the LGBT community
occurring on the contemporary Right (Brock 2002; Finlay & Walther 2003; Kuo 2006; Robison
& Richards 2012) logically might cause LGBT conservatives to assume – and covertly want to
leave (Brock 2002; Dean 2008) – a heterosexual public identity. Of course, more research into
what is currently a one-off result remains to be done. However, the lowered valuation of
heterosexual identity displayed by straight conservatives under List conditions is intriguingly
reminiscent of the lowered racial identity valuation visible among immigrant-origin minorities,
and like it quite possibly is explained by a substantial literature (Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Chen
1999; McWhorter 2000; McClain et al 2006).
A final note about the impact of conservatism on valuation concerns the second measure
of conservatism I employ, the partisan identification variable. Across the chapters, and during
this chapter, the influence of conservative partisanship on valuation has been both weaker and
less reliable than the effect of personal ideology. While coefficients for the effect of ideology on
valuation were, with one exception, in the expected positive direction in all models run, the
influence of conservative partisanship on valuation was in a positive direction in only six of 10
models and never reached significance. Similarly, the correlation between Republican Party
membership and willingness to become homosexual was positive during the List Experiment –
itself a fascinating finding (!) – but this relationship narrowly missed statistical significance.
The underperformance of partisanship as a factor variable, unlike some of my other
results, does have a fairly definite explanation. Although political scientists include measures of
both ideology and partisan identification in models (Kuklinksi et al 1997; Pike 2004; Sparks &
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Watts 2009), ideology is often a superior predictor of effects on the dependent variable (Sears,
van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman1997; Tarman & Sears 2005). To a large extent, this is simply
because asking people how liberal or conservative they happen to be is a better measure of their
political preferences than partisan affiliation. African Americans, whites in the upper South, and
other groups fairly frequently vote for the party out of sync with their individual ideological
preferences for racial and strategic reasons (D’Souza 1994; Foskett 2004; Pike 2004; Moser
2009). Myown observations of the very limited effect of partisan affiliation, compared with
conservative individual ideology, on partisan affiliation gels with this substantial literature.
A final variable to reach significance during at least one survey administration was ingroup identification. During Survey A 2.0, the “GroupID” variable was a significant positive
predictor of orientational identity valuation among all respondents in both linear and logistic
regressions. The variable also reached significance separately among the sub-population of
straights analyzed alone using both linear and logistic models. During this administration, the
median respondent at the lowest level of in-group identification was 35.76% likely to change her
sexual orientation, while the median respondent at the highest level of identification was only
6.8% likely to change hers. The impact of GroupID on valuation was less statistically robust
during Survey A, and did not reach standard levels of significance. However, the identification
variable had coefficients in the expected direction in every model and approached significance at
the (.08) level in the all-respondents linear regression and. Like many other variables analyzed
during this project, the group identification metric would have been significant in several models
had these been run as one-tailed tests or had significance been measured at the .1 level. During
Survey A, the median low-identification individual was 20.87% likely to change his sexual
orientation, while the median individual at the highest level of identification was only 9.13%
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likely to do so. These results, while less consistent than expected in statistical terms, support the
conclusion by scholars like Hughes & Demo (1989) that in-group identification can predict
group pride and collective esteem.
In addition to those analyzed above, five factors had no statistically significant influence
on the valuation of orientational identity. These factors were Linked Fate, race, education, age
(again an underperforming variable of interest), and job status. Results for Linked Fate have
already been discussed; this factor has been at best a weak predictor of the valuation of
biological, as versus ascribed or partly ascribed, traits throughout this project. In the context of
orientation, a Linked Fate variable had almost no influence in any model. Some other findings,
such as the non-effect of age, were unexpected. Age has previously been found to be a major
predictor of negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (Herek 2003: 269), and I hypothesized
that age would correlate with unwillingness to change sexual orientation for the straight and allrespondent sub-populations. All coefficients for the age variable – as well as the education and
job status variables – were in the expected direction in the majority of models across y surveys,
but these variables simply failed to reach standard levels of significance in 12-variable models
testing a question different from Herek’s.
Another expected effect that failed to materialize was the influence of sexual openness on
orientational identity valuation among LGBT respondents. I hypothesized that openly gay men
and women would value their orientational identities more highly than “closeted” gays,
following Jordan & Deluty’s (1998) conclusion that honest disclosure of lesbian identity
correlates with at least individual esteem. Testing this thesis was the reason for dividing my
LGBT sample into open and closeted respondents. However, lower percentages of closeted gays
than of open gay men and women were willing to change orientation across my two samples.
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The lowest mean rates of identity attachment were actually found among bisexuals, who were
almost always open about their sexuality and presumably face less abuse than gays. As with the
Black skin bleachers interviewed by Charles (2003), gays may closet for reasons unrelated to
identity devaluation, such as the pursuit of business success or avoidance of the abuse that
gender-atypical citizens often endure (Chasin 2000; Brock 2002; Ryan and Rivers 2003: 104;
Dean 2008). Such conclusions, touched on in the literature, cannot fully be reached using data
drawn from my medium-N samples. However, they merit further analysis by researchers in the
fields of orientation, gender, and identity.
Analysis of the effect of sexual orientation and other characteristics on orientational
identity valuation supported fewer of my hypotheses than was the case in previous chapters.
Most importantly, the hypothesis that LGBT status does not correlate with lowered valuation of
sexual orientation was at best partly confirmed. The correlation between LGBT orientation and
decreased identity valuation was not significant during Survey A, but was substantively large and
in a negative direction. Further, during the only slightly smaller-N Survey A 2.0 and Survey C
administrations, this negative correlation was significant. Conservative personal ideology and ingroup identification were significant predictors of valuation, each in essentially the direction and
manner hypothesized – but among only one of my two survey populations rather than both. I
also, did not say the least, expect to find a sizable and significant correlation between
conservatism and willingness to become homosexual under List conditions.
Several other signficant results were not as expected. Just as sexual orientation proved
had the largest substantive influence among all factors on sex identity valuation, sex had the
largest influence among all factors on the willingness of respondents on orientational valuation.
While it makes some sense, this result was not a formal hypothesis in my Theory section. Nor,
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obviously, was the underperformance of variables measuring Linked Fate, age, education, and
open as versus closeted status. Most importantly, my focal hypothesis was challenged and
probably fails in the context of sexual orientation. Not only did the actual majority of bisexual
respondents express willingness to change orientation for reasons unrelated to oppression, more
than 30% of specifically gay respondents were willing to change- for less cheery reasons – in
response to Survey A 2.0 and Survey C. In the modern United States, I do find a statistically
significant negative correlation between living as a gay man or woman and devaluing that
identity.
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CHAPTER 8
THE DAVINCI COEFFECIENTS – PREDICTORS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
VALUATION

After analyzing how my set of independent variables affects the valuation of sexual
orientation, I next examine how the same factors influence the valuation of religious identity.
The experimental structure and chapter formatting follow those for all previous chapters. I first
employ cross-tabulation analysis to measure identity change willingness among the entire
population of respondents – including Protestant Christians, Catholics, atheists and agnostics,
members of “other” religions, Jews, and Muslims. Next, I conduct linear and logistic regression
analysis among the entire population to determine the effect of religious minority status and
other factors on religious identity valuation. Finally, I conduct separate linear and logistic
regressions among the three Large-N sub-populations of Protestants, Catholics, and nontraditional religious minorities to determine the effect of the independent variable set among
these populations taken separately.58 Overall, my hypothesis that religious minority status will
not significantly correlate with decreased religious identity valuation was largely confirmed. I
did observe a negative correlation between religious minority status and religious identity
valuation in most models. However, this correlation reached standard levels of statistical
significance in only one of 19 models, a stand-alone means test that was part of Survey A.

58

In my regression models, the non-traditionally religious sub-category was made up of respondents who identified
as atheists, identified as agnostics, or identified as having an “other faith” beyond those religions explicitly listed on
my surveys (Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam) – such as Wicca or Buddhism. These three groups
of respondents were substantially similar to one another in terms of background characteristics like education and
ideology, and are analyzed together in order to allow more statistically significant results to be obtained from a
larger respondent sub-population. Jewish and Muslim respondents were not included in the non-traditionally
religious category; there were a tiny number of these respondents, and they obviously follow very “traditional” faith
traditions that have rivaled Christianity for centuries.
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Table Fifty-Eight: Survey A Population Size and Mean Rates of Change Willingness by Faith
Valuation Level

Protestants

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

19 (.11)

All Faith
Minorities
28 (.12)

(N=180)

Catholics

(N=240)

12 (.11)
(N=105)

NonTraditional
14 (.11)
(N=122)

For $25 Million or Less 12 (.07)

41 (.17)

24 (.23)

17 (.14)

For $25-50 Million

6 (.03)

9 (.04)

4 (.04)

4 (.03)

For $50-75 Million

2 (.01)

2 (.01)

1 (.01)

0

For $75-100 Million

3 (.02)

1 (.005)

1 (.01)

0

For $100 Million-Plus

9 (.05)

20 (.08)

10 (.10)

9 (.07)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

129 (.72)

139 (.58)

53 (.51)

78 (.64)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
(Standard Deviation)

5.78 (2.18)

5.18
(2.44)**

4.87
(2.49)**

5.41 (2.39)

As usual throughout this study, the majority of respondents in most religious subpopulations were unwilling to change their beliefs. During Survey A, 128 of 180 Protestants
(71%) and 60% of admittedly small samples of Jews (5) and American Muslims (9) were
unwilling to do so. Interestingly, some of the highest levels of valuation were displayed by
respondents who do not follow conventional Western religions at all. Forty-three of 70 atheists
and agnostics (61.4%) refused to change their faith or lack therof, as did 36 of 52 (69.2%) of the
followers of unconventional religions like Wicca. Survey A 2.0 results were similar, with 80% of
Protestants and 74% of minority faith respondents refusing to change religion.
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Table Fifty-Nine: 2.0 Survey Population Size and Mean Rates of Change Willingness by Faith
Valuation Level

Protestants

Number/Percentage
Willing to Change
Identity for Free

10 (.08)

All Faith
Minorities
18 (.09)

(N=133)

Catholics

(N=195)

7 (.09)
(N=75)

NonTraditional
11 (.10)
(N=109)

For $25 Million or Less 7 (.05)

13 (.07)

6 (.08)

6 (.06)

For $25-50 Million

1 (.01)

3 (.02)

2 (.03)

1 (.01)

For $50-75 Million

3 (.02)

0

0

0

For $75-100 Million

1 (.01)

7 (.04)

5 (.07)

1 (.01)

For $100 Million-Plus

5 (.04)

9 (.05)

3 (.04)

6 (.06)

Number/Percentage
Unwilling to Ever
Change Identity

106 (.80)

145 (.74)

52 (.69)

84 (.77)

Mean Level (1-7) of
Compensation Asked
For Identity Changes/
(Standard Deviation)

6.14 (1.92)

5.93 (2.08)

5.76 (2.15)

6.01 (2.07)

The only group of respondents for which levels of willingness to change rose above 40%
during any survey was the Roman Catholic sub-population. During Survey A, nearly 50% of
Catholic respondents (52 of 105) announced they would change their religion for financial
reward. During that administration, the mean number of units of compensation demanded by
Protestant respondents to make identity changes was 5.78 and the mean number demanded by
the non-traditionally religious was 5.41, but the mean level of compensation demanded by
Catholic respondents was only 4.87 units. During the 2.0 survey, Catholic respondents displayed
higher mean levels of identity valuation, but 32% of Catholics remained willing to change
identity, and Catholic levels of valuation were the lowest for all populations surveyed.
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Table Sixty: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Religion Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.329 (.287)
-.030 (.113)
.518 (.137)*
.281 (.139)*
.344 (.186)
-.105 (.111)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.030 (.247)
-.265 (.346)
-.108 (.253)
-.311 (.142)*
.200 (.113)
-.068 (.186)

R2 = .145
Number of Observations = 359

Largely as a result of low levels of identity valuation among Catholic respondents, the
mean differences between Protestant Christians and all religious minority respondents in terms of
both levels of compensation demanded for religious change and yes: no willingness to change
religion was statistically significant during the univariate means test for Survey A depicted in
Table One. Mean differences in valuation between Protestant and Catholic respondents taken
alone were also significant during Survey A. However, Survey A differences in mean levels of
valuation between Protestants and members of non-traditional religious communities were not
independently significant, and religious minority status remained an insignificant if negative
predictor of minority status during all other Survey A models and all models run during the 2.0
survey.
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Table Sixty-One: Linear Regression – 2.0 Compensation for Religion Change (All Respondents)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.514 (.266)
.064 (.111)
.086 (.073)
.115 (.123)
.553 (.191)**
-.093 (.170)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.432 (.249)
.174 (.291)
-.137 (.258)
-.046 (.180)
-.115 (.126)
-.309 (.217)

R2 = .112
Number of Observations = 261

Several quick comments about these initial results are worth making. First, results for
faith identity valuation illustrate a continued pattern of respondents valuing ascribed or nongenetic characteristics (religion, ethnicity) a significant bit less than primarily genetic
characteristics (sex, sexual orientation). The main focus of this chapter is obviously analyzing
the effect of religious minority status on religious identity valuation. Nonetheless, it remains
notable that fully 36.2% of respondents were willing to change their religious identity during
Survey A, and between 20-32% of individuals in every sub-population were willing to do so
during Survey A 2.0. Results for race, which is at least a partly ascribed characteristic (Harris
1993, D’Souza 1995; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Horowitz 2000) were similar but reflected
somewhat greater attachment to the core characteristic in question. During Survey A, for
example, 21.7% of Blacks (18 of 87), 27.6% of Hispanics (8 of 29), and roughly 30% of whites
were willing to change race. These percentages do not match the percentages of Catholics, Jews,
Muslims, and agnostics willing to change their faith tradition, but remain sizable.
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Table Sixty-Two: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Religion Change
(Protestants)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.151 (.375)
-.178 (.168)
.767 (.202)*
.318 (.172)
.210 (.250)
-.127 (.147)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.275 (.326)
-.1.31 (.585)*
-.457 (.179)*
.104 (.151)
-.078 (.231)

R2 = .259
Number of Observations = 163

Change willingness results for entirely biological core characteristics reflect a very
different picture. During Survey A, only 12.6% of both males and females were willing to
change their sex for any price, and this level of identity valuation actually increased during both
the 2.0 survey and the List Experiment. Similarly, with the sole exception of bisexuals, rates of
willingness to change sexual orientation ranged between 30% and 0% across all sexual identity
populations during at least the two Large-N ordinal surveys. While respondents certainly valued
all core characteristics that were studied, my results do indicate that individuals are far less likely
on average to change traits viewed as biological components of the self than to alter even the
most beloved ascribed characteristics.
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Table Sixty-Three: 2.0 Survey Compensation for Religion Change (Protestants)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.026 (.406)
.209 (.159)
.154 (.107)
.261 (.181)
.678 (.319)*
-.030 (.248)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.331 (.396)
1.306 (.789)
-.184 (.248)
-.261 (.171)
-.130 (.275)

R2 = .178
Number of Observations = 112

An equally interesting if less sweeping result revealed by initial cross-tabulation is the
low level of religious identity valuation among Catholics. During both Survey A (49%) and the
2.0 survey (32%), much larger percentages of Catholic Christians than of any other religious subpopulation were willing to make identity changes. The stand-alone difference between
Protestants and Catholics in mean levels of identity valuation was in fact significant during
Survey A. This result is indicative of a trend; many Catholics see their ancient church as staid,
and rival congregations are growing at the expense of Catholic ones around the world (Cevallos
2004; Harris 2004; Chao 2013). In Brazil, a recent papal visit was challenged by the fact that
“(only) 57% of Brazillians call themselves Catholics today as compared with 75% in 1994 (Chao
2013).” In contrast, Protestantism in particular of the Evangelical variety is arguably
experiencing a renaissance (Frank 2004; Kuo 2006; D’Souza 2007; Rosin 2008; Chao 2013).59

I analyze Protestants as a bloc, rather that separately analyzing Protestant constituencies like mainline, evangelical,
and born-again Protestants, because my thesis question is whether members of majority groups are more attached to
their core characteristics than members of minority groups; the majority religion in the United States is Protestant
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Table Sixty-Four: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Religion Change (Catholics)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.812 (.672)
-.168 (.212)
.536 (.294)
.303 (.328)
.411 (.395)
-.023 (.222)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.603 (.563)
-.739 (1.16)
.412 (.360)
.185 (.245)
-.107 (.457)

R2 = .181
Number of Observations = 91

Importantly, however, and despite the correlation between specifically Catholic status
and lowered religious identity valuation, the effect of religious minority status on religious
identity valuation did not reach statistical significance during any multivariate regression
analysis during either Survey A or the 2.0 survey. While Catholics did display low mean levels
of religious identity valuation, the answer to my primary research question of whether religious
minority respondents as a whole devalue their faith traditions was no. During Survey A, the
linear (B) coefficient for my binary faith variable was -.108, while the standard error was .253;
this variable was significant only at the .671 level (t = -.42). The effect of religious minority
status on the level of compensation demanded to change faith was negative, indicating the
survival of a slight negative correlation between religious minority group membership and
religious identity valuation, but this result is almost meaningless given the coefficient involved.

Christianity (www.census.gov). I take it as a given that any majority or minority group (“whites,” “Blacks”) will
contain sub-groups of individuals more or less attached than the median to their group identity, and differing from
that median in other ways.
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Table Sixty-Five: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Religion Change
(Catholics)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.045 (.792)
.129 (.277)
-.026 (.232)
.388 (.353)
.149 (.494)
-.026 (.437)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level*
Income/Job Status
Age

.135 (.698)
.466 (.661)
.399 (.602)
.189 (.334)
-.557 (.593)

R2 = .074
Number of Observations = 62

During Survey A, the faith variable came closer to standard levels of statistical
significance in the all-respondents logistic regression model, but again did not closely approach
significance. With Catholic respondents included in the logistic regression from which predicted
probabilities numbers were generated, the median Protestant was 33.8% likely to change his
religion while the median member of a religious minority group was 34.5% likely to do so – a
difference of less than 1%. Results from the 2.0 survey – during which 77% of atheists,
agnostics, and non-traditionally religious respondents were unwilling to change their beliefs –
were similar. There, the difference in identity change willingness between median Protestant
Christian (17.3%) and religious minority respondents (20.5%) was 3%. Overall, religious
minority status did not correlate with significantly with reduced religious identity valuation in
my multivariate regressions, despite the Catholic exception and undeniable harassment of
religious minority groups during various historical periods (Adorno 1950; Harris 2004; Dawkins
2006; Hitchens 2007; Baigent 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013).
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Table Sixty-Six: Mean Rates of Survey B & C Response by Religion
Mean Response

Protestants

Survey B Mean/
Standard Deviation

.92 (.91)
(N=96)

All Faith
Minorities
1.14 (1.03)
(157)

Catholics
1.08 (.93)
(74)

NonTraditional60
1.27 (1.13)
(70)

Survey C Mean/
Standard Deviation

.99 (1.15)
(N=83)

1.34 (1.39)
(170)

1.29 (1.26)
(73)

1.33 (1.44)
(88)

Survey B/Survey C
Difference: Mean
Items Selected

.07

.20

.21

.06

List Experiment results largely support the conclusion that there exists some negative
correlation between religious minority status and identity valuation, but that this relationship
generally does not reach statistical significance. During the List Experiment, more than 75% of
the members of all major religious groups refused to change their religious identities, confirming
List Hypothesis (1). In response to Survey C, nearly 95% of non-traditional believers and 81% of
Catholics, in comparison with 93% of Protestants, were unwilling to change their faith when
asked covertly. Hypothesis (2) was also confirmed; the overall influence of religious minority
status on religious identity valuation was in a negative direction but insignificant.

60

As in previous chapters, the “non-traditional religious minorities” category consists of respondents who identified
as atheist or agnostic, and also of respondents who identified with a faith tradition other than the six religions listed
by name (i.e. Wicca). This is clearly a growing segment of the U.S. population, my respondent group for Survey C
included 83 Protestant respondents, 73 Catholic respondents, and a total of 88 non-traditionally religious
respondents – including 50 self-identified atheists and agnostics.
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Table Sixty-Seven: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Religion Change (NonTraditional)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.718 (.615)
-.054 (.277)
.469 (.292)
.024 (.348)
.213 (.413)
-.234 (.265)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.072 (.540)
.384 (.505)
-.757 (.302)*
.515 (.251)*
-.037 (.409)

R2 = .205
Number of Observations = 94

A few additional List findings merit comment. First, as the raw data indicate, Catholics
continued to display relatively low mean levels of religious identity valuation in response to
Survey C, in comparison with Protestants, atheists and agnostics, and members of non-traditional
religious minority groups. The difference in identity change willingness between Catholics and
Protestants during the List Experiment is not enormous, and is probably not due to intense
contemporary social oppression (atheists and Jews do not display similar tendencies). However,
this result did reach standard thresholds of significance under List conditions and cannot be
ignored - and Catholic respondents have appeared throughout this project not to match the
religious attachment that characterizes modern Protestants and drives evangelical and mainline
involvement with political discourse (Frank 2004; Wallis 2005; Kou 2006; Rosin 2008; Robison
& Richards 2012).
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Table Sixty-Eight: Linear Regression – 2.0 Survey Compensation for Religion Change (NonTraditional)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

1.203 (.419)*
-.317 (.197)
.070 (.112)
-.190 (.194)
.840 (.288)**
-.136 (.306)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age*

1.085 (.402)*
-.411 (.383)
.237 (.290)
-.260 (.219)
-.936 (.440)

R2 = .398
Number of Observations = 77

As notably, it seems clear following three Large-N survey administrations that atheists,
agnostics, and persons of “other or no faith” do not on average devalue their beliefs relative to
Protestant and (certainly) Catholic Christians. This is an interesting and relevant tertiary finding
of my research. Although atheists, Wiccans, Taoists and so forth are often not perceived as
coherent religious or social in-groups (Guenther & Mulligan 2013), non-traditionally religious
respondents were one of the two populations least likely to change their faith across all survey
administrations. During the List Experiment, atheists and their brethren were actually less likely
than Protestants to change religious identity. These consistent results are extremely unlikely to be
statistical or methodological aberrations. Instead, they likely reflect the rise in “ungodly pride”
that has been extensively documented during the past decade (Harris 2004; Dawkins 2006;
D’Souza 2007; Hitchens 2007; Baigent 2009; Maher 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013).
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Table Sixty-Nine: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Religion Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.479 (.294)
-.050 (.115)
-.427 (.138)*
-.348 (.147)*
-.423 (.190)*
-.008 (.112)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.088 (.255)
.205 (.336)
.041 (.258)
.192 (.145)
-.179 (.155)
.105 (.200)

R2 = .104
Number of Observations = 359

The documented fact that followers of secular paths and non-traditional religions display
levels of faith identity valuation (and in-group identification) on par with those measured among
Protestant Christians should be of extreme interest to scholars in the discipline. The growing
tendency of Americans to cluster in enclaves of like-minded persons has often been noted
(Fussell 1983; Chasin 2000; Frank 2004; Bishop 2008; Rosin 2008), as has the concentration of
free-thinkers and Evangelicals in the Democratic and Republican parties respectively (Frank
2004; Kuo 2006; D’Souza 2007; Moser 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). The growth of a
mobilized “new atheist (Guenther & Mulligan 2013: 458)” movement might well herald the
growth of an American spiritual politics where each party is dominated by a concentrated
faith/interest bloc representing roughly one quarter of the national population.61 For good and ill,
probably the latter, this is a trend that bears watching.

61

These 25% figure estimates are based on ARIS data published here
(http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris/aris_index.htm) and reprinted on the respected religious
website http://www.adherents.com. According to the ARIS data, roughly 14% of Americans identify as
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Table Seventy: Survey A Religion Change by Respondent Category (All Respondents)
Variable Level
White
Non-White

Chance of Change
34.51%
24.90%

Male
Female

34.51%
32.72%

Straight Respondent
Gay Respondent

34.51%
45.10%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

33.84%
34.51%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

30.41%
38.99%
43.69%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

44.53%
34.51%
26.01%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

34.80%
34.51%
34.17%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

34.51%
37.02%
39.72%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

42.96%
34.51%
30.73%

Low Religious Identification
High Religious identification

54.99%
19.05%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

42.69%
21.17%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

38.27%
35.69%
33.43%

atheist/secular – as of 2001 – with smaller but sizable groups identifying as agnostic, Unitarian, Wiccan, and so on.
On the other end of the spectrum, slightly under 25% of Americans appear to identify as Evangelical Christians,
with 16.3% of the national population being Baptist and 2.1% identifying as Pentecostal.
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Table Seventy-One: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Religion Change (All)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.756 (.376)*
.064 (.154)
-.099 (.098)
-.133 (.178)
-.590 (.267)*
.153 (.233)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Religious Background
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.457 (.328)
.141 (.347)
.245 (.362)
-.165 (.241)
.035 (.170)
.464 (.278)

R2 = .087
Number of Observations = 262

Moving on to those non-faith variables to influence the valuation of faith identity, results
from Survey A provided support for Linked Fate Theory. The Linked Fate variable was one of
only two variables (along with Group Identification) to be significant among all respondents in
both the Survey A linear and logistic regressions. In addition, the Linked Fate metric had
coefficients in the expected positive direction in all models, closely approaching significance in
the two regressions among Protestants. Among all respondents, the median individual at the
lowest level of Linked Fate was 42.7% likely to change his religion, while the median individual
at the highest was only 21.2% likely to change his. The positive relationship between Linked
Fate and religious identity valuation fell from statistical significance during the 2.0 survey, but
the Linked Fate variable again had coefficients in the expected direction in 7 of 8 models.
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Table Seventy-Two: 2.0 Survey Religion Change by Respondent Category (All Respondents)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

20.52%
11.44%

Male
Female

28.75%
20.52%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

20.52%
23.37%
27.20%

Protestant Christian
Any Religious Minority

17.28%
20.52%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

20.52%
16.56%
15.47%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

31.49%
20.52%
13.10%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

16.83%
18.35%
23.37%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

28.80%
39.04%
49.55%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

19.61%
20.52%
21.34%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

27.91%
17.83%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

22.83%
17.13%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

18.59%
19.64%
21.63%
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Table Seventy-Three: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Religion Change
(Protestants)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.026 (.495)
.292 (.229)
-.837 (.275)*
-.493 (.240)*
-.370 (.389)
.042 (.200)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.601 (.472)
1.941 (.984)*
.314 (.239)
-.203 (.204)
.197 (.341)

R2 = .207
Number of Observations = 163

While the statistical insignificance of the positive relationship between Linked Fate and
religious identity valuation during Survey 2.0 limits the extent to which I can speak ambitiously
about the reliability of this finding, several interesting conclusions and theories pertaining to
Linked Fate can be unpacked from the data by this point of the dissertation. First, while Linked
Fate has often been regionalized as a concept specifically relevant to the study of minority
identity in the United States (Dawson 1994; Chong & Rogers 2005; Simein 2005; Sanchez 2006;
Walker 2007; Block 2011; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012; but see Gay, Hochschild, & White
2014), my results throughout this dissertation indicate that it can be a significant predictor of
identity valuation(s) across a range of minority and majority identity populations.
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Table Seventy-Four: Survey A Religion Change by Respondent Category (Protestants)
Variable Level

Chance of Religion
Change

White
Non-White

30.60%
30.34%

Male
Female

30.60%
20.19%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

30.60%
71.56%
88.09%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

25.11%
37.17%
44.30%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

38.51%
30.60%
24.56%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

30.46%
30.60%
31.05%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

30.60%
35.26%
40.36%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

39.46%
30.60%
27.05%

Low Religious Identification
High Religious Identification

68.23%
9.14%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

41.65%
15.15%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

18.01%
21.17%
25.32%
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Table Seventy-Five: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Religion Change
(Protestants)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable

.235 (.695)
-.480 (.286)
-.226 (.176)
-.411 (.326)
-1.001 (.540)
.219 (.401)

Minority Status
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation
Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.737 (.637)
.
(.)
.337 (.383)
.376 (.344)
.242 (.440)

R2 = .168
Number of Observations = 106

To this point, Linked Fate has shown notable influence on valuation among racial
minorities, religious respondents taken as a group, Protestant Christians taken alone, and to some
extent males during Survey A. While these findings do not come close to providing full
confirmation of my starting hypothesis that increasing Linked Fate would predict increasing
identity valuation among all populations studied, the discovery that Linked Fate can and often
does exert influence well beyond minority ethnic populations merits notice. While much research
remains to be done here, I draw from the literature on how Linked Fate influences AfricanAmerican political behavior and hypothesize that what links all of the aforementioned social
groups is the feeling of being potentially or currently under attack, or at least engaged in intense
social competition.
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Table Seventy-Six: 2.0 Survey Religion Change by Respondent Category (Protestants)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

6.77%
7.10%

Male
Female

13.51%
6.77%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

6.77%
14.07%
20.81%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

13.78%
6.77%
3.87%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

6.41%
6.77%
10.51%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

7.69%
9.79%
13.05%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

4.67%
6.77%
8.91%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

15.02%
4.93%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

15.50%
4.82%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

15.86%
8.72%
5.52%
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Table Seventy-Seven: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Religion Change
(Catholics)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-.772 (.597)
.001 (.196)
-.392 (.264)
-.148 (.299)
-.539 (.356)
-.112 (.200)

Sex
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.592 (.510)
-.506 (.333)
-.222 (.221)
.192 (.460)

R2 = .128
Number of Observations = 89

The idea that the presence of out-group competitors correlates with increasing Linked
Fate and increasingly strong links between Linked Fate and group-centric behaviors is a bedrock
component of standard explanations of how Linked Fate operates among racial minorities
(Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Cornell & Hartmann 2006: 202; Block 2011;
McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010). My results indicate that this thesis can be
extended to groups beyond racial minority populations, and that in-group identity valuation may
be one of the characteristics/positively co-correlated with increasing Linked Fate during
situations of real or perceived competition. All of the groups for which I observed statistically
significant links between Linked Fate and increasing identity valuation are rather frequently
described as being currently engaged in intense social competition. Black and Hispanic
Americans, to give the most obvious example, frequently and with some justification view
themselves as jockeying for social position with whites inside an institutionally racist system
(Bell 1989; Cose 1993; Steele 1993; Robinson 2002; Walker 2007; Block 2011).
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Table Seventy-Eight: Survey A Religion Change by Respondent Category (Catholics)
Variable Level

Chance of Religion
Change

White
Non-White

52.97%
35.64%

Male
Female

52.97%
66.79%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

52.97%
30.08%
22.30%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

65.09%
52.97%
40.75%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

55.53%
52.97%
43.36%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

52.97%
56.09%
58.25%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

58.24%
47.50%
42.22%

Low Religious Identification
High Religious identification

70.51%
35.41%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

56.36%
46.22%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

51.51%
52.50%
53.38%
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Table Seventy-Nine: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Religion Change
(Catholics)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

.039 (.770)
.158 (.280)
.023 (.215)
-.316 (.352)
-.269 (.419)
-.154 (.189)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

.533 (.703)
-.020 (.634)
-.861 (.728)
-.318 (.333)
.681 (.612)

R2 = .091
Number of Observations = 62

Even more than African Americans or Latinos, traditional Protestants and other
conservative Christians often seem often seem to view themselves as being almost at war with a
decadent surrounding society (Frank 2004; Dawkins 2006; Kuo 2006; D’Souza 2007; Rosin
2008; Robson & Richards 2012; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). Right-wing scholar Dinesh
D’Souza devotes a lengthy book (The Enemy Within: 2007) to arguing that American pop
culture’s sexuality and tawdriness is so offensive to Muslims and traditionalist Christians that it
is a major cause of the Terror War. More broadly, it is a truism that conservative Protestant
reaction to the successes of the gay and abortion rights movements constitutes one of the driving
forces in U.S. politics today (Herek 2003; Frank 2004; Kuo 2006). Even males, the sexual
majority population among whom Linked Fate closely approached significance as a predictor of
valuation during Survey A, often attribute financial difficulties to the contemporary burden of
competing with women and minorities moving into the professional job market (Faludi 1992;
Eastland 1994; Hoff-Sommers 2000; O’Bierne 2006).
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Table Eighty: 2.0 Survey Religion Change By Respondent Category (Catholics)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

35.94%
37.43%

Male
Female

25.83%
35.94%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

35.94%
37.05%
39.20%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

35.94%
15.56%
13.15%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

42.16%
35.94%
31.12%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

44.14%
39.91%
33.10%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

52.08%
65.25%
72.99%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

42.78%
30.19%
25.97%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

35.80%
37.30%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

43.02%
25.24%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

28.21%
32.64%
39.69%
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Table Eighty-One: Logistic Regression- Survey A Yes/No Chance of Religion Change (NonTraditional)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-1.43 (.706)*
-.202 (.289)
-.317 (.310)
-.378 (.372)
-.413 (.431)
.188 (.262)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-.153 (.544)
-.496 (.684)
.741 (.329)*
-.398 (.256)
.042 (.426)

R2 = .186
Number of Observations = 94

For all of the groups just discussed, Linked Fate was a highly influential predictor of
identity valuation during at least one of two Large-N survey administrations. Most previous
research focuses more on the fact that high levels of Linked Fate often exist among members of
groups engaged in social competition than on potential links between Linked Fate and increased
identity valuation for members of these groups, and the thesis that this positive relationship will
generally exist for members of majority or minority groups engaged in competition needs
reinforcement by future studies to stand (was small sample size the only reason for the limited
influence of Linked Fate among LGBT respondents?). However, the observation of a statistically
significant relationship between Linked Fate and increased identity valuation for “embattled”
groups ranging from Black Americans to Protestant Christians does provide support for the claim
that the relationship is a real one.
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Table Eighty-Two: Survey A Religion Change by Respondent Category (Non-Traditional)
Variable Level

Chance of Religion
Change

White
Non-White

37.45%
14.89%

Male
Female

37.45%
34.37%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

37.45%
28.68%
24.50%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

23.37%
54.61%
69.66%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

46.69%
37.45%
30.19%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

31.34%
34.03%
41.40%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

37.45%
39.08%
41.04%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

55.69%
37.45%
29.61%

Low Religious Identification
High Religious identification

45.39%
21.77%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

46.00%
25.32%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

50.33%
41.81%
33.69%
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Table Eighty-Three: Logistic Regression – 2.0 Survey Yes/No Chance of Religion Change (NonTraditional)
Coefficient (S.E)

Variable
Minority Race
Self-Esteem
Group Identification
Linked Fate Level
Personal Ideology
Partisan Affiliation

-4.033 (1.455)*
.746 (.443)
-.158 (.232)
.325 (.390)
-1.286 (.840)
1.164 (.854)

Sex
Sexual Orientation
Education Level
Income/Job Status
Age

-1.919 (.889)*
1.119 (.653)
-.749 (.709)
.404 (.534)
1.962 (1.050)

R2 = .087
Number of Observations = 77

My results for both religion and race also indicate that Linked Fate is a more statistically
and substantively significant predictor of the valuation of ascribed core characteristics than the
valuation of bio-genetic core characteristics. Although findings – sometimes inconsistent – from
this single project cannot be taken as conclusive, Linked Fate was a significant predictor of the
valuation of several ascribed traits: minority racial identity, religious identity broadly, and
Protestant Christian religious identity. At least during the larger-N Survey A, the Linked Fate
variable was by far the most statistically significant predictor of racial identity valuation in linear
regressions among minorities (.001; t=3.28),while also boasting a substantive (B) of (.529).
During that administration, Linked Fate also significantly predicted increased religious identity
valuation among all respondents and among Protestants taken alone. This relationship did not
reach significance during the 2.0 survey, but the Linked Fate variable had coefficients in the
expected positive direction in 15/16 regression models dealing with religion.
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Table Eighty-Four: 2.0 Survey Religion Change by Respondent Category (Non-Traditional)
Variable Level

Chance of Orient/
Change

White
Non-White

8.83%
0.62%

Male
Female

2.59%
8.83%

Straight Respondent
Bi-Sexual
Gay Respondent

8.83%
21.10%
40.86%

High School Education
College Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Collegiate Degree

8.83%
5.00%
5.24%

Ideologically Liberal
Ideologically Moderate
Ideologically Conservative

24.18%
8.83%
4.26%

Green Party Member
Democratic Party Member
Republican Party Member

3.39%
4.40%
23.10%

Respondent 20-30
Respondent 30-40
Respondent 40-50

34.96%
66.37%
80.29%

Unemployed Respondent
Stable Part-Time Job
Full-Time Job

7.40%
12.33%
18.40%

Low Orientational Identification
High Orientational identification

13.70%
6.46%

Low Linked Fate
High Linked Fate

7.04%
16.64%

Low Self Esteem
Moderate Self Esteem
High Self Esteem

2.45%
5.01%
16.45%
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In contrast, Linked Fate had no statistically significant influence on the valuation of
sexual orientation or of sex in any model during any survey administration, and generally did not
approach significance as a predictor. While it is important not to overstate the impact of this
finding, the magnitude of the dichotomy does merit comment. It also, while unexpected, quite
arguably makes sense. The key way in which non-genetic identities differ from bio-genetic
identities is that non-genetic identities can be changed, often at will. Changing religion is a
process that requires literally nothing but faith; millions of human beings do so annually. Even
race is an ascribed characteristic so arbitrary that many members of every racial group could
“pass” or be described as members of another racial population (Williamson 1980; Hacker 1992;
Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; McClain et al 2006).
For many individuals in this potentially flexible position, the extent to which an arbitrary
characteristic like race or religion is valued depends on the degree to which competition between
in-groups forces them to identify as a member of one or the other - someone with a stake in the
performance of other in group members (Dawson 1994; Simein 2005; Cornell & Hartmann
2006; Junn 2008). For example, Hispanic students confronted with Caucasian bigotry against all
individuals defined as Hispanic become much more likely to identify as Hispanic than as
Caucasian (Cornell & Hartmann 2006: 202). In contrast, genetic core characteristics tend to be
non-malleable. For various biological reasons (Wolf 1991; Faludi 1992; Hoff-Sommers 2000;
O’Bierne 2006), a given woman is very likely to identify as female even in the absence of
Linked Fate-inducing competition, and has almost no control over whether she will be perceived
as being female by others should a battle of the sexes in fact occur. It is logical, then, that Linked
Fate seems to have less effect on the valuation of genetic identities with which respondents have
never had any choice about identifying than on the valuation of ascribed identities.
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Replies to my open-ended question provide some support for the thesis that the valuation
of ascribed identities is strategic whereas the valuation of genetic traits can be primordial in
nature. In the context of Religion, few if any respondents displayed the primordial attachment to
core characteristics so visible during the Sex and Orientation chapters. In fact, many respondents
described all religions as serving similar spiritual purposes and being nearly equivalent. Twentysix of the 99 (27%) respondents agreeing to change their faith tradition and explaining why
mentioned commonalities between religions as a factor influencing their decision, with one
young Caucasian saying simply “all religions have some truth,” noting that most religions are
ethically similar to one another, and agreeing to change at the second lowest level of
compensation (Survey Instrument 286).
Without explicitly contrasting religions, another group of respondents agreeing to change
their faith for financial or strategic reasons said that religion is just not important to them. One
Latina woman said that she would change her faith because she “had no preference” among faith
traditions (Survey Instrument #279), while a moderate Black female simply said that she is “just
not very religious” (Instrument #68). Some survey-takers actually contrasted religion with more
valuable biological identities; the respondent who refused to change sex “because DNA is
special” agreed to change religion for free (Instrument 258). At the extremes, 5 respondents
stated that they would change their religion because all religions are equally nonsensical and it
does not matter which nonsensical religion one follows. A white male making this argument said
that “religion is mindless drivel,” conceded that he currently held one, and agreed to change it for
free (Instrument 47). Another male described religion as “a fairy tale” (Instrument 241). In
addition to the 26 persons describing all faiths as similar, an additional 45 respondents (46%)
described simply receiving money as a sufficient strategic motivator for faith identity changes.
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In addition to illustrating the partially strategic bases of non-genetic identity valuation,
results pertaining to the willingness of respondents to change religious identity reflect an
important trend toward increasing ecumenicalism in contemporary U.S. society (Schafer & Shaw
2009; Stirling 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). While medieval Crusaders and their jihadi
opponents would probably have valued their specific religion more highly than any other
biological or ascribed trait (Harris 2004; Santosuosso 2004; Dawkins 2006; Baigent 2009), an
increasing acceptance of multiple faiths as morally positive or even as equivalent has come to
characterize mainstream religious practice today.62 According to Gallup International’s most
recent global poll, 71% of North Americans believe that there exist many true religions rather
than one way to God (www.gallup-international.com); popular writing on faith is full of prose
like “all who make wheels make them round (Stirling 2009).” The fact that very large
percentages of my respondents (37% during Survey A) were willing to change their faith
tradition, and that many openly attributed this to commonalities among all religions (27%) gels
with the substantial literature on contemporary religious ecumenicalism.
A third factor variable to merit analysis as a predictor of religious identity valuation is
conservatism conceptualized as personal ideology, which – actually unlike religious minority
status or Linked Fate – had a significant positive effect on valuation during both Survey A and
Survey A 2.0. During Survey A, the ideology variable was a significant positive predictor of
identity valuation in the all-respondents logistic regression and had coefficients in the expected
direction in every other model. During the 2.0 survey, the same variable had an essentially
identical, but even more statistically and substantively robust, effect on valuation. There, the

62

“Mainstream” is, admittedly, a key word in this sentence. There obviously exists a religious right passionate about
opposition to gay rights, increasing public-sector liberalism, and some elements of minority religious practice (Kuo
2006). However, the existence of this backlash movement on the political Right alters none of the figures given
above.
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Ideology metric reached significance in both logistic and linear models containing all
respondents and again had a positive effect across all models. During both surveys, the effect of
ideology on religious identity valuation was substantively large as well as statistically
significant. During the 2.0 survey, the ideology variable had the largest pure coefficient (.533) in
linear regressions among all respondents, despite being a multiple-unit variable; the median
liberal was 21.4% more likely to change her faith than was the median conservative.
Although I was again unable to test correlations between conservatism and actual bigotry
because of the extremely small number of respondents to directly express their dislike of outgroup members, List Experiment results again supported the finding of an honest correlation
between personal conservatism and increased identity valuation under covert conditions. Also,
again, political party affiliation proved a weaker and less statistically significant predictor of
identity valuation than ideology – probably indicating that partisanship can be a less accurate
measure of conservatism than individual self-identification (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, &
Kosterman 1997; Tarman & Sears 2005; Moser 2009). Overall, the powerful effect of personal
conservatism on the valuation of faith identity came very close to being exactly what I
hypothesized.
As in the case of race and orientation, it is noteworthy that no “majority effect”
concerning the impact of increasing conservatism on valuation was measurable in the context of
religion. Multiple scholars have argued rather openly that conservatives tend to be bigots (Edsall
& Edsall 1991; Hacker 1995; Sniderman & Carmines 1997: 74; Pike 2004; Speakman &
Moskowitz 2009), and pointed out that minority conservatives are frequently accused of being
dupes or secret self-haters (D’Souza 1994; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McWhorter 2000; Thernstrom
& Thernstrom 2003). However, individual ideological conservatism had a sizable if not always
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significant impact on identity valuation among both American racial minorities and members of
the LGBT community. In the religious case, the relationship between ideology and valuation was
in fact stronger in terms of coefficient size and came closer to significance among at least one
minority group (Catholic Christians) than among majority Protestant Christians during logistic
runs. Although the statistical unreliability of these results bars me from concluding definitively
that the effect of conservative personal ideology is stronger among religious minorities than
majority group Protestants, it remains noteworthy that few “majority effects” for conservatism
were observed in the context of religion or indeed throughout this study.
Unlike that of conservative ideology, the effect of the only other variable to significantly
affect religious identity valuation across the two primary survey administrations – minority race
– was wholly unexpected. During Survey A, membership in a minority racial group was a
significant positive predictor of identity valuation among non-traditionally religious respondents,
and had a substantive if insignificant effect on valuation among all respondents. The median
white Survey A respondent was 20.52% likely to change her religion, while the median minority
respondent was only about 11% likely to do so. Minority race and the valuation of religious
identity were even more highly correlated during Survey A 2.0. There, the race variable not only
reached significance in both sub-population specific regressions among non-traditionally
religious respondents but also in the primary logistic regression among all respondents.
This finding, that on average racial minorities appear to value their religious traditions
more than whites do, was not at all expected. There certainly exists a magnificent and passionate
churchly tradition in Black and Latino communities (Lincoln & Mamiya 1990; Brown 1999;
Dawson 2001; Foskett 2004; Moser 2009). However, strong and probably equivalent attachment
to religious tradition can certainly be found among many white Protestants (Frank 2004; Kuo
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2006; D’Souza 2007; Rosin 2008; Robison & Richards 2012). Further, elevated valuation of
religious identity among racial minorities was actually driven by atheists and other nontraditionally religious respondents, only 14.9% of whom compared to 37.5% of white coreligionists agreed to change their beliefs. More research, including religion-specific qualitative
questions targeted precisely at racial (and gender) minority respondents, remains to be done here.
A final variable to exert influence on religious identity valuation across both survey
administrations, although not always at standard levels of statistical significance, was in-group
identification. During Survey A, the variable representing group identification reached
significance in both linear and logistic regressions conducted among all respondents. This effect
was both highly statistically reliable – the GroupID variable was significant at the .000 level (t=
4.18) in the primary linear model - and substantial. Although I did not standardize coefficients,
the overall difference of 2.7 units of compensation demanded by median respondents at the
lowest and highest levels of in-group identification represents the largest substantive effect of
any variable in the linear model. Logistic predicted probabilities further illustrate this effect;
here, the median respondent at the lowest level of religious in-group identification was 55%
likely to change his religion, while the median respondent at the highest level of in-group
identification was only 19.1% likely to do so.
The correlation between in-group identification and increased valuation of religious
identity was also measurable, although less statistically robust, among smaller sub-populations of
respondents. The GroupID metric had coefficients in the expected positive direction in every
model, reaching standard significance levels in linear and logistic regressions among Protestants,
and having influence in the expected direction and not far from significance in linear regressions
among Catholics (.072; t= 1.82) and the non-traditionally religious. During Survey A 2.0, the
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group identification metric had influence in the expected positive direction in six of eight
models, and the median low-identification respondent remained more than 10% more likely to
change her faith tradition than the average high-identification respondent. However, the variable
simply did not reach significance inside the (.05) level during the 2.0 administration.
Survey A 2.0 results mean that my hypothesis that in-group identification will be a
significant positive predictor of religious identity valuation in every model, flatly put, fails.
However, the finding that the GroupID variable had sizable coefficients in the expected direction
in 14/16 models, and was a significant positive predictor of valuation in 2/4 all-respondents
models, does support the thesis that the relationship between in-group identification and
valuation is positive and will often be significant. I expected this to be the case, and it generally
has been throughout this project. Logically, individuals are more likely to identify strongly with
characteristics they like and do not wish to change (Hughes & Demo 1989), thus the vanishingly
small number of people willing to openly identify as ugly, poor, racist, or evil (Arendt 1968;
Fussell 1983; Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman 1997; Krysan & Mick 2003; Reilly 2008;
Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). In the discipline, multiple scholars have noted that increased
levels of in-group identification predict increased attachment to and in some cases valuation of
in-group identities (Horowitz 2000; Huddy 2001; Cornell & Hartmann 2006), and my results
indicate that this is in fact true.
Unlike the GroupID and Ideology metrics, a fourth variable to reach significance during
Survey A had a completely dissimilar effect during the 2.0 survey. During Survey A, the
education variable easily reached significance in the all-respondents linear model, and had
influence in the expected negative direction and approaching significance in the all-respondents
logistic model. Unlike some trends observed during this project, this effect was not driven by any
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one group of respondents. The education variable reached significance independently among
both Protestants taken alone and the non-traditionally religious.
As for most factor variables to predict valuation throughout this project, the effect of
increasing education on identity valuation during Survey A was substantively large as well as
statistically significant. Making the transition from less than a high school degree to a college
graduate degree decreased the amount of compensation demanded for making religious identity
changes by 1.24 units among all respondents, 1.83 units among Protestant respondents, and
almost 3 units among non-traditionally religious respondents. In predicted probabilities runs, the
median respondent with a high school degree was 30.4% likely to change his faith tradition,
while the median college educated respondent was 39 % likely to do so and the median holder of
a graduate certificate 43.7% likely to change. Among Protestants, the comparable figures were
respectively 25.1%, 37.2%, and 44.3%.
A tempting explanation exists for the extremely robust Survey A relationship between
increasing education and the devaluation of religious identity. Unlike other identities such as
race, religions - and non-religions like atheism or Taoism – are sets of empirical hypotheses
about humanity, being, and the nature of the world (Harris 2004). Without wasting ink on an
exhaustive and potentially offensive list of these hypotheses (“virgins give birth”), it seems safe
to say that many of the central claims made by modern Western religions would strike a collegeeducated person as rather unlikely (Harris 2004; Dawkins 2006; Baigent 2009; Zuckerman 2011;
Guenther & Mulligan 2013). Even atheists, while spared the task of defending such assertions,
must themselves defend the faith-based position that there is no “watchmaker” in which to have
faith against the coherent counter-arguments of Augustine, Aquinas, Carroll (in Mere
Christianity, among other pieces), D’Souza (2008), and others. As for nontraditional faiths, there
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frankly seems to be little difference in terms of Popperian provability between the founding
theses of Wicca and Lakota and those of Christianity. While this thesis should be tactfully stated,
it does seem logical that more education in history or the sciences might correlate on average
with decreased valuation of one’s religion.
However, this argument is challenged by the plain fact that the education variable did not
reach significance in a single model during Survey A 2.0. Further, while the influence of
education on valuation among all respondents taken together and among Protestants remained
negative during the 2.0 survey, the influence of education on the valuation of faith identity
among religiously non-traditional respondents was positive and substantively strong. Given the
contrast between this result and the Survey A finding of high correlations between increasing
education and decreasing valuation of almost all religious identities, the exact nature of the
relationship between education and religious identity valuation obviously remains to be
determined.
In addition to the education variable, two other factor variables to reach significance
among at least one sub-population of respondents during Survey A, job status among nontraditionally religious respondents and sexual orientation among Protestants, had effects that
were insignificant or in the opposite direction during the 2.0 survey administration. During
Survey A, the four-stage employment variable was a significant predictor of identity valuation,
in a positive direction opposite from that hypothesized, in the linear regression among nontraditionally religious respondents. There, a respondent working in a full-time position demanded
1.55 levels more compensation than an unemployed respondent for changing her faith. During
predicted probabilities runs among religiously non-traditional respondents, the median
unemployed respondent was 55.7% likely to change his faith tradition, while the median
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respondent working in a stable part-time position was 37.5% likely do so and the median
respondent working full-time only 29.6% likely.
Again, there initially appears to be a fascinating probable explanation for this result.
Bigotry against the non-traditionally religious is arguably one of the great under-reported stories
of our time (Dawkins 2006; Cline 2007; D’Souza 2007; Hitchens 2007; Rosin 2008; Schafer &
Shaw 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). According to recent Gallup data, fewer Americans
would vote for a “well qualified” atheist candidate for President than would vote for a woman,
gay man, Black man, Mormon, or Muslim (Cline 2007; Schafer & Shaw 2009). Prejudice against
atheists and followers of non-conventional religions certainly extends into the realm of
commerce; a rather surprising aspect of contemporary American business culture is the
prevalence of the argument that accepting Christianity is a route not merely to salvation but also
to earthly wealth. There is a popular preacher named Reverend (Creflo) Dollar, and literally
dozens of best-selling books arguing that Jesus Christ preached a gospel of “prosperity” (Jakes
2001; Salerno 2005; Jakes 2006; Jakes 2007; Jakes 2009).
Like women, who frequently face workplace discrimination (Nelson and Bridges 1999)
and who displayed some positive correlation between job status and identity valuation during
Survey A, it seems logical that non-traditionally religious persons may feel more able to
appreciate the value of their unique perspectives on faith when successful enough not to be fired
for holding them. However, the effect of job status on identity valuation was not only
insignificant but actually in a negative direction in both models run among non-traditionally
religious respondents during the 2.0 survey. As with the relationship between education and
religious identity valuation, future research is needed to determine not merely the statistical
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reliability but even the direction of the relationship between employment status and the valuation
of religious identity.
LGBT status was another variable to have a significant effect on religious identity
valuation among one sub-population of respondents, Protestant Christians, during Survey A.
While it had little or no influence in other models, a variable representing sexual orientation
reached standard levels of significance among Protestants in both linear and logistic regressions.
The multi-unit variable also had by far the largest (B) coefficients in both linear (B= -1.31) and
logistic (1.94) regressions among Protestants. An otherwise median Protestant moving between
the identity categories (straight) and (gay: closeted) would demand 3.93 units less in
compensation in exchange for changing his religion. Similarly, the median straight Protestant
respondent was 30.60% likely to change his faith tradition, while the median bisexual respondent
was 71.56% likely to do so and the median gay respondent 88.09% likely to do so.
For the third time in a row, it is tempting to speculate here. A major component of
modern centrist and conservative Protestantism, noted by dozens of authors writing on faith, is
open hostility toward homosexuality (Herek 2003; Finlay & Walther 2003; Frank 2004; Kuo
2006; Robison & Richards 2012). Conservative Protestants score higher on standard scales used
to measure homophobia than members of any other religious group (Finlay & Walther 2003:
370). Given that many modern Westerners no longer stigmatize gays at all (Mackinnon & Luke
2002), it would not be shocking if gay Protestants are more tempted than straight Protestants to
leave congregations which do. However, Survey A 2.0 results once again spoil the party – here,
by reminding readers of the potential unreliability of statistical results drawn from small- or
medium-N samples. The direction and significance of the relationship between LGBT status and
the valuation of Protestant religious identity could not be fully re-tested during Survey A 2.0,
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where an even smaller LGBT population sample than that analyzed during Survey A was
actually dropped from Protestants-only logistic regressions. While it is logically coherent to
hypothesize that contemporary Protestant hostility toward the gay community (Finlay & Walther
2003; Kuo 2006) correlates with lowered valuation of religious identity among gay Protestants,
further research is again required to properly confirm this.
A final variable to reach significance “somewhere” – among at least one population of
respondents during at least one survey administration – was female sex, which was a positive
predictor of the valuation of religious identity among non-traditionally religious respondents
during the 2.0 survey linear model. It is difficult to know what to make of this stand-alone result.
The finding that female sex correlates with increased valuation of non-traditional religious
identities but not mainline Protestant or Catholic identities could reflect the fact that
contemporary conservative Christians, presumably unlike Wiccans or atheists, are often seen as
hostile toward feminism and women (Faludi 1992; Frank 2004; Harris 2004; Kuo 2006; Rosin
2008). However, I observed this result in only one of 16 models dealing with religious identity
valuation, and it might very well be an aberrational one.
In addition to those already discussed, three factors, partisan affiliation, age, and selfesteem, had no significant effect on religious identity valuation in any model. Patterns of results
for partisan affiliation and self-esteem were briefly discussed earlier on in this chapter, and
indeed throughout this dissertation project. Results for age, a variable of interest to me
throughout this project, do merit some comment. Age was predicted to positively influence the
valuation of religious identity, but a glance at the data makes clear an interesting explanation of
why this did not occur. Among both the Protestant and non-traditionally religious subpopulations, younger respondents were much more attached to their beliefs than their elders. The
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median Protestant in the 40-50 age range was more than 40% likely to consider changing his
faith, while the median Protestant in the 20-30 age range was only 30.5% likely to do so.
Similarly, the median older follower of a non-traditional path was more than 50% likely to
change her beliefs, as versus 37.5% for the median young person holding the same beliefs. This
finding appears to directly contradict the “post-racial, post-tribal” thesis I expressed an interest in
testing on pp.42-53 (Hutchings 2009; Plant & DeVine 2009; Donovan 2010; Redlawsk 2011),
and to reflect increasing levels of ethno-religious attachment among both Protestant Evangelicals
(Frank 2004; D’Souza 2007; D’Souza 2008; Rosin 2008) and atheist “Brights (Harris 2004;
Dawkins 2006; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). However, it should be emphasized that these results
for age were not statistically significant, some were again drawn from populations too small
(non-traditional religionists over 50) to allow for truly rigorous statistical analysis, and many
scholars have claimed that ecumenicalism rather than inter-group competition characterizes
religious practice in today’s America.
As in most past chapters, not all of my starting hypotheses were confirmed, but a fair
number were. My primary hypothesis, that religious minority status will not be a significant
negative predictor of religious identity valuation, was largely confirmed. I did observe some
negative correlation between minority status and decreased valuation, driven largely by Catholic
respondents. However, this relationship reached standard levels of significance only during the
Survey A stand-alone means test – never again during Survey A, the 2.0 survey, or the List
Experiment. Religious minority status was not a significant negative predictor of religious
identity valuation in any regression model. The effects of conservative ideology, group
identification, and Linked Fate on valuation were also largely of the kind expected, although
almost universally weaker than expected. Each of these variables reached significance among all
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respondents during at least one Large-N survey administration, and had coefficients in the
expected (positive) direction in almost every model.
However, I did not expect a number of other results – including the significant effect of
minority race on religious identity valuation across survey instruments, the inconsistent
performance of the education variable as a negative predictor of valuation, and the significant
positive effects of the job status and LGBT sexual orientation variables among at least some subpopulations of respondents. I also did not expect the female sex variable to significantly predict
the valuation of non-traditionally religious identity in one model during Survey A 2.0, although I
believe that result was quite possibly a statistical aberration. However, as in past chapters, my
most important finding here is that the primary hypothesis of the Religion chapter was confirmed
at least in part. Despite a negative correlation between the two variables, religious minority status
was not a significant negative predictor or religious identity valuation in any regression model.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DATA

As I outline in my Introduction, the question of how minority status (minority race,
female sex, LGBT orientation, membership in a minority religious group) affects the degree to
which individuals value their in-group identities is an important one. The question is inherently
interesting, and the valuation of both group and individual identities can affect political behavior
(Carmines 1978; Horowitz 2000; Block 2011). There are two primary scholarly perspectives on
this issue. Authors writing in the Reflected Appraisals tradition argue that minority status often
or generally correlates with minority identity devaluation (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum
1997; McIntyre 1997; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McIntyre 2002). Majority identities like whiteness
are forms of valuable property (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; Lucal 1996; McIntyre 2002), and
members of majority groups will thus value their identities more than members of minority
groups (Vaughter 1975; Hacker 1995; Hoff-Sommers 2000).
Authors writing within the Linked Fate tradition and other paradigms of oppositional
identification disagree, arguing that oppression or inter-group competition can produce extreme
unity among minority populations rather than identity devaluation (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001;
Simein 2005; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010). This
position is supported by empirical results indicating that levels of collective esteem and identity
valuation among minority populations are often on par with those for the equivalent majority
group (Mackie 1983; Stern 1995; Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003). Both of
these positions have been advanced across a range of academic disciplines, in domestic (Harris
1993) and international (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003) contexts. The goal of this
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dissertation is to provide a methodologically sound quantitative test of these two opposing
theories within the contemporary American context, and determine which more closely
approaches the truth.
My dissertation is written as a quantitative test of four thesis questions related to the
TRA/LFT dispute, and contributes to the discipline of political science by attempting to answer
them. The primary question tackled in the body of the project is: does membership in one of four
American minority groups (racial minorities, women, the LGBT community, and faith traditions
other than Protestant Christianity) correlate significantly with lowered valuation of minority ingroup identities? Obviously, any finding that minority race, female sex, LGBT sexual
orientation, or membership in a religious minority group correlates with lowered valuation of
those in-group identities would provide support for TRA. On the other hand, the conclusion that
minority status does not correlate with devaluation of core characteristic identities would provide
significant support for Linked Fate Theory. My starting hypothesis, based within LFT and the
paradigm of oppositional identity valuation more broadly, was that membership in any of the
minority groups being studied will not correlate significantly with lowered identity valuation.
This thesis was supported more often than not – although far from always – by data gleaned from
an initial ordinal survey of more than 500 respondents (Survey A), a List Experiment survey of
503 respondents (Survey Instruments B and C), and a methodologically retouched ordinal survey
of 401 new respondents (Survey A 2.0).
Results from my two ordinal surveys, Survey A and Survey A 2.0, indicate that there is a
positive and significant relationship between minority race and the valuation of racial identity, no
relationship between female sex and the valuation of sex identity, a negative and sometimes
significant relationship between LGBT status and the valuation of sexual orientation, and a
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negative but weak and statistically insignificant relationship between religious minority status
and religious identity valuation. Three of these conclusions were replicated almost exactly during
a covert List Experiment. During that experiment, however, racial minority status correlated
negatively with the valuation of racial identity. Overall, across instruments, I observed no
significant relationships between female sex or religious minority status and identity valuation,
observed a negative correlation between LGBT status and identity valuation that often but not
always reached significance, and observed a correlation between racial minority status and
valuation that was positive and significant during the ordinal Survey A and negative and
significant during a fully covert List Experiment. All of these relationships are fully detailed in
this chapter’s Figure One, appearing immediately below.
The data from Survey A and Survey A 2.0 provided very strong support for the thesis that
minority racial status does not correlate with devaluation of racial identity, but this was not at all
the case during the List Experiment. Among respondents to both Survey A and Survey A 2.0,
minority race was in fact a significant positive predictor of racial identity valuation. On Survey
A, 39% of Caucasian respondents but only 20.7% of African American respondents and 27.6%
of Hispanic respondents agreed to change their race. During predicted probabilities regressions,
this gap actually increased; the median Caucasian respondent was 43.9% likely to change his
race while the median minority group respondent was only 26.3% likely to change his. Taken
alone, this finding appears to directly contradict the conclusions of multiple scholars regarding
the financial value of Caucasian status in a presumably racist society (Harris 1993; Hacker 1995;
Tatum 1997; Hunter 2002). These results indicate that Hacker was correct that American
Caucasians would demand tens of millions of dollars in exchange for agreeing to change a core
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characteristic like race. However, my minority respondents demanded significantly more money
to make the same racial change.
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Table Eighty-Five: Effects of Independent Identity Variables on Dependent Valuation
Variables across Methodologies
Effect of Variable on Valuation

Survey A
Linear
.55 (.23)**

Survey A
Logit
-.81
(.28)**

Survey A
2.0 Linear
.64 (.22)**

Survey A
2.0 Logit
-1.33
(.38)**

List
Experiment
+16**

Direction of the Effect

Positive

Positive

Positive

Positive

Negative

Association Significant (Y/N)
((p) Value given)

Y (.01)

Y (.01)

Y (.01)

Y (.001)

Y (.01)

Hypothesis Confirmed (Y/N)

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

.003 (.13)

.02 (.30)

.09 (.15)

.21 (.43)

+ 2%

Minority Race: Effect on DV
((B), Std. Error, List Data)63

Female Sex: Effect on DV

Direction of the Effect

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Association Significant (Y/N)

N (.63)

N (.95)

N (.56)

N (.63)

N (.96)

Hypothesis Confirmed (Y/N)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

.16 (.29)

-.60
(.21)**

.87 (.31)** + 63%*

LGBT Orientation: Effect on DV -.31 (.18)

Direction of the Effect

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Association Significant (Y/N)

N (.09)

N (.59)

Y (.003)

Y (.005)

Y (.03)

Hypothesis Confirmed (Y/N)

Y

Y

N

N

N

Minority Faith: Effect on DV

-.02 (.28)

.04 (.24)

-.14 (.26)

.25 (.36)

+14

Direction of the Effect

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Association Significant (Y/N)

N (.94)

N (.85)

N (.60)

N (.50)

N (.21)

Hypothesis Confirmed (Y/N)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

63

Figures in the “List data/List Experiment” column indicate the percentage difference in willingness to change
between the minority population being studied and the equivalent majority population. Stars indicate whether this
difference, and all other differences being studied, are significant. As is standard in the discipline, * indicates
significance at the .05 level, ** indicates significance at the .01 level, and *** indicates significance at the .001
level.
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However, during the List Experiment, racial minority status did correlate negatively and
to a significant degree with racial identity valuation. In the List context, white respondents (14%
willing) were less willing than any other group to change race in response to List questions. In
contrast, a majority of Asian American respondents (55%) and a near majority of Hispanic
Americans (44%) stated their willingness to change in response to List questions. Complicating
the situation further, African American respondents’ level of change willingness remained
consistent and relatively low during the List Experiment; the Black rate of change willingness
was about 25% in response to Survey C, in comparison to 21% during Survey A. Even given the
Black exception, these differences between white and minority rates of change willingness were
obviously statistically significant, at the (.001) level.
These results are intriguing. Although Survey A and my List surveys were worded
differently and thus are not perfectly comparable, it is noteworthy that the correlation between
Caucasian status and racial identity valuation was statistically significant, substantively sizable,
and negative during Survey A and the 2.0 survey – and statistically significant, substantively
large, and positive during the List Experiment. This finding is made still more interesting by the
fact that Survey A and Survey A 2.0 were administered under conditions of total anonymity but
were not covert. Literally dozens of scholars, concentrated among the conservative intelligentsia,
have noted that intentionally dishonest responses are frequent when Caucasians publicly discuss
race and affirmative action (Steele 1993; Eastland 1994; D’Souza 1995; Krysan & Mick 2003;
D’Souza 2007; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009. However, my results indicate that, to the extent
feelings of elevated identity valuation or even bigotry exist among Caucasians, many individuals
may avoid openly admitting this even to themselves (Sniderman & Carmines 1997: 42)..
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Totally setting aside cross-survey comparisons, it is remarkable that roughly 50% of all
immigrant-origin minority respondents - well over 40% of both Hispanics and Asians - agreed to
change race under List conditions. These levels of identity change willingness were higher than
those displayed during the List Experiment even by gay respondents (42%), and far higher than
those displayed for Roman Catholics (20.7%) – otherwise the non-LGBT population with the
lowest mean level of identity valuation. In contrast and as noted, roughly 15% of whites and 25%
of Blacks were willing to change race during the Experiment. African-American rates of identity
change willingness were much closer to those of whites (-12%) than those of Asians (+30%).
Several authors have argued that there exists a distinction between members of indigenous
minority groups, who develop oppositional identities, and members of immigrant-origin minority
groups who desire to acclimate into mainstream society and become “white” (Hacker 1992;
Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Chen 1999; McClain et al 2006). My List results indicate this idea
may hold water, at least under covert conditions designed to elicit truth. Given the extreme
dichotomy between List Experiment results and Survey A/Survey A 2.0 results for the effect of
minority status on racial identity valuation, more research into the exact nature of this
relationship remains to be done.
In the case of sex, in contrast, results from Survey A, the 2.0 survey, and the List
Experiment all provide strong support for the thesis that minority in-group status does not
correlate with devaluation of in-group identities. While numerous scholars have detailed the
home-front and workplace oppressions faced by women (Wolf 1991; Faludi 1992; Browne 1999;
Hoff-Sommers 2000), and authors have argued for decades that sex identity devaluation among
women can be quantitatively demonstrated (Barnard 1975), I find no correlation between
“minority” sex and the devaluation of sex identity. In fact, men and women – with both groups
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speaking of their valuation of sex identity in almost primordial terms – were identically
(un)likely to consider sex identity changes during this project. In response to Survey A, 88.14%
of men and 88.24% of women were unwilling to consider sex identity changes. In response to
Survey A 2.0, 90.23% of men and 91.81% of women were unwilling to change their sex. During
logistic predicted probabilities, the median Survey A male respondent was 12.20% likely to
change his sex, while the median female respondent was 13.91% likely to change hers. None of
these differences were statistically significant. Similarly, List Experiment results for the effect of
female sex on identity valuation confirmed my hypotheses (1) and (2). In the List Experiment
context, only 5.8% of women and 7.7% of men stated that they would be willing to change their
sex for some amount of compensation, confirming Hypothesis (1). The difference between these
two rates of willingness to change was insignificant, confirming Hypothesis (2).
Unlike female sex, LGBT status did correlate negatively with valuation of a minority
identity: sexual orientation. This relationship was observable across all survey instruments and
was often significant. During Survey A, the negative relationship between LGBT orientation and
identity valuation approached but did not reach standard levels of significance. However, this
relationship was one of the most statistically significant (.003; t= -2.95) and substantively sizable
(unstandardized (B) = -.604) measured during the 2.0 survey linear model, and also reached in
logistic regression models during this administration. Predicted probabilities based on 2.0 data
measure this effect; the median straight respondent was 12.33% likely to change his sexual
orientation while the median gay respondent was 44.21% likely to change his. Obviously, these
results were not as hypothesized, although I did observe during the Methods chapter that my
hypothesis about the non-effect of LGBT status on the valuation of LGBT sexual orientation was
the most likely of all my hypotheses to be wrong.
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Results from the List Experiment continue to bear out the thesis that LGBT status
correlates negatively with valuation of sexual orientation, perhaps due to the social abuses
experienced by gay Americans. Like those for race and unlike those for sex, List Experiment
results for sexual orientation indicate a link between minority status and lowered identity
valuation, with both Hypotheses (1) and (2) failing. All told, almost exactly 6% of straight
respondents agreed in confidence to change their sexual orientation. Results for gays were quite
different. Forty-two percent of gay respondents and 68.7% of all LGBT respondents agreed to
change their orientation in response to Survey C. The difference between 68.7% and the 6%
level of change willingness for straights is significant, at the (.001) level despite the small size of
the LGBT sub-sample. The difference between the 42% level of change willingness for gay
rather than bisexual respondents taken alone and the 6% level of change willingness for straights
was also independently significant.
It is worth noting that one of the primary causes of lowered identity valuation among the
“queer” sample was an extremely high rate of change willingness among bisexual respondents
that had little to do with experiences of oppression. In contrast to virtually every other group
surveyed during this project, 62.5% of bisexuals agreed to consider orientational changes, and
this willingness (see respondent comments in the LGBT Identity chapter) was attributable more
to attraction to both sexes than to perceived abuses suffered by bisexual respondents. During
Survey A, respondents who identified specifically as gay were no more willing to consider
changes to their sexual orientation than straight respondents; 80% of openly gay respondents,
85% of straight respondents, and 100% of a small closeted gay sample refused to change
orientation. However, the fact that 30% of gay respondents were willing to change orientation in
during the 2.0 survey and roughly 40% were willing to do so under covert conditions probably
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does reflect the unpleasant social realities associated with being gay in today’s USA (Meyer
1995; Brock 2002; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; Dean 2008; Schafer & Shaw 2009).
Finally, the relationship between religious minority status and religious identity valuation
was in a negative direction but almost always insignificant in statistical terms. To be specific:
this relationship was significant during a means test but insignificant in all multi-variate
regressions during Survey A, insignificant during Survey A 2.0, and insignificant during the List
Experiment. I did observe some large gaps in identity change willingness between faith
populations – with 49.5% of Catholics as versus only 28.3% of Protestant Christians willing to
change religion during Survey A. However, the answer to my research question of whether
religious minority status overall correlates with the devaluation of religious identity appears to
be: not to a statistically significant degree. Minority faith was an insignificant predictor of
religious identity valuation in all four multi-variate linear and logistic regressions run in
connection with Survey A and Survey A 2.0. More precisely, in predicted probabilities models
with all control variables stabilized at their median, the median Protestant respondent was 33.8%
likely to change his religious identity while the median religious minority respondent was 34.5%
likely to change his. Interestingly, the relatively high levels of identity valuation measured
among religious minority respondents were driven by members of non-traditional subpopulations not thought of as socially acceptable faith traditions until recently (Dawkins 2006;
Baigent 2009; Schafer & Shaw 2009; Guenther & Mulligan 2013). Across instruments, more
than 60% of atheists, agnostics, and followers of non-traditional religions like Wicca refused to
consider changes to their beliefs
Similarly, both Hypothesis (1) and Hypothesis (2) were confirmed in the context of
religious identity valuation during the List Experiment. Only 7% of Protestants, 20% of
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Catholics, and 6% of non-traditionally religious respondents were willing to change their faith
tradition under List Experiment conditions, confirming Hypothesis (1). A negative correlation
between religious minority status and religious identity devaluation was observed but did not
reach statistical significance, confirming Hypothesis (2).
Analysis of Survey A and Survey A 2.0 data reveals several other trends worthy of
analysis.64 First, Survey A results provide support for Linked Fate Theory in the contexts of
racial and religious identity valuation, although these results were not replicated to the point of
significance during the 2.0 survey. As expected, the effect of Linked Fate on identity valuation
was in a positive direction in almost every model I ran. However, the variable did not reach
significance among all respondent sub-populations. During Survey A, increasing Linked Fate
was a significant positive predictor of identity valuation among members of racial minority
groups – not exactly what I hypothesized, but a logical finding given that most contemporary
Linked Fate literatures focus on these populations (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Chong &
Rogers 2005; Junn 2008; Block 2011; Austin, Middleton, &Yon 2012).
Interestingly, Linked Fate actually had a more sweeping effect on the valuation of
religious identity than on the valuation of racial identity; the Linked Fate variable was a
significant predictor of valuation among respondents of all faiths in both linear and logistic
regression models during Survey A, neared significance as a predictor of valuation among
Protestant Christians taken alone, and had a strong effect in the expected direction in six models
dealing with religious identity valuation. This effect did not again reach significance during
Survey A 2.0, but the Linked Fate metric again had coefficients in the expected positive direction
among all respondents and in the large majority of other models. In contrast to these effects
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As my analysis of List Experiment results focused on bivariate means tests, I obviously cannot analyze the impact
of multiple independent variables on the List Experiment’s dependent variable.
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among large-N racial and religious sub-populations during at least one of my two survey
administrations, Linked Fate had no significant effect on the valuation of sex or sexual
orientation in any model.
While more research into the strength and reliability of these relationships remains to be
done, it is interesting that I find Linked Fate to exert influence entirely among groups (1) based
around culturally defined rather than genetic characteristics (Harris 1993; D’Souza 1994; Hacker
1995; Tatum 1997; McClain et al 2006) and (2) currently engaged in ongoing social competition
(Bell 1989; Harris 1993; Dawson 1994; Dawkins 2006; Kuo 2006; Baigent 2009; Guenther &
Mulligan 2013). This two-part label would certainly seem to be an appropriate description of
Blacks, Latinos and other racial minorities, Protestants, and atheists. In contrast, Linked Fate had
essentially no effect on the valuation of the two (largely) biological traits I study, sex and sexual
orientation. Respondents also valued genetic traits more highly than non-genetic traits. For
example, a consistent ten or so percent of both sexes was willing to change sex across survey
instruments, in contrast to rates of religious identity change willingness ranging up to 49.5%.65 It
may be that individuals value genetically based identities like sexual orientation highly, as core
components of the self, even in the absence of strategic pressures like of the kind often
associated with Linked Fate (Horowitz 2000; Dawson 2001; Simein 2005). However, my
findings pertaining to the greater effect of Linked Fate on the valuation of non-genetic identities
are speculative for now; the significant positive effect of Linked Fate on identity valuation
among racial minorities and members of all religious in groups was not replicated during Survey
A 2.0 and retests remain to be done.
In addition to minority status and to some extent Linked Fate, several other variables had
generally consistent effects across survey instruments. Both female sex as a negative predictor of
65

Among Catholic Christians during Survey A.

236

the valuation of sexual orientation and LGBT sexual orientation as a negative predictor of the
valuation of biological sex had statistically significant and substantively large effects across
Survey A and Survey A 2.0. LGBT sexual orientation was a significant negative predictor of sex
identity valuation among all respondents in both linear and logistic regressions during Survey A,
and a significant negative predictor of valuation among all respondents in the primary logistic
model and in both models run among women alone during Survey A 2.0. Similarly, female sex
was a significant negative predictor of the valuation of sexual orientation among all respondents
during both survey A and the 2.0 survey.
All of these relationships were statistically significant at the (.05) level, and had sizable
substantive implications. During Survey A, for example, the median straight respondent was
12.2% likely to change his sex, while the median gay respondent was 30.1% likely to change his.
While this relationship was not specifically hypothesized, logical and scholarly explanations for
it do exist. Literally by definition, gay and bisexual Americans at least sometimes prefer to take
partners of their own sex, from a pool of individuals most often viewed as proper partners for the
opposite sex (Herek 2003). This flexibility of interest has led directly to frequent and intensive
gender-bending play within the gay community, such as the displays accompanying Gay Pride
parades, circuit and Mix Parties, drag events (Gamson 1996; Klein 1999; Chasin 2000; Dean
2008). It is not entirely surprising that it might also correlate with lowered valuation of biological
sex. Further, and unfortunately, gay Americans currently experience more bigotry and direct
abuse than almost any other population of Americans (Meyer 1995; Herek 2003; Ryan &
Reynolds 2003; Cline 2007; Dean 2008; Schafer & Shaw 2009). Almost certainly, not a few gay
men and women conclude that they could more easily date members of the sex they prefer if they
were members of the sex they currently are not.
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Similarly, lowered valuation of sexual orientation among female respondents appears to
correlate with greater social tolerance of female bi- and homosexuality than of the same behavior
among males. While male homosexuals endure stigmatization including “fag bashings,” minority
stress, and forced closeting (Meyer 1995; Jenness 1995; Brock 2002; Ryan & Reynolds 2003;
Dean 2008), mainstream magazines run pieces with titles like “Bi-Sexual Hottie Megan Fox Sits
with Maxim (www.maxim.com),” and female bisexuality is an accepted part of the collegiate
‘hookup’ scene (Sessions Stepp 2008). My data directly reflect these trends. Among LGBT
female respondents to Survey A, 13 of 17 (76.5%) identified as bisexual, the other four as gay
and entirely open. No female respondents felt a need to engage in closeting behavior, but 20% of
gay males did and only four of a pool of 295 male respondents (1.3%) chose to identify as
bisexual. While multiple male respondents openly stated their dislike of “faggots” (Survey
Instrument #195 among others), several female respondents said things like “I would NOT mind
getting paid to ‘do’ men and women” (Instrument #271) and “I am hetero, but have had girl-ongirl” experiences (Instrument #184). Overall, more research into the root causes of the negative
correlations between female sex and the valuation of sexual orientation, as well as those between
LGBT status and sex identity valuation, should certainly be done - but there is little doubt that
these relationships exist.
Unlike female sex and LGBT orientation, the conservative ideology and in-group
identification variables also reached statistical significance during both Survey A and Survey A
2.0, but did not do so among exactly the same groups during both administrations. During
Survey A, increasing in-group identification was a significant positive predictor of racial and
religious identity valuation among all respondents, as well as of religious identity valuation
among Protestants analyzed alone. In contrast, during Survey A 2.0, in-group identification was
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a significant positive predictor of the valuation of sex and sexual orientation among all
respondents, as well of sexual orientation among straight respondents analyzed alone. It is
important to note that none of these results were aberrational or the result of statistical chance.
During Survey A 2.0, for example, the effect of the previously significant GroupID variable as a
predictor of racial identity valuation was in the expected direction in five of six models and the
variable came within .005 of repeating as significant among Caucasians. Several of these effects
would have been significant had my models been run as one-tailed tests; they simply missed
significance in the models as I constructed them.
Similarly, the conservative political ideology variable was a significant positive predictor
of religious identity valuation among all respondents during Survey A, and had a broader and
different effect during Survey A 2.0. During the 2.0 survey, increasingly conservative personal
ideology was again a positive predictor of religious identity valuation among all respondents and
separately among all sub-populations except Roman Catholics – but also of the valuation of
racial identity among all respondents and of sex identity valuation among women. Both
increasing conservatism and high levels of in-group identification were hypothesized to predict
increased valuation of all identities studied at the beginning of this project, and a simple analysis
of coefficient directions leaves little doubt that the relationships between both of these factors
and in-group identity valuation are generally positive. A goal during future projects will be
determining which relationships between increasing in-group identification and/or conservatism
and valuation are consistently significant. At very least, the relationship between increasing
conservatism and the valuation of religious identity, especially among Protestants, has been
consistently measurable throughout this project.
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Unlike female sex, LGBT sexual orientation, in-group identification, and conservative
ideology, three additional variables – self-esteem, partisan affiliation, and job status – merit
analysis because of what they did not do. Hypothesized to have significant effects in a particular
direction throughout the project, none of these variables performed as expected. Self-esteem, in
particular, has been something of a whipping boy for me during this dissertation. In the
contemporary American discourse around race and gender, it is no exaggeration to say that
individual esteem is the most consistently cited potential predictor of phenomena ranging from
identity valuation to test scores (Sowell 1993; Hacker 1995; Tatum 1997; Gross 1999; HoffSommers 2000; McWhorter 2000; McIntyre 2002; Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003). However, I
find little evidence that self-esteem is a major predictor of valuation. Not only did most subpopulations of Survey A and 2.0 respondents have extraordinarily high mean levels of selfesteem, increasing self-esteem was not a significant predictor of racial, orientational, or religious
identity valuation in any model. The esteem variable was a significant positive predictor of sex
identity valuation in the linear regression run among all respondents, but this finding was not
repeated during Survey A 2.0. How people feel about themselves, as versus identification with a
particular group or an ideological movement, simply does not seem to be a primary predictor of
identity valuation.
The partisan affiliation variable, in contrast to the conservative personal ideology
variable, was also an underperforming metric. Increasingly conservative individual ideology was
a positive predictor of religious identification across both of my survey instruments and a
positive predictor of religious, racial, and gender identity valuation during the better designed of
the two. In contrast, the partisan affiliation variable was significant only among two respondent
sub-populations during Survey A, and neither of these performances was repeated during the 2.0
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survey. This was not a case of two variables measuring the same thing: the correlation between
the conservatism and affiliation variables was never more than 51% (during Survey A), and the
two measures had coefficients in the same direction in 80% of cases while both reaching
significance more than once. Instead, these results probably indicate that partisanship is a less
effective measure of conservatism/liberalism than stated ideology, due to significant racial and
regional dichotomies between individual beliefs and political party affiliation (West 2001; Frank
2004; Williams 2006; Moser 2009). As Brown-Guinyard (2013) points out, citing the work of
Green (Green & Palmquist 1990; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002), partisan affiliation is
often long-held and in the short run may be almost “exogenous” to individuals’ current attitudes
toward issues and candidates (2013: 17). Partly for this reason, several previous scholars have
found ideology to predict respondent behavior where partisanship does not (Sears, van Laar,
Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997; Tarman & Sears 2005); I do as well.
Finally, a job status variable – using level of employment as a proxy for income – also
did not perform as expected. Hypothesized to have a negative influence on identity valuation, job
status was in fact a strong positive predictor of core characteristic valuation on all three
occasions when it was significant, including among women (logistic regression) and members of
non-traditional religious traditions (linear regression) during Survey A and among all
respondents as a positive predictor of racial identity valuation during Survey A 2.0. None of
these results was replicated during the other survey administration, but coefficients for all were
in the same direction and substantively sizable. While unreliable, these results are directly
contrary to my hypothesis that higher-income respondents are on average more sophisticated and
more willing to consider core self changes than “proles” (Fussell 1983; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo,
& Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003).
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To the extent that these unreliable results merit one, an interesting potential explanation
presents itself. It is notable that both groups for whom job status was a significant positive
predictor of identity valuation during Survey A – women and followers of unconventional
religions – face considerable discrimination in the workplace (Faludi 1992; French 1992;
Browne 1999; Simein 2005; Dawkins 2006; Harris 2004; Cline 2007; Schafer & Shaw 2009).
For that matter, both whites and Blacks, have been known to argue that their race can be a major
predictor of employability in contemporary job markets (D’Souza 1991; Eastland 1994; West
2001; Sowell 2005), and results from the 2.0 survey where job status reached significance as a
predictor of racial identity valuation follow a major recession. It could be that freedom to value
all of these rich identities is contingent on the ability to eat despite possessing them. However,
given the plain fact that none of my Survey A and Survey A 2.0 results for the impact of job
status on identity valuation proved replicable across both instruments, it is also possible that they
all might mean exactly nothing.
Another two underperforming variables, age and education, had effects that were in the
expected direction but much weaker than hypothesized. Education reached significance only
once, as a negative predictor of religious identity valuation during Survey A, while age reached
significance as a positive predictor of racial valuation among Caucasians during the same
administration. Neither result was replicated during Survey A 2.0. Coefficients for these
variables were almost always in the direction expected, across both survey instruments; they
simply did not usually reach significance in multi-variate models incorporating data taken from a
respondent sample without ideal age and educational diversity. Finally, in addition to those
variables which were hypothesized to have a significant positive or negative effect on identity
valuation but did not, three variables not posited to significantly influence valuation did. LGBT
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status had a significant negative effect on the valuation of Protestant Christian religious identity
during Survey A, minority race had a positive effect on the valuation of religious identity in one
of two all-respondents models during Survey A 2.0, and both sex and minority race had a
positive effect on the valuation of non-traditionally religious identity during the 2.0 survey.
While some of these results may be logically explicable - LGBT teens do not necessarily receive
succor in contemporary Protestant congregations (Frank 2004; Kuo 2006; Dean 2008; Rosin
2008) - none were hypothesized and all arose from the data as surprises.
Many of my conclusions are relevant to the discipline of Political Science. First and most
importantly, I test the question of whether correlations between minority status and decreased
valuation of in-group identities in fact exist. It is indisputable that many respected senior scholars
have argued that identity devaluation occurs among members of racial and gender minority
groups (Vaughter 1975; French 1992; Harris 1993; Hacker 1995; McIntyre 1997; Hoff-Sommers
2000; Hunter 2002; McIntyre 2002). Hacker’s $50 million experiment (1995) and Harris’
famous argument that whiteness is valuable property (1993), two of the most famous works in
the literature, make literally no logical sense outside the context of the assumption that minority
statuses are not equivalently valuable. Scholars making these claims about devaluation propose
very specific and concrete socio-political solutions to the problem, including affirmative action
targeted at the issue of “expected privilege (Harris 1993: 1779),” affective education (Tatum
1997; Kors & Silverglate 1998; Gross 1999; McIntyre 2002), and even changes to the civil law
(Hoff-Sommers 2000: 70).
However, my results indicate that there are no statistically significant negative
correlations between either female sex or minority religion and identity devaluation, and that
there may be a positive relationship between racial minority status and identity valuation. Even
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should the dichotomy between List Experiment and ordinal survey results be taken as evidence
that the positive relationship between minority race and valuation observed during Survey A and
Survey A 2.0 is an artifact of white dishonesty, it remains notable that no more than 25% of
African Americans – historically the most abused non-Native minority group in this country
(Bell 1989; Harris 1993; Dawson 1994; Hacker 1995; West 2001; Robinson 2002; McClain et al
2006) – were willing to consider racial identity changes during any survey administration. At
very least, these results challenge the thesis that identity devaluation is occurring today among
members of most minority groups, and that political solutions (X) and (Y) are necessary to
correct this problem.
As a quick and important aside, it cannot be ignored that gay Americans were a major
exception to my often positive findings about the effect of minority status on identity
devaluation. The correlation between LGBT status and lowered valuation of sexual orientation
was negative and substantively strong across all three survey administrations and significant
during two of them. During the List Experiment, roughly 70% of LGBT respondents as versus
six percent of straights were willing to change their sexual orientation. Leaving aside bisexuals,
who appear to have a fluid conception of sexual orientation for obvious reasons, 42% of gay
respondents were willing abandon their orientation during the List Experiment and 30% were
willing to do so during Survey A 2.0. Unfortunately, it is not hard to find the probable
explanation for this. I have cited Ryan and Rivers (2003) frequently throughout this dissertation
because of their explicit description of the harassments experienced, memorably if not on a daily
basis, by large percentages of gay Americans. For example, among gay people nationwide, 44%
report experiencing orientation-related threats, 30% report being followed or chased, and fully
80% report verbal abuse and chaffing (2003: 106).
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Anti-gay bigotry goes deeper than the occasional fist fight. Although this appears to be
changing (Gamson 1996; Chasin 2000), near majorities of Americans continue to disapprove of
the very existence of gay and bisexual individuals (Herek 2003; Cline 2007; Dean 2008; Schafer
& Shaw 2009). I conclude that prevalent ant-LGBT bigotry is one cause of the identity
devaluation I observe among gay Americans. This is, again, a politically relevant point. To the
extent that a civil rights movement can be defined as an attempt by any group to access the full
sets of rights and privileges associated with citizenship, the gay rights struggle is the Civil Rights
Movement of our time. And, interestingly, my analysis of the data also turns up a major gender
gap regarding this struggle. Not only did males make up the majority of the 27 individuals (10%)
to explain their refusal to change sexual orientation in terms indicating dislike of the LGBT outgroup, female sex had a substantively huge and statistically significant negative effect on the
valuation of sexual orientation across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0. In predicted probabilities
runs based on Survey A data, the median male was 13.6% likely to change his orientation, while
the median woman was 28.5% likely to change hers. To the extent that the gay rights struggle
can be seen as the civil rights fight for our time, it seems likely that many of the “Generals”
under the rainbow banner will be female.
Another politically relevant objective of this dissertation is testing whether Linked Fate
Theory can successfully extend into a new if niche area of research. In the past, scholars in the
discipline have examined relationships between Linked Fate and phenomena including Black
American political participation (Chong & Rogers 2005; Simein 2005; Austin, Middleton, &
Yon 2012), vote choice among members of non-Black minority sub-populations (Sanchez 2006;
Junn 2008; McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas 2010), homogeneity of viewpoint among
minority group members (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001; Winter 2007), and more broadly
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nationalism (Bock 2010) and attitudes toward out-group members (McClain et al 2006).
However, despite the existence of a very large literature dealing with relationships between
minority status and both individual and collective esteem (Hughes & Demo 1989; Tatum 1997;
McIntyre 2002; Charles 2003; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse 2003), I could find no sources in
the literature testing whether a relationship exists between Linked Fate and identity valuation and
so designed one.
My findings indicate that Linked Fate can positively predict identity valuation among
several groups. I have already outlined the caveat that, although this may be partly due to the
small-N size of my sample of LGBT respondents, Linked Fate had essentially no effect on the
valuation of the two primarily bio-genetic identities I studied. However, in addition to having a
significant positive effect on valuation among members of racial minority populations during
Survey A, Linked Fate also was a significant positive predictor of religious identity valuation in
both all-respondents models during that survey administration. None of these relationships were
replicated to standard levels of significance during the 2.0 survey, despite almost universal
coefficient effects in the same direction, and questions about their strength and reliability await
future researchers. Nevertheless, I do find at least some evidence that Linked Fate can positively
predict the valuation of racial and non-racial in-group identities. This (limited) finding, in
combination with my discovery that various groups including women (2.7/4), Jews (3.8/4), and
Protestants (2.4/4) boast levels of Linked Fate higher than those found among whites and on par
with those found among racial minorities, and recent analyses of the operation of class-based
Linked Fate (see Gay, Hochschild, & White 2014), may help to nudge scholars toward the use of
Linked Fate as a tool for the study of populations other than racial minority groups.
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Such research would be centered within the field of political science, and would have
very specific applications for the discipline. Linked Fate has been repeatedly found to
significantly influence specific political behaviors. Obviously, not every study of the correlations
between Linked Fate and behaviors like voting and partisan affiliation has found these to be
consistently significant (Brown-Guinyard 2013; Gay, Hochschild, & White 2014).66 However,
for members of the racial minority populations among whom the concept has traditionally been
studied, Linked Fate has been found to be a significant predictor of political actions including
petitioning (Chong & Rogers 2005; Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012), giving money to
candidates (Austin, Middleton, & Yon 2012: 632), direct action and nationalism (Chong &
Rogers 2005; Block 2011), and voting either overall (Lien, Conway, & Wong 2004) or
preferentially for in-group members (McConnaughy et al 2008; McConnaughy, White, Leal, &
Casellas 2010). To the extent that this has not already been done, political scientists should test
whether similar behavior occurs among members of non-racial populations, such as Protestant
and Evangelical Christians, members of non-traditional religious minorities, and perhaps LGBT
Americans surveyed in numbers larger than those for my sample.
Moving on, a tertiary goal of this project was making a contribution to currently ongoing
scholarly conversations about whether conservatism is highly correlated with prejudice (Hacker
1995; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman 1997; Herek 2003; Speakman and Moskowitz
2009 but see Wood 1994; Sniderman & Carmines 1997) and whether the USA is becoming a
“post-racial” and post-tribal society (Hutchings 2009; Redlawsk 2011). I attempted to do this by
66

These results may be partly due to methodological issues. In her all-respondents model, Brown-Guinyard appears
to be testing the effect of Linked Fate on conservative partisan affiliation among a mixed population of white, Black,
Black Caribbean, and other respondents (2013: 194). This almost certainly minimized the measurable influence of
the variable on partisan selection, given the conclusion of Gay, Hochschild, & White (2014) that increasing Linked
Fate appears to correlate with Democratic preference for Blacks and Republican preference for whites. The
existence of inter-group differences of this sort was the primary reason for m decision to analyze my subpopulations of respondents separately as well as together.

247

testing whether (1) conservatism and (2) age correlate positively and significantly with increased
valuation of the four identities I study during standard surveying, increased valuation of these
identities under covert List conditions, and openly expressed bigotry. This effort failed. In an
unexpectedly positive result, the number of respondents who openly described bigotry against
out-group members as their reason for not making identity changes during each chapter was so
small that no single variable significantly predicted this behavior. Ideological conservatism and
to a lesser extent partisan conservatism and age generally did correlate with increased identity
valuation both during Survey A/A 2.0 and under List conditions. However, in the absence of any
direct evidence of bigotry, this finding could simply indicate lower risk aversion among old
conservatives (Fussell 1983; Herek 2003; Pike 2004; Sowell 2005).
However, my research detour into testing tertiary questions did produce one unexpected
and fascinating finding. Unless my math is in error to an improbable degree, conservatives are
extremely likely to be repressed homosexuals. During my Orientation chapter, the correlation
between conservatism and the valuation of heterosexual orientation was positive and in fact
significant during both Survey A and the 2.0 survey. However, this changed during the List
Experiment. List data indicate that virtually no heterosexual liberals (Survey C 1.64 – Survey B
1.64) or moderates (1.24 – 1.24) would change their sexual orientation if offered the chance
under absolutely covert conditions, but that nearly 25% of conservatives (1.12 - .90) would do
so.67 This finding is unlikely to be the result of statistical aberration; the gap between
conservative and liberal rates of change willingness under List conditions was statistically
significant at the (.001) level, and the result was derived from a sample including at least
67

I confine my analysis to heterosexual conservative respondents here because there were exactly two gay
conservative respondents to both Survey B and Survey C, and the mean number of items selected increased by this
population increased by three between Survey B and Survey C. I decided to drop these respondents from my
analysis of the impact of conservatism on valuation during the List Experiment, rather than including obvious outlier
cases.
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medium-N populations of liberal (119), moderate (98), and conservative (33) respondents. This
result also stands in stark contrast to the consistent effects of conservatism on race and sex
identity valuation across ordinal and List survey instruments.
I did not, to say the least, hypothesize this. But, again assuming that I have actually made
replicable discoveries, this one makes a sort of practical sense. It seems safe to assume that
conservatives are no less likely to be gay, in the sense of genetic preference, than anyone else.
Given this, the constant devaluation of homosexuality and of the LGBT community occurring on
the contemporary Right (Brock 2002; Finlay & Walther 2003; Kuo 2006; D’Souza 2007; Rosin
2008; Robison & Richards 2012) logically might cause LGBT conservatives to assume – and
covertly want to leave (Brock 2002; Dean 2008) – a heterosexual public identity. Of course,
more research into what is currently a one-off result remains to be done. However, the lowered
valuation of heterosexual identity observed among presumably straight conservatives under List
conditions is reminiscent of the lowered racial identity valuation I measured among immigrantorigin minorities, and like it may well be explained by a substantial literature (Hacker 1995;
Tatum 1997; Chen 1999; McWhorter 2000; McClain et al 2006).
As well as those results which I expected to test for, and discuss from pp.42-53 of the
Introduction and Literature Review chapters, my dissertation research also produced two
additional non-hypothesized findings with potential political consequences. First, results from
my three primary surveys indicate, although they do not prove, that there is a significant
disconnect between the public and covert positions taken by whites on issues of race. I have
tried, no doubt with imperfect success, to avoid lengthy in-chapter comparisons of my differently
worded Survey A and List Experiment. However, it cannot be ignored that majority Caucasian
status correlated negatively and significantly with racial identity valuation across both Survey A
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and Survey A 2.0, and correlated positively and significantly with valuation during the covert
List Experiment. During Survey A, Caucasian respondents were nearly 40% (39.1%) likely to
change race, while only 14% of whites as versus 26% of Blacks and 54.5% of Asians were
willing to do so under List conditions. Although more research again remains to be done here,
one possible explanation for this dichotomy is duplicity on the part of white respondents
answering non-covert survey questions.
In my opinion as a junior but competent scholar, the existence of potentially high levels
of hidden identity valuation among American Caucasians, and the dishonesty resulting from their
ongoing repression, is a major problem facing the country. Obviously, members of all social
populations can and do avoid answering questions about touchy subjects like race to avoid
admitting unpopular attitudes to others or to themselves (Kuklinksi & Cobb 1997; Krysan &
Mick 2003; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009). However, many contemporary conservative
academics – writing from the mid-1990s to today – have specifically noted the existence of a
prevalent cynical version of this pattern among Caucasians, where lip service is paid to social
policies that are actually held in contempt, out of a belief that honest talk would invite censure
(D’Souza 1991; Taylor 1992; Steele 1993; Eastland 1994; D’Souza 1995; Kors & Silverglate
1998; Hoff-Sommers 2000; McWhorter 2000; McIntyre 2002; Thernstrom & Thernstrom 2003;
O’Bierne 2006; Williams 2006; Speakman & Moskowitz 2009).
This extensive literature, in combination with the recent discovery that a majority of
whites feel they experience more discrimination than Blacks but are reluctant to talk about this
(Sommers & Norton 2010), and even my own finding of a 25% gap between overt/covert rates of
white willingness to change identity, paints a troubling picture. To give just one practical
consequence, redistributive programs such as affirmative action almost certainly rest upon a
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much weaker social footing than many whites and most minorities think they do (Kuklinski &
Cobb 1997; Kuklinski et al 1997; Sniderman & Carmines 1997). While my findings alone are
hardly conclusive, results drawn from my three large-N and very contemporary (2009, 2013)
subject pools - as well from as the 17 studies just cited - reinforce for me the importance of an
honest American dialogue on race, led by the discipline and tackling tough topics like white
privilege and minority crime.
A final politically relevant meme revealed by my research results is the rise of atheism as
a social and political force. Throughout this project, I have been surprised both by the number of
respondents who identified themselves as atheists, agnostics, or followers of non-traditional
religions like Wicca and by the intensity of these respondents’ attachments to their beliefs.
During Survey A, 88 respondents (17.6%) identified themselves as atheists or agnostics, and 59
respondents (11.8%) identified themselves as having a faith “other” than the four primary faith
traditions listed as alternatives (Protestant Christianity, Catholic Christianity, Judaism, Islam).
During the 2.0 survey, 51 respondents (12.8%) identified themselves as atheists, while fully 85
(21.3%) identified themselves as followers of a non-traditional faith. The percentages of
respondents who identified as atheists/agnostics and non-traditional believers were very similar
during the two stages of the List Experiment. During all three survey administrations, more
respondents fell into these two categories combined than identified as Roman Catholics. Atheists
and followers of non-traditional faiths also displayed one of the highest mean levels of religious
identity valuation to be measured among any sub-population of religious respondents. During the
List Experiment, only 5.9% of respondents in these two groups (combined for purposes of
analysis) were willing to change religious identity under List conditions – as versus 7% of
Protestants and 20.7% of Catholics.
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These findings reflect an ongoing social trend. Over the past five years, many authors
have commented on the growing visibility and activism of the non-religious share of the U.S.
population (Harris 2004; Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007; Baigent 2009; Zuckeran 2011; Guenther
& Mulligan 2013). Although this movement has certainly received coverage in the popular and
scholarly press, it has not so far generated the same sort of in-depth analyses that have
accompanied the mainstreaming of Evangelical Christianity within the Republican Party (Frank
2004; Kuo 2006; Rosin 2008; Moser 2009). However, it may have a similar impact. Without
stretching specifically what I find, it is very notable that roughly 30% of the individuals surveyed
during a Large-N sampling of Midwestern college students identified as atheists, agnostics, or
followers of a religion other than Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Further, these non-traditionally
religious respondents displayed levels of religious identity valuation on par with Protestant
Christians and far above those of Catholic Christians. This, in combination with the politically
focused findings of scholars like Guenther & Mulligan (2013) at least indicates that we may soon
see the rise of a vibrant rationalist agenda to challenge the Evangelical voice in the public square.
In addition to listing the contributions and potential contributions that my dissertation
research makes to political science, it is also important to acknowledge the limitations of this
research project. I have done so piecemeal throughout the dissertation, but would like to
summarize these limits in a single section of the Conclusion. First, and perhaps most
importantly, I am testing only “first-stage questions.” This is to say: I am testing the impact of
minority status and of Linked Fate on identity valuation, among a broader range of groups than
scholars of Linked Fate and in-group identification generally seem to study (Dawson 1994;
Dawson 2001; Simein 2005; Sanchez 2006; Winter 2007; Junn 2008). However, I am not then
testing the impact of identity valuation, increasing Linked Fate, or any other variable on the
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actual political behavior of respondents – as many other authors have in the literatures dealing
with voting patterns and with direct action (Chong & Rogers 2005; McConnaughy, White, Leal,
& Casellas 2010; Austin, Middleton & Yon 2012). Very specifically, any arguments I make
about the potential political impact of phenomena like the non-devaluation of minority identities
or the growth of the atheist/agnostic population are purely speculative in nature, and this is a
major brake on the reach of my research.
A second limit of this project is my reliance on a university student sample, which could
potentially produce results which are not generalizable to other sectors of the American
population or to that population at large. As I note in the Methods section, my samples were in
fact fairly representative of the national population along several dimensions. Using race as a
bellwether for overall diversity, my survey populations all closely matched a Southern Illinois
University student body which is roughly 70% white, 14.8% Black, 13.7% Latino or other, and
2% Asian (Southern Illinois University Facts 2007). In comparison, the population of the United
States is currently 68% Caucasian, 15% Hispanic, 12% Black, 5% Asian, and roughly 1% Native
(www.census.gov).
However, there is no escaping the fact that – despite SIU-C’s role as a regional Mecca for
non-traditional students – the average age of Southern Illinois graduate students is 32 and that of
undergraduates under 25 (University Facts 2007). The average age of my heavily undergraduate
survey samples was 23-24, in contrast to a U.S. national median age of 34 (ww.census.gov). A
student sample can also logically be logically expected to deviate from the national norm in
terms of SES and mean level of education, and mine does. While I believe with reason that my
findings about the prevalence of – for example – atheism, non-traditional religious belief,
bisexuality, and female sexual and gender flexibility reflect genuine national trends (Harris 2004;
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Dean 2008; Sessions-Stepp 2008; Zuckerman 2011; Guenther & Mulligan 2013), it is eminently
possible that all of these behaviors are more common among an atypical sample of educated
young people than they would be among most other possible survey populations (see Herek
2003; Pike 2004; Sowell 2005). These questions await future researchers.
A problem similar to that caused by my reliance on an atypical student sample, which
limits the generalizability of my results, is the potential effect on reliability and validity caused
by the extremely small size of some of my sub-populations of respondents. The total size of my
LGBT respondent population, for example, was 25 individuals during both Survey A and the 2.0
survey and 16 individuals during Survey C. Although this seems unlikely in light of the
extensive literature detailing the abuses experienced by gay Americans (Meyer 1995; Herek
2003; Ryan & Rivers 2003; Kuo 2006; Dean 2008), the finding that non-bisexual LGBT status is
significantly correlated with the devaluation of sexual orientation could technically have been
driven by extremely low levels of identity valuation among a few unique individuals rather than
being reflective of a broader social trend.
Similarly, unexpectedly small samples of members of several religious minority groups
including Jews (9 respondents during Survey A) and American Muslims (5) made it impossible
to accurately measure the statistical significances of differences in mean levels of identity
valuation between these groups and majority Protestant Christians. Tiny sample sizes also
undoubtedly prevented other relationships from reaching statistical significance. Respondents
within both the LGBT sub-population and several small-N religious populations like the Jewish
sub-sample (3.8/4), displayed high levels of Linked Fate, and Linked Fate might well have been
a significant predictor of identity valuation among these groups had my sample sizes been larger.
Re-testing of my thesis questions with larger-N populations of respondents is necessary to
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determine the actual nature and reliability of the relationships between multiple minority statuses
which I study on the one hand and identity valuation on the other.
A final methodological caveat concerns my process of survey administration. Due to
scheduling conflicts, my Survey A and List Experiment surveys B and C were not always
administered together. As I note in the Methods chapter, the ideal technique for obtaining data
from exactly comparable populations would be administering Survey A to 50% of the
respondents surveyed in one venue and Surveys B and C in alternation to the other 50% of
respondents. In fact, Surveys A, B, and C were administered together in roughly 70% of venues.
During the first round of surveying, I received a total of 145 replies from classrooms where I
administered only Survey A, 152 replies from locales where I administered only Surveys B and
C, and 706 replies from classrooms where 50% of respondents received Survey A and 50% of
respondents received Surveys B and C in alternation. The lack of total population congruence
with Survey A – and of course Survey A 2.0 - is hardly a fatal flaw for a List project targeted at
distinct questions. However, the fact that each survey had a slightly different respondent pool is
not ideal for the purpose of comparing findings, especially given the already imperfect extent to
which this can be done across similar but non-identical instruments.
After noting both the contributions and limits of my research project, I can summarize
my research results as: some but not all of my hypotheses received support during Survey A,
Survey A 2.0, and the List Experiment. Most importantly, the primary hypothesis that minority
in-group status does not correlate with identity devaluation received support in 9/12 cases.
Female sex was not a significant negative predictor of identity valuation during any model, and
in fact almost exactly 10% of both women and men were willing to change sex across the three
instruments. Similarly, despite a weak negative correlation driven by Catholics, religious

255

minority status was not a significant predictor of decreased identity valuation in any regression
or List model. Results for race were mixed: the minority race variable was a positive predictor of
racial identity valuation during two of my three models and a significant negative predictor of
valuation during the covert third of the trio. This was an interesting result that has been discussed
extensively above. Finally, my primary hypothesis largely failed in the context of orientation.
The correlation between LGBT status and identity valuation was negative during all three survey
administrations, and reached significance during the latter two. This unexpected result seems to
have been driven both by understandably low levels of orientational identity valuation among
bisexuals and by the ongoing actual oppression of LGBT Americans (Jenness 1995; Meyer 1995;
Chasin 2000; Herek 2003; Ryan & Reynolds 2003; Dean 2008).
Several other starting hypotheses received at least limited support across my surveys.
Although the effect of Linked Fate on identity valuation was substantially less consistent and
reliable than hypothesized, the key Linked Fate variable did reach significance as a predictor of
the valuation not only of minority racial identity but also of religious identity among all
respondents during Survey A. Increasing in-group identification was, as hypothesized, a positive
predictor of racial and religious identity valuation among all respondents during Survey A and a
positive predictor of sex and orientational identity valuation among all respondents during the
2.0 survey. Neither set of results was aberrational. The GroupID variable had coefficients in the
expected positive direction in more than 90% of models, and would have reached significance in
a majority of them had my significance level been set at (.10) or the models run as one-tailed
tests. Perhaps most notably, the conservative ideology variable was a significant positive
predictor of religious identity valuation among all respondents across both Survey A and Survey
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A 2.0, as well as a positive predictor of racial and gender valuation among all respondents during
the 2.0 survey.
Other effects were not as expected. Female sex (as a negative predictor of the valuation
of sexual orientation) and LGBT sexual orientation (as a negative predictor of the valuation of
biological sex) had effects across both Survey A and Survey A 2.0 that were sizable and highly
reliable but not hypothesized. Similarly, job status – a positive predictor of identity valuation
among women and religious minority respondents during Survey A and of racial identity
valuation among all respondents during the 2.0 survey – and minority race had effects on
valuation in several models that simply were not hypothesized. For their part, the self-esteem,
partisan affiliation, education, and age variables almost always influenced valuation in the
direction expected but did so weakly and rarely reached significance. Overall, continuity of
performance across survey instruments for variables that did reach statistical significance at least
once was fairly high but very far from total. During Survey A 2.0, 85.37% (35/41) of those
unique variables that reached statistical significance during Survey A, or failed to do so where
that result constituted a successful hypothesis test (i.e. the effect of female sex on sex identity
valuation), had effects in the same direction during the retest But, on the other hand, only 11 of
41 (26.83%) replicated the same result to standard levels of significance. Similarly, List
Experiment results support Hypothesis (1) in 8 of 12 cases, but Hypothesis (2) in only two of
four cases. My most important finding, however, remains the conclusion that three of four
primary hypotheses were supported by the data – if with some fascinating caveats - in a majority
of cases.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
The Survey A/Survey A 2.0 Instrument

Cover Letter and Explanation: Please Read
Students:
I am a PhD student at SIU-C, and I am doing research in which I would like you to participate.
Specifically, I am testing how different individuals feel about some aspects of their personal
backgrounds. If you choose to participate in this study, please fill out the attached questionnaire.
Doing so should take about eight to ten minutes.
I have chosen university students as the subjects for this survey, because I believe college men
and women are generally used to discussing issues like this – and are comfortable enough with
personal opinions not to have a negative experience filling out this survey. In addition to your
class, this survey will be administered in a number of other classroom and professional settings.
This is a voluntary study. If you do not feel like participating, simply do not answer the survey
questions and hand in the survey un-done. No extra credit is being assigned for participation in
this project and no points will be lost by students who do not participate. For those who do
participate, no records of the names or answers of participants will be kept. Please do not write
your name or personal identification on the survey blank. If you are under 18, please – as was
requested at the beginning of class – do not complete this survey.
If you have questions about this project, I can be contacted as: Wilfred T. Reilly, 209 North
Springer Street (# 2), Carbondale IL 62901. My business phone is (618) 303-6525, and my email is wreilly2003@yahoo.com. The faculty mentor supervising this project is Dr. Stephen
Shulman of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Shulman’s business address is: Faner Hall,
Room 3063, Carbondale IL 62901. His business phone is (618) 453-3194 and his e-mail is
shulman@siu.edu.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this project may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale IL 62901-4709. The e-mail here is siuhsc@siu.edu.
Thank you.
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1. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my race (i.e. Black, white, Asian, Middle
Eastern, Hispanic/Latino, or Native American).”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
2. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my race.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
3. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your religion (i.e. Protestant Christian, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, atheist/agnostic) will
affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
4. If it were fully possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently
change your biological sex (i.e. male, female)? If you change, you will still have your own
personality and memories. However, you will be a man if you are now a woman, and a
woman if you are now a man.
a.) __________ I would change this for free
b.) __________ I would change this for $25 million or less
c.) __________ I would change this for between $25 and $50 million
d.) __________ I would change this for between $50 and $75 million
e.) __________ I would change this for between $75 and $100 million
f.) __________ I would change this only for more than $100 million
g.) __________ I would never change this
h.) __________ I don’t really know if I would change this
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5. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
6. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my biological sex.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
7. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your race will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
8. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change
your sexual orientation (i.e. gay, straight, bisexual)? If you change, you will still have your
personality and memories. However, you will be gay if you are now straight and straight if
you are now gay or bisexual.
a.) __________ I would change this for free
b.) __________ I would change this for $25 million or less
c.) __________ I would change this for between $25 and $50 million
d.) __________ I would change this for between $50 and $75 million
e.) __________ I would change this for between $75 and $100 million
f.) __________ I would change this only for more than $100 million
g.) __________ I would never change this
h.) __________ I don’t really know if I would change this
9. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my biological sex.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know

273

10. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your sexual orientation will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
11. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
12. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change
your race? If you change, you will still have your personality and memories. However, you
will be White if you are a member of any non-white minority group, and Black if you are
White.
a.) __________ I would change this for free
b.) __________ I would change this for $25 million or less
c.) __________ I would change this for between $25 and $50 million
d.) __________ I would change this for between $50 and $75 million
e.) __________ I would change this for between $75 and $100 million
f.) __________ I would change this only for more than $100 million
g.) __________ I would never change this
h.) __________ I don’t really know if I would change this
13. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
14. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
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15. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have high
Self-esteem.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I am neutral about this
d.) __________ I somewhat disagree
e.) __________ I strongly disagree
f.) __________ I don’t really know
16. How much do you think what happens generally in this country to people that share your
biological sex will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
17. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change
your religion? If you change, you will still be yourself. However, you will be a Protestant
Christian if you are Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, or atheist/agnostic. You will be a Jewish
American if you are a Protestant Christian.
a.) __________ I would change this for free
b.) __________ I would change this for less than $25 million
c.) __________ I would change this for between $25 and $50 million
d.) __________ I would change this for between $50 and $75 million
e.) __________ I would change this for between $75 and $100 million
f.) __________ I would change this only for more than $100 million
g.) __________ I would never change this
h.) __________ I don’t really know if I would change this
18. What is your biological sex?
a.) __________ Female
b.) __________ Male
19. What is your primary sexual orientation?
a.) __________ Heterosexual
b.) __________ Bisexual
c.) __________ Lesbian or gay
20. If you identified as lesbian or gay, how open are you about your sexuality?
a.) __________ Not open: virtually no one knows that I am gay
b.) __________ Not very open: some friends and intimates know
c.) __________ Somewhat open: many people know; many don’t
d.) __________ Pretty open: most people know
e.) __________ Totally open: almost everyone knows
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21. What is the highest level of education you have completed so far?
a.) __________ Less than high school
b.) __________ High school
c.) __________ Community or two-year college
d.) __________ Four year college: any undergraduate degree
e.) __________ Any graduate degree
22. How would you describe your ideological position, on political and social issues?
a.) __________ Liberal
b.) __________ Moderate
c.) __________ Conservative
23. What political party do you most identify with?
a.) __________ Democratic
b.) __________ Republican
c.) __________ Green
d.) __________ Other third party
e.) __________ No party
24. What is the racial category that best describes you?
a.) __________ Black/African descent
b.) __________ Caucasian
c.) __________ Hispanic or Latino
d.) __________ Asian or Pacific Islander
e.) __________ Middle Eastern descent
f.) __________ Native American or Native Alaskan
25. What is your current age?
a.) __________ 20 or under
b.) __________ 21-30
c.) __________ 31-40
d.) __________ 41-50
e.) __________ 51-60
f.) __________ Older than 60
26. What is your religious faith?
a.) __________ Atheist or agnostic
b.) __________ Protestant Christian
c.) __________ Catholic Christian
d.) __________ Jewish
e.) __________ Muslim
f.) __________ Other faith
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27. How would you describe your current work status?
a.) __________ I do not work currently
b.) __________ I work occasionally
c.) __________ I have a part-time job
d.) __________ I have a full-time job
28. In response to the questions on this survey about changing things – your race, sex, sexual
preference, and religion – why did you answer as you did? What made you say that you
would or would not change, and/or give the dollar amount you did?
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APPENDIX B
The Survey B Instrument
Cover Letter and Explanation: Please Read
Students:
I am a PhD student at SIU-C, and I am doing research in which I would like you to participate.
Specifically, I am testing how different individuals feel about some aspects of their personal
backgrounds. If you choose to participate in this study, please fill out the attached questionnaire.
Doing so should take about eight to ten minutes.
I have chosen university students as the subjects for this survey, because I believe because
college men and women are generally used to discussing issues like this – and are comfortable
enough with personal opinions not to have a negative experience filling out this survey. In
addition to your class, this survey will be administered in a number of other classroom and
professional settings.
This is a voluntary study. If you do not feel like participating, simply do not answer the survey
questions and hand in the survey un-done. No extra credit is being assigned for participation in
this project and no points will be lost by students who do not participate. For those who do
participate, no records of the names or answers of participants will be kept. Please do not write
your name or personal identification on the survey blank. If you are under 18, please – as was
requested at the beginning of class – do not complete this survey.
If you have questions about this project, I can be contacted as: Wilfred T. Reilly, 209 North
Springer Street (# 2), Carbondale IL 62901. My business phone is (618) 303-6525, and my email is wreilly2003@yahoo.com. The faculty mentor supervising this project is Dr. Stephen
Shulman of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Shulman’s business address is: Faner Hall,
Room 3063, Carbondale IL 62901. His business phone is (618) 453-3194 and his e-mail is
shulman@siu.edu.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this project may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale IL 62901-4709. The e-mail here is siuhsc@siu.edu.
Thank you.
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1. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my race (i.e. Black, white, Asian, Middle
Eastern, Hispanic/Latino, or Native American).”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
2. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently change your eye color
b.) Kill a good friend
c.) Join the Catholic priesthood
d.) Permanently move to Mexico
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________ .
3. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my race.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
4. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your religion (i.e. Protestant Christian, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, or atheist/agnostic) will
affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
5. Here is a list of items. In response to the question that will be asked after the list, please tell
me how many of them (one of them, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would not do for any amount of
money.
a.) Lose an eye
b.) Permanently give up watching television
c.) Go sky-diving
d.) Marry a complete stranger
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________ .
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6. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
7. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently become one foot taller
b.) Sell marijuana to a minor
c.) Undergo medical infection with the AIDS virus
d.) Travel to Cuba for six months
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
8. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Change your political party affiliation
b.) Permanently move to the Arctic Circle
c.) Kill a casual acquaintance
d.) Suffer a broken leg
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
9. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment towards the group of people that share my biological sex (i.e. male, female).”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
10. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Vote for a candidate representing an rival political party
b.) Marry a casual acquaintance
c.) Permanently give up eating meat
d.) Send financial support to Islamic terrorists
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
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11. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your race will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
12. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Lower your level of physical attractiveness by 50%
b.) Have a voodoo death curse placed on you
c.) Permanently become one foot shorter
d.) Spit on a U.S. military veteran
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
13. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my biological sex.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
14. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Fight in Iraq with the U.S. military
b.) Kill a complete stranger
c.) Move to France
d.) Permanently gain 100 pounds
● Please fill in the total number you would do _________.
15. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your sexual orientation (i.e. gay, straight, bisexual) will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
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16. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
17. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently give up drinking liquor
b.) Burn an American flag
c.) Join the military forces of North Korea
d.) Permanently have platinum blond hair
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
18. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Marry a casual friend
b.) Permanently become sexually celibate
c.) Fight in Afghanistan with the U.S. military
d.) Suffer a broken arm
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
19. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
20. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment towards the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
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21. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have high
Self-esteem.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I am neutral about this
d.) __________ I somewhat disagree
e.) __________ I strongly disagree
f.) __________ I don’t really know
22. How much do you think what happens generally in this country to people that share your
biological sex will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
23. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, or 4) you would do
for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Blow up the American White House
b.) Sell cocaine to a peer
c.) Campaign for a candidate from an opposing political party
d.) Spend six months in isolation from all others
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
24. What is your biological sex?
a.) __________ Female
b.) __________ Male
25. What is your primary sexual orientation?
a.) __________ Heterosexual
b.) __________ Bisexual
c.) __________ Lesbian or gay
26. If you identified as lesbian or gay, how open are you about your sexuality?
a.) __________ Not open: virtually no one knows that I am gay
b.) __________ Not very open: some friends and intimates know
c.) __________ Somewhat open: many people know; many don’t
d.) __________ Pretty open: most people know
e.) __________ Totally open: almost everyone knows
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27. What is the highest level of education you have completed so far?
a.) __________ Less than high school
b.) __________ High school
c.) __________ Community or two-year college
d.) __________ Four year college: any undergraduate degree
e.) __________ Four year college: any graduate degree
28. How would you describe your ideological position, on political and social issues?
a.) __________ Liberal
b.) __________ Moderate
c.) __________ Conservative
29. What political party do you most identify with?
a.) __________ Democratic
b.) __________ Republican
c.) __________ Green
d.) __________ Other third party
e.) __________ No party
30. What is the racial category that best describes you?
a.) __________ Black/African descent
b.) __________ Caucasian
c.) __________ Hispanic or Latino
d.) __________ Asian or Pacific Islander
e.) __________ Middle Eastern descent
f.) __________ Native American or Native Alaskan
31. What is your current age?
a.) __________ 20 or under
b.) __________ 21-30
c.) __________ 31-40
d.) __________ 41-50
e.) __________ 51-60
f.) __________ Older than 60
32. What is your religious faith?
a.) __________ Atheist or agnostic
b.) __________ Protestant Christian
c.) __________ Catholic Christian
d.) __________ Jewish
e.) __________ Muslim
f.) __________ Other faith
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33. How would you describe your current work status?
a.) __________ I do not work currently
b.) __________ I work occasionally
c.) __________ I have a part-time job
d.) __________ I have a full-time job
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APPENDIX C
The Survey C Instrument

Cover Letter and Explanation: Please Read
Students:
I am a PhD student at SIU-C, and I am doing research in which I would like you to participate.
Specifically, I am testing how different individuals feel about some aspects of their personal
backgrounds. If you choose to participate in this study, please fill out the attached questionnaire.
Doing so should take about eight to ten minutes.
I have chosen university students as the subjects for this survey, because I believe because
college men and women are generally used to discussing issues like this – and are comfortable
enough with personal opinions not to have a negative experience filling out this survey. In
addition to your class, this survey will be administered in a number of other classroom and
professional settings.
This is a voluntary study. If you do not feel like participating, simply do not answer the survey
questions and hand in the survey un-done. No extra credit is being assigned for participation in
this project and no points will be lost by students who do not participate. For those who do
participate, no records of the names or answers of participants will be kept. Please do not write
your name or personal identification on the survey blank. If you are under 18, please – as was
requested at the beginning of class – do not complete this survey.
If you have questions about this project, I can be contacted as: Wilfred T. Reilly, 209 North
Springer Street (# 2), Carbondale IL 62901. My business phone is (618) 303-6525, and my email is wreilly2003@yahoo.com. The faculty mentor supervising this project is Dr. Stephen
Shulman of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Shulman’s business address is: Faner Hall,
Room 3063, Carbondale IL 62901. His business phone is (618) 453-3194 and his e-mail is
shulman@siu.edu.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this project may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale IL 62901-4709. The e-mail here is siuhsc@siu.edu.
Thank you.
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1. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my race (i.e. Black, white, Asian, Middle
Eastern, Hispanic/Latino, or Native American).”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
2. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently change your eye color
b.) Kill a good friend
c.) Permanently change your biological sex (i.e. male, female)
d.) Join the Catholic Priesthood
e.) Permanently move to Mexico
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
3. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my race.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
4. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your religion (i.e. Protestant Christian, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, or atheist/agnostic) will
affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t know how much it will affect me
5. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Lose an eye
b.) Permanently give up watching television
c.) Go sky-diving
d.) Marry a complete stranger
e.) Suffer a paralyzing back injury
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
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6. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
7. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently become one foot taller
b.) Sell marijuana to a minor
c.) Undergo medical infection with the AIDS virus
d.) Travel to Cuba for six months
e.) Permanently change your biological race
● Please fill in the total number you would do _________.
8. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Change your political party affiliation
b.) Permanently move to the Arctic Circle
c.) Permanently lower your IQ by 10 points
d.) Kill a casual acquaintance
e.) Suffer a broken leg
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
9. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment towards the group of people who share my biological sex.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
10. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Vote for a candidate representing a rival political party
b.) Marry a casual acquaintance
c.) Permanently give up eating meat
d.) Permanently change your sexual orientation
e.) Send financial aid to Islamic terrorists
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
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11. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your race will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
12. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Lower your level of physical attractiveness by 50%
b.) Have a voodoo death curse placed on you
c.) Permanently become one foot shorter
d.) Give up ½ of your friends
e.) Spit on a U.S. military veteran
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
13. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my biological sex.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
14. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Fight in Iraq with the U.S. military
b.) Kill a complete stranger
c.) Move to France
d.) Permanently give up U.S. citizenship
e.) Permanently gain 100 pounds
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
15. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share
your sexual orientation (i.e. gay, straight, bisexual) will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
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16. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment toward the group of people that share my religion.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
17. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Permanently give up drinking liquor
b.) Burn an American flag
c.) Join the military forces of North Korea
d.) Permanently have platinum blond hair
e.) Abandon all contact with your family
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
18. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Marry a casual friend
b.) Permanently abandon cheering on your favorite sports team
c.) Permanently become sexually celibate
d.) Fight in Afghanistan with the U.S. military
e.) Suffer a broken arm
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
19. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense
of belonging to the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
20. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong
attachment towards the group of people that share my sexual orientation.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I somewhat disagree
d.) __________ I strongly disagree
e.) __________ I don’t really know
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21. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have high
Self-esteem.”
a.) __________ I strongly agree
b.) __________ I somewhat agree
c.) __________ I am neutral about this
d.) __________ I somewhat disagree
e.) __________ I strongly disagree
f.) __________ I don’t really know
22. How much do you think what happens generally in this country to people that share your
biological sex will affect your life?
a.) __________ It won’t affect me at all
b.) __________ It will affect me slightly
c.) __________ It will affect me a fair amount
d.) __________ It will affect me a great deal
e.) __________ I don’t really know how much it will affect me
23. Here is a list of items. Please tell me how many of these things (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) you would
do for a sufficient amount of money.
a.) Blow up the American White House
b.) Permanently change your religious faith and traditions
c.) Sell cocaine to a peer
d.) Campaign for a candidate from an opposing political party
e.) Spend six months in isolation from all others
● Please fill in the total number you would do __________.
24. What is your biological sex?
a.) __________ Female
b.) __________ Male
25. What is your primary sexual orientation?
a.) __________ Heterosexual
b.) __________ Bisexual
c.) __________ Lesbian or gay
26. If you identified as lesbian or gay, how open are you about your sexuality?
a.) __________ Not open: virtually no one knows that I am gay
b.) __________ Not very open: some friends and intimates know
c.) __________ Somewhat open: many people know; many don’t
d.) __________ Pretty open: most people know
e.) __________ Totally open: almost everyone know
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27. What is the highest level of education you have completed so far?
a.) __________ Less than high school
b.) __________ High school
c.) __________ Community or two-year college
d.) __________ Four year college: any undergraduate degree
e.) __________ Four year college: any graduate degree
28. How would you describe your ideological position, on political and social issues?
a.) __________ Liberal
b.) __________ Moderate
c.) __________ Conservative
29. What political party do you most identify with?
a.) __________ Democratic
b.) __________ Republican
c.) __________ Green
d.) __________ Other third party
e.) __________ No party
30. What is the racial category that best describes you?
a.) __________ Black/African descent
b.) __________ Caucasian
c.) __________ Hispanic or Latino
d.) __________ Asian or Pacific Islander
e.) __________ Middle Eastern descent
f.) __________ Native American or Native Alaskan
31. What is your current age?
a.) __________ 20 or under
b.) __________ 21-30
c.) __________ 31-40
d.) __________ 41-50
e.) __________ 51-60
f.) __________ Older than 60
32. What is your religious faith?
a.) __________ Atheist or agnostic
b.) __________ Protestant Christian
c.) __________ Catholic Christian
d.) __________ Jewish
e.) __________ Muslim
f.) __________ Other faith
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33. How would you describe your current work status?
a.) __________ I do not work currently
b.) __________ I work occasionally
c.) __________ I have a part-time job
d.) __________ I have a full-time job
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